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Introduction

In 1966, during the Vietnam War and long before the Watergate
affair, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., remarked that "while nearly every increase in presidential power has produced a reaction in favor of the
limitation of that power ... the reaction has never quite cut the power
back to its earlier levels."' This prophetic remark foreshadowed the
development of presidential power under Jimmy Carter. President
Carter took office after the courts and Congress had rejected several of
President Nixon's extensive claims of executive authority. After President Ford's brief interregnum, President Carter's election seemed to
portend an era of cooperation between the executive and legislative
branches and to presage a degree of presidential modesty and reticence. 2 In some instances this promise was fulfilled; the rhetoric of
presidential power was muted under President Carter, and the Administration accommodated the institutional requirements of Congress in
several instances. In other cases, however, President Carter advanced
claims of executive power that were hardly more modest than notable
claims advanced by the Nixon administration. These assertions were
perhaps less striking because they lacked the flamboyant and obsessive
quality of President Nixon's executive claims and did not push executive power to the point of illegality. Yet they are particularly interesting for what they suggest about the structural and institutional limits of
voluntary executive restraint.
This Article outlines and discusses some of the positions taken by
the Carter administration on questions of presidential power. This rel1. A. SCHLESINGER & A. DEGRAZIA, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY: THEIR ROLE IN
MODERN TIMES 15 (1967).
2. For example, the new Administration pledged close cooperation with Congress in foreign
affairs. See Atwood, Downtown Perspective:Lessons on Liaison with Congress, in THE TETHERED
PRESIDENCY 220-21 (1981); see also J. CARTER, KEEPING FAITH 18 (1982) (desire to reduce the

imperial status of the presidency); id at 27 (desire for open government); id at 66 (desire to
cooperate with Congress).
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atively brief period produced a rich variety of separation of powers
disputes, and a review of some of these issues may assist in an understanding of continuing problems. In several cases the discussion extends into the Reagan administration, especially when later
developments illuminate the implications or fate of policies initiated by
President Carter. The analysis generally observes the framework of an
earlier article on the separation of powers under the Nixon administration 3 and embodies the general conceptual view advanced in that
article.
According to this view, two types of separation of powers questions must be distinguished. 4 The first type of question focuses on
whether the President or Congress is authorized to make decisions of
general policy in a particular area. This question is raised whenever
the President or Congress seeks to make a policy decision that the other
branch claims to be within its purview, and it requires judgments about
the comparative institutional competence of the branches. Functionally, these questions raise such doctrinal issues as the respective abilities of Congress and the President to reflect the popular will, and the
extent to which other values such as executive "secrecy" and "dispatch" should affect the allocation of authority.
The second type of separation of powers question arises when the
Executive acts without explicit congressional authorization in a manner
that threatens the constitutional rights of individuals. When the Executive threatens constitutional rights without explicit statutory authority,
there is an increased risk of discriminatory executive action and a serious danger that the Executive may unduly favor the government interest and undervalue the countervailing constitutional interests. In these
cases, legislative action can protect individual rights in addition to effecting the majority will. When the Executive threatens constitutional
rights, therefore, this Article advocates a strict requirement of prior legislative authorization.
In accordance with this distinction, the separation of powers
problems of the Carter administration are discussed in the following
order. Part II discusses assertions of general policymaking authority by
the Carter administration in both domestic and foreign affairs. President Carter's position in these cases is analyzed, and a general principle
that may be helpful in resolving these issues is examined. Part III dis3. Quint, The Separationof Powers Under Nixon: Reflections on ConstitutionalLiberties and
the Rule of Law, 1981 DUKE L.J. 1.
4. For a detailed discussion of these two central issues in the context of the Nixon administration, see id at 35-70.
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cusses cases in which the Carter administration threatened individual
constitutional rights without clear congressional authorization. In
some ways these were among the Carter administration's most farreaching assertions, but the courts upheld the Administration's actions
almost without exception. This Part urges that courts should impose a
requirement of strict statutory authorization. Part IV discusses special
executive privileges and immunities asserted by the Carter administration, including the presidential privilege of confidentiality and the Executive's immunity from tort liability. Several of these assertions arose
from events of the Nixon era, and the Carter administration was called
upon to take positions on these issues. This Part argues that these privileges and immunities often are ancillary to the central separation of
powers issues discussed in Parts II and III, and they are accordingly
analyzed in light of those central concerns.
Although the principal focus of this Article is an analysis of specific cases and doctrines, it indicates that in several instances the Carter
administration asserted extensive claims of executive policymaking authority, even in circumstances in which individual constitutional rights
were at stake. In a brief conclusion, this Article reflects upon certain
structural pressures in the American constitutional system that may encourage executive officials to assert strong positions of executive policymaking authority despite their abstract desire for accommodation
with Congress.
II.

Allocation of General Policymaking Authority

Although the Constitution confers the federal legislative power on
Congress, 5 Presidents frequently have undertaken executive measures
that reflected independent decisions of policy. The most common issue
in separation of powers conflicts between the President and Congress
has been the manner in which general policymaking authority should
be allocated between the two branches, and these questions continued
to be of great significance during the Carter administration. Issues of
this sort commonly arise when the President asserts general policymaking authority in an area ordinarily thought to be within the congressional preserve, or in which the allocation of competence is unsettled.
Each assertion of policymaking power by the Executive poses the basic
questions of whether the President or Congress is better able to reflect
the wishes and interests of the populace and whether particular virtues
5. U.S. CONST. art. I.
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of executive action may override other considerations in some
instances.
The "legislative power" of Congress is the power to formulate basic policy, based on the presumed superiority of the legislature in divining and effecting the majority will.6 The President's power to "take
care that the Laws be faithfully executed" 7 also may confer policymakbig authority, but it is basically a policy of implementation. Much executive policymaking authority is delegated authority, and Congress
can confer more or less policymaking authority on the Executive by
legislating at a high level of generality or by enacting detailed legislation that leaves very little discretion to the Executive.8 In contrast,
when the Constitution directly grants the President some independent
policymaking authority, it is probably not because the President is
thought to possess greater representative capacities in the area concerned. Rather, the Executive's ability to act with secrecy and dispatch 9 may override the legislative values of representation and
deliberation in these areas.
The activities of the Carter administration presented several important instances of executive policymaking in both domestic and foreign affairs. In adjudicating these cases, however, the courts tended to
adopt an unsatisfying formalism that ignored the basic principle at issue. Decisions in separation of powers cases should reflect a functional
understanding of the executive and congressional roles. When individual constitutional rights are not involved, the judicial choice is often
between the legislative power to make fundamental policy decisions
and the executive power to implement those decisions. The values of
representative democracy, moreover, imply that as the likelihood of a
significant social impact from the policy increases, the argument that
the choice should be made by the legislature gains strength. When a
measure has an important effect on the general populace, there is a
6. Commentators often rest the case for a basic congressional role in policymaking on an
assumption of Congress' ability to reflect the popular will. See, e.g., Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and Executive Policymaking: Notes on Three Doctrines, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 46
(1976); see also R. DAHL, CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY (Yale University Institute of International Studies Memorandum No. 30, 1949). For a review of some of the factors favoring this view,
see Quint, supra note 3, at 35-37. See also G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST
127-29 (1981) (noting that the Framers assumed congressional predominance in the Constitution).
But see Quint, supra note 3, at 37 n.169 (discussing arguments for the representative nature of the

presidency).
7. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
8. Congress cannot legislate so narrowly, however, that penalties are placed on named individuals or groups. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); United States v. Lovett, 328
U.S. 303 (1946).
9. See THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 403 (J.Jay) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
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more pressing need for the support of legislative representation and deliberation. Like many constitutional principles, this principle is so general in form that it may be insufficient to decide certain difficult
cases;' 0 moreover, it may be subject to modification when secrecy and
dispatch are required. Nonetheless, it is a useful starting point for solving problems that otherwise may be intractable. This Part will trace the
role of this principle in the disputes of the Carter era.
A second functional point that must be considered in separation of
powers cases is the requisite vigor of judicial review. I In individual
liberty cases, the courts act to protect the rights of individuals and minorities against the will of the majority; 12 in these cases, vigorous judicial review is warranted. Judicial review need not be so stringent,
however, in allocating power between Congress and the Executive
when individual liberties are not at issue. In deciding between
majoritarian branches, greater deference can be accorded to the
majoritarian political process; moreover, such adjudication may require complex factual inquiries and assessments of social and economic
policy that may not be subject to principled resolution. Even here,
however, the issues sometimes may be presented clearly enough for judicial decision. This is most likely to be true when Congress has legislated a resolution to a disputed issue. Indeed, the limitations of judicial
authority suggest that substantial weight should be accorded to congressional allocations of legislative and executive authority under the
13
necessary and proper clause.
A.

Executive Power in Domestic Affairs-The Control of Inflation

Some of the most important domestic separation of powers disputes since World War II have centered on the problem of inflation.
Inflation has been a particularly tenacious domestic issue and was one
of President Carter's most intractable domestic problems. 14 Perhaps
because of the difficulty of the problem and its high political costs, several presidents have sought to control inflation with programs not au10. See C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW (1981) (emphasizing the generality of constitutional principles).
11. See Linde, Judges, Critics and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 227-29 (1972);
Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of UnderenforcedConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARv. L. REV.
1212, 1212-13 (1978) (distinguishing between the underlying constitutional norm and the extent to
which the courts enforce that norm).
12. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 64-70, 79-128
(1980).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
14. See, e.g., State of the Union Address, 1 PuB. PAPERS: JIMMY CARTER 90, 92-93 (1978).
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thorized by Congress. 15 In these instances, assertions of executive
policymaking authority took the form of a claim that the circumstances
triggered direct constitutional authority, enabling the President to act
6
without statutory authorization.'
Assertions of inherent executive policymaking authority in domes7
tic affairs, however, are likely to encounter serious judicial resistance.1
In some cases, therefore, the executive branch has urged the alternative
claim that an executive policy decision is authorized by a statute that
does not grant explicit authority, but nonetheless should be interpreted
to confer the power to act. In some instances, the Executive has used
this form of argument to claim extensive authority under extremely remote or tenuously related statutes. 8 In these cases, questions of presidential power and the correlative issues of presidential or congressional
representation are recast as issues of statutory interpretation. The
question of statutory interpretation, however, must in turn be influenced by underlying constitutional judgments. 19
Such a case was presented by President Carter's most significant
assertion of domestic policymaking authority-his claim of authority to
combat inflation by denying procurement contracts to certain companies that refused to follow presidentially issued guidelines. In November 1978, President Carter issued an executive order that set forth
"voluntary" guidelines for wage and price increases for all business enterprises.20 The Administration also announced that it would ordinarily deny federal contracts in excess of $5 million to companies that

15. For example, President Truman seized control of the steel mills in 1952 because he
wished to maintain steel production without a strike or a price increase that would have aggravated wartime inflation. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 676 (1952)
(Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Message from President Truman to Congress (Apr. 9, 1952),
reprintedin PUB. PAPERS: HARRY S. TRUMAN 250-51 (1952-1953)). Similarly, President Nixon
impounded funds allocated by Congress in order to control inflation by decreasing government
expenditures. See Quint, supra note 3, at 14-17.
16. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (evaluating a
Presidential claim of authority to seize steel mills). During the impoundment controversy, the
Nixon administration advanced both constitutional and statutory arguments. See Quint, supra
note 3, at 16 & n.67.
17. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (striking down
the seizure of domestic steel mills); Local 2677, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Phillips, 358 F.
Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1973) (striking down the attempted dissolution of an executive agency).
18. See, e.g., Quint, supra note 3, at 27 (discussing the Nixon administration's claim that a
statute authorizing the use of the Army for riot control also authorized a secret domestic surveillance program).
19. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527,
539-40 (1947).
20. Exec. Order No. 12,092, 3 C.F.R. 249 (1979), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,288, 3
C.F.R. 125 (1982), reprintedin 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1982).
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failed to comply with the guidelines. 2' Although the issuance of voluntary guidelines probably was authorized by the Council on Wage and
Price Stability Act of 1974 (COWPSA), 22 no explicit statutory authority
existed for using the denial of government contracts as a means of en23
forcing the guidelines.
24
The President's program was challenged in AFL-CIO v. Kahn.
In defending its policy, the Administration generally avoided assertions
of "inherent" executive powers over government procurement or the
control of inflation. 25 Rather, the Administration argued that the contract policy was authorized by section 205(a) of the Federal Property
and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (FPASA).26 The general objective of the FPASA is to implement procurement policy "advantageous to the Government in terms of economy, efficiency, or service." 27
Section 205(a) authorizes the President to "prescribe such policies and
as he shall
directives, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act,
' 28
deem necessary to effectuate the provisions of said Act.
The decision in Kahn turned on the interpretation of this language. The provision easily could be read as authorizing the President
to do little more than issue relatively modest housekeeping regulations
relating to procurement practice. 29 The government argued, however,
that this section authorized the denial of government contracts to companies exceeding the wage-price guidelines, a program that could impose wide-ranging anti-inflation controls on most large domestic
21. 44 Fed. Reg. 1229 (1979);see AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 786 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979).
22. 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1982) (terminated on Sept. 30, 1981).
23. The voluntary program of COWPSA replaced an earlier provision that authorized
mandatory controls imposed during the Nixon era. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1904 note (1982) (expired on Apr. 30, 1974); see Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971). For a discussion of informal executive guidelines under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, see Kurland, Guidelinesand the Constitution.: Some
Random Observationson PresidentialPower to ControlPrices and Wages, in GUIDELINES, INFORMAL CONTROLS, AND THE MARKET PLACE 209 (1966).
24. 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979).
25. See id at 787. The executive order, however, invoked President Carter's constitutional
power "as President and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces," in addition to statutory
authority. Further, the government suggested in its brief that the question of inherent presidential
power remained open. Brief for Appellants at 19 n.10, AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C.

Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979).
26. 40 U.S.C. § 486(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (originally enacted as FPASA, ch. 288,
§ 205(a), 63 Stat. 377, 389 (1949)).
27. Id § 481(a).
28. Id § 486(a).
29. The legislative history supports this view. See Kahn, 618 F.2d at 799-800 (MacKinnon,
J., dissenting); Casenote, Underthe ProcurementAct of 1949 the PresidentHas the ImpliedAuthority to Enforce Wage andPriceGuidelines-AFL-CIOv. Kahn, 13 CREiGHTON L. REV. 975, 981-82
(1980).
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corporations. 30 According to the government, the program would effectuate a procurement policy "advantageous to the Government in
terms of economy" because it would ultimately result in lower costs for
31
goods purchased by the government.
The District of Columbia Circuit agreed with the government and
held that the program was authorized by section 205(a). 32 Although
the court conceded that the grant of presidential authority was "imprecise," 33 it concluded that there was "a sufficiently close nexus" between
the wage and price guidelines and the statutory goals of "economy"
and "efficiency" in government procurement. 34 According to the court,
the guidelines probably would yield not only short term procurement
benefits in the form of lower prices charged by complying companies,
but also long term benefits in the form of lower costs to the government
35
resulting from a general decline in inflation.
The Kahn court found congressional authorization of sweeping
presidential power in general language designed to achieve less expansive goals. Although Kahn did not by its terms find "inherent" execu30. According to the district court, 50%-70% of "government procurement dollars" would be
influenced by the program. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 472 F. Supp. 88, 92 (D.D.C. 1979); see also Note,
PresidentialPower over FederalContracts Under The FederalPropertyandAdministrativeServices
Act: The Close Nexus Test of AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 1980 DUKE L.J. 205, 212 (noting that the competitive effects of procurement regulations were expected to spread throughout the economy). But
seeAdequacy ofthe Administration'sAnti-ln;QationProgram(PartI): HearingsBefore a Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-10 (1979) (testimony of
Jerome H. Stolarow) (asserting that the procurement guidelines would be ineffectual) [hereinafter
referred to as Anti-Ination Hearings].
31. See Kahn, 618 F.2d at 792-93.
32. See id at 793. The circuit court reversed the district court, which found the program to
be unauthorized in light of the history of the FPASA and Congress' evident intention to "occuply]
the field of wage and price controls." Kahn, 472 F. Supp. 88, 98 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 618 F.2d 784
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979). The district court also found that the program was a
"mandatory economic [control]" prohibited by § 3 of COWPSA. Id at 99-102.
33. 618 F.2d at 789.
34. Id at 792.
35. Id at 792-93. The court also found that there was an executive practice of using the
procurement process to achieve substantive policy goals. According to the court, "[T]he President's view of his own authority under a statute is not controlling, but when that view has been
acted upon over a substantial period of time without eliciting congressional reversal, it is 'entitled
to great respect.'" Id at 790. Moreover, the court found that the guidelines were not
"mandatory" controls prohibited by COWPSA because they did not possess the requisite "elements of coercion and enforceable legal duty." Id at 794. Finally, the court noted that Congress
had increased funding for the council created under COWPSA with knowledge that the council
was carrying out the President's program. Id at 795-96.
In a vigorous dissent, Judge MacKinnon argued that the contract program was not authorized by § 205(a) of FPASA and was inconsistent with other provisions of the statute. Id at 799803 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). Judge MacKinnon argued that the guidelines might not result in
short term savings in government procurement costs and that the long term nexus-the relationship between reduced inflation and future procurement costs-was "exceedingly attenuated." Id
at 804-05. Judge MacKinnon also argued that if § 205(a) authorized the guidelines, the statute
would be unconstitutional as an excessive delegation of legislative power. Id at 811-14.
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tive power, decisions like Kahn greatly decrease the necessity of
arguments for inherent presidential authority. The proliferation of federal legislative control over large segments of American life36 often will
enable courts to find tenuous statutory language to support an extensive assertion of executive authority, if the court is willing to concur
with the executive in a strained construction of a remote statute.
The Kahn decision lacked an appropriate sensitivity to the relationship between the functional reasons for conferring legislative power
on Congress-representation and deliberation-and the interpretation
of a statute that conceivably could be read to confer sweeping policymaking power on the President. By imposing a broad wage and
price control program under the FPASA, the President made a significant decision of economic policy. The framers of the FPASA, however, were concerned primarily with housekeeping provisions for
procurement and did not specifically contemplate the use of the procurement statute as an enforcement mechanism for wage and price
controls. 37 Therefore, the necessity and desirability of these controls
were decided upon solely by the President and other executive officials.
The policy was made without the opportunity to consider the views of
many varying constituencies that is normally present in congressional
decisionmaking and without the deliberation afforded by debate in a
bicameral legislature. These legislative values counsel, however, that
as the importance of a policy decision increases, the more that decision
requires legislative approval with its concomitant opportunities for
popular representation and deliberation. This underlying functional
38
principle should be recognized in statutory construction.
Instead of recognizing this principle, the Kahn decision appeared
to grant the President a degree of latitude under the "necessary to effectuate" language of section 205(a) similar to the discretion ordinarily
extended to Congress under the necessary and proper clause. 39 The
court allowed the President to use the procurement process in any manner that he might reasonably believe could achieve the "end" of economy, regardless of the independent social importance of the "means."
36. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (noting the
proliferation of statutory law at both the state and federal levels).
37. Indeed, the General Accounting Office argued that Congress specifically considered and
rejected the use of procurement as a means of price control when it enacted the FPASA. See AntiInflation Hearings,supra note 30, at 4, 52-56 (statement of Milton J. Socolar, General Counsel of

the GAO).
38. See, e.g., Gewirtz, supra note 6, at 65-80; see also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 161 (1962).

39. Cf. Bruff, Judicial Review and the President's Statutory Powers, 68 VA. L. REV. 1, 50
(1982) (discussing rational basis review for presidential action under statutes).
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Although the court found a "sufficiently close nexus" between the
guidelines and savings in procurement, the nexus was based on speculative data and economic analysis; 40 the court effectively deferred to
the judgment of the President in the same manner that it ordinarily
defers to the judgment of Congress.
This deference is unwarranted. By imposing broad wage and price
controls to achieve efficiency in government procurement, the President chose an executive "means" that seemed substantially more significant as a goal in itself than as a method for achieving the statutory
"end." When Congress acts similarly, by choosing significant means to
achieve arguably less significant ends, 4 1 it is ordinarily not subject to
judicial scrutiny because its basic policymaking authority includes the
power to assess the relative weight of means and ends. 42 If the President acts in this manner, however, his lesser capacity for representation
and deliberation inhibits democratic interchange on the choice of
means. When the President's choice of means overshadows the statutory ends, it is doubtful that Congress has authorized those means.
This doubt should influence statutory construction to the extent that
other materials such as legislative history or context do not yield a different result.43 In sum, the social importance of the Executive's choice
of policy should be taken into account in determining whether executive action is authorized under a broad or general statute. The District
of Columbia Circuit's failure to recognize this principle in Kahn provided President Carter with a significant opening wedge into the realm
of discretionary executive policymaking.
In contrast, this principle may have played a greater role in another case in which President Carter sought broad policymaking power
under tenuous statutory authority. In 1980, President Carter imposed a
fee on all retail gasoline sales in order to curb domestic consumption of
imported oil.44 The Administration sought to justify the proposed fee
40. 618 F.2d at 792-93.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the regulation of wages
and hours in local production as a means of regulating the flow of goods in interstate commerce).
42. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
43. The importance of the means chosen by the executive is only one factor in statutory
interpretation and should be viewed together with legislative history and other relevant considerations. See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in
BENCHMARKS 196 (1967) (discussing the use of related legislation as an aid in statutory interpretation). The argument made in this Article would not affect those administrative programs in which
other indicia leave little doubt of Congress' intention to grant the Executive or an agency the
authority to make basic policy decisions.
44. See Proclamation No. 4751, 45 Fed. Reg. 27,905; Proclamation No. 4748, id at 26,371;
Proclamation No. 4744, id at 22,864. Although the President initially imposed a fee on imported
oil, other provisions of the program ensured that the cost ultimately would be borne by all consumers of both imported and domestic oil: "[Tihe effect [was] to impose a $. 10 per gallon conser-
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under a statute that authorized the President to "take such action...
as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of" a foreign product
whose importation "threaten[s] to impair the national security. '45 This
provision, like the statute at issue in Kahn, appeared to grant broad
authority to the President to choose the means necessary to achieve a
specified end-curbing potentially harmful imports of foreign oil.
Moreover, the Supreme Court had held that the "action" authorized by
the statute was not limited to import quotas, but also permitted license
fees on foreign oil in order to increase its price and thus to reduce its
46
importation.
President Carter tried to extend this authority by raising the retail
prices on all gasoline, whether domestic or imported, in order to reduce
total national consumption and thereby ultimately to reduce oil imports.4 7 This action was challenged in Independent Gasoline Marketers
Council v. Duncan.48 In GasolineMarketers, the Carter administration
argued that the eventual reduction of imports justified the fees.4 9 To
the federal district court, however, the independent economic burdens
of the price increase apparently outweighed its value as a means of
reducing oil imports, the end sanctioned by Congress. Accordingly, the
court noted that "the program imposes broad controls on domestic
goods to achieve [a] slight impact" on oil import levels.5 0 For this reason, among others, the court held that the fee was unauthorized. 5' The
court concluded that "[e]xisting statutes cannot be used for purposes
never contemplated by Congress and in ways contrary to congressional
52
intent."
Gasoline Marketers and Kahn are difficult to reconcile. In both
cases, the President tried to justify important economic measures with
general statutory language and argued that the measures were "means"
vation fee on all gasoline sales." Independent Gasoline Marketers Council v. Duncan, 492 F.
Supp. 614, 618 (D.D.C. 1980).
45. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 232(b), 76 Stat. 872, 877 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (1982)).
46. See Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976).
47. See supra note 44.
48. 492 F. Supp. 614 (D.D.C. 1980).
49. Id at 617.
50. Id at 618.
51. See id The court also argued that the increase was invalid as an "indirect" rather than a
"direct" means of reducing imports. Id Moreover, the court found indications of specific congressional intent to withhold authority for the President's action. See id at 620-21.
52. Id at 620. The court in GasolineMarketers also rejected the government's extraordinary
assertion that the President possessed independent constitutional power to impose the program
because the importation of oil affects national security. See id at 619-20. For a discussion of this
and similar cases of executive policymaking, see Bruff,supra note 39; Quint, supra note 3, at 38 &
n.173 (similar cases in the Nixon administration).
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to a statutory end. In both cases, the independent social and economic
impact of the means seemed to outweigh their value in achieving the
end toward which they were ostensibly directed. President Carter succeeded in Kahn and failed in Gasoline Marketers; yet the President's
case in Kahn seems the weaker of the two. In Gasoline Marketers, the
statute at least was intended to grant the President some authority over
certain oil prices, but the statute in Kahn was virtually unrelated to
inflation. In striking down the provision in Gasoline Marketers, the
district judge possessed a clearer appreciation of the underlying func53
tional principle than did the court of appeals in Kahn.
In retrospect, President Carter's imposition of economic measures
that rested on tenuous statutory authority may have reflected the political pressures often faced by incumbent presidents. 54 Whether ration53. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Carmen, 669 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1981), presented
a contrasting factual situation. In that case, President Carter ordered federal employees to pay
fees commensurate with commercial parking fees for the use of parking spaces on federal property. Id at 817-18, 820 n.27. The court rejected a claim that this action was unauthorized, and
held that the order fell within the President's authority under § 205(a) of the FPASA to implement
.'an economical and efficient system for the. . . utilization of available [federal] property." Id at
821. Like the statutes in Kahn and Gasoline Marketers, this provision was very general and said
nothing specific about the type of program ordered by the President. In finding authority, however, the court may have been influenced by the fact that imposing commercially reasonable parking fees for the use of federal parking spaces by federal employees does not involve a major choice
of social policy-a factor that distinguishes this case from Kahn and Gasoline Marketers.
54. President Carter also took other, less formal anti-inflationary steps that were challenged
as impermissible attempts to impose executive policies without statutory authorization. In several
instances, executive officials sought to persuade regulatory agencies to modify proposed environmental and health regulations that the Administration believed would prove unduly expensive
and inflationary. See Verkuil, JawboningAdministrativeAgencies: Ex ParteContactsby the White
House, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 943, 944-46 (1980) (discussing cotton dust, ozone, and strip mining
regulations). These exparte contacts might be seen as attempts to replace congressional policy
decisions by executive policymaking, because under applicable statutes "general inflationary considerations are not legally relevant in most cases." Morrison, PresidentialIntervention in Informal
Rulemaking: Striking the ProperBalance, 56 TUL L. REv. 879, 889 (1982). Dean Verkuil, however, has argued that, within certain limits, this intervention represents a permissible form of policy coordination by the President. See Verkuil, supra, at 956-58. Moreover, Congress may have
manifested "an intent to countenance" exparte contacts in informal rulemaking. See Rosenberg,
Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: PresidentialControlofAgency Rulemaking UnderExecutive
Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REv. 193, 229 (1981). Nonetheless, attempts by the Executive to introduce broad policy considerations into administrative rulemaking raise serious problems when the
policy advocated by the Executive has substantial social and economic ramifications and falls
outside the scope of the statute. In one case, however, exparte contacts by President Carter and
his advisors were held to be lawful. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 387-408 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
President Carter also employed an executive order to direct the agencies' attention to the
inflationary effects of proposed regulations. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979), revoked
by Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (1982); see Bruff,
PresidentialPower and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 463-64 (1979). The order,
however, "lacked enforcement provisions that would give teeth to" the Administration's economic
goals. See DeMuth, ConstrainingRegulatory Costs-The W4hite House Review Programs (pt. 1),
REG., Jan.-Feb. 1980, at 13, 16. President Reagan has gone beyond President Carter's executive
order by issuing a "potentially revolutionary" executive order that seeks to achieve anti-inflation-
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ally or irrationally, public opinion tends to hold the President
responsible for the success or failure of the economy.5 5 In fact, President Carter believed that his political future depended upon controlling
inflation, and that it was the paramount political issue of his Administration.5 6 When such pressures become extreme, the President may
stretch or exceed statutory authority to achieve greater control over decisions he believes are crucial to his political future. These pressures

may continue to evoke executive policymaking in domestic affairs in
times of political crisis.
B. Allocation of GeneralPolicymakingAuthority in Foreign Affairs
In foreign affairs, independent presidential power has been asserted with considerable vigor and success in the postwar period. In
practical as well as constitutional terms, President Carter considered
his authority in foreign affairs to be more sweeping than his domestic
powers.5 7 Although President Carter was willing to accommodate
Congress on certain foreign policy issues, it is in this area that the Administration's most far-reaching assertions of executive authority are to
be found. During the same period, however, Congress was seeking to
reassert its authority over a broad range of foreign policy issues.5 8 In
the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate, therefore, the actions of the
Carter administration tested the continued efficacy qf postwar claims
that the President possessed unchallenged primacy in foreign affairs.
Historically, claims of presidential primacy in foreign affairs have
rested on various constitutional bases, a number of which were asserted
by the Carter administration. In some cases, for example, the Administration adopted a well-known interpretation of history that recognized
the President's ability to exercise extraconstitutional power in foreign
ary goals and contains an enforcement mechanism based on review by the Office of Management
and Budget. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 note
(1982). This order seeks to prohibit executive agencies from issuing certain regulations that cannot be justified by a cost-benefit analysis. See Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Separation
of Powers, 23 ARIz. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1981).
55. Cf. Cutler, To Form a Government, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 126, 138 (1980) ("The public-and
the press-still expect the President to govern. But. . . the public cannot fairly blame the President because he does not have the power to legislate and execute his program.").
56. See J. CALIFANO, GOVERNING AMERICA 124 (1981); see also Remarks by President
Carter Announcing the Administration's Anti-Inflation Program, I PUB. PAPERS: JIMMY CARTER
476 (1980-1981) (reflecting President Carter's deep concern over high inflation and outlining his
intensive anti-inflation program); J. CARTER, supra note 2, at 78 ("[Flor more than three and a
half years, my major economic battle would be against inflation.").
57. J. CARTER, supra note 2, at 89.
58. See Tower, Congress Versus the President." The FormulationandImplementation ofAmerican Foreign Policy, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 229, 229-30 (1981-1982).
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affairs.5 9 Moreover, the Administration agreed with Hamilton that extensive foreign affairs authority was implicit in the "executive power"
conferred on the President by article II of the Constitution.6 0 Advocates of presidential primacy also have asserted that the exercise of congressional lawmaking authority is inappropriate in foreign affairs
because it requires prudence, secrecy, and dispatch to respond to the
unpredictable actions of foreign nations, which are not constrained by
domestic law.61 Others have emphasized the historical shift of foreign
affairs power to the President and have invoked the authority of the
62
"living Constitution."
These arguments, however, recently have encountered skepticism
in response to the insights furnished by the Vietnam War and the
Watergate affair. 63 Some commentators have noted that when foreign
affairs issues affect domestic policies-as they do in an increasing
number of instances64-there is a heightened interest in legislative representation and deliberation. 65 Moreover, "[tlhere is little question
that, largely stemming from the change in Congress and its desire for a
more assertive role in foreign policy, the dynamics of power between
the executive and legislative branches have shifted radically" in recent
years. 66 Thus the lessons of the "living Constitution" may change with
each decade. 67 The foreign affairs cases of the Carter administration
59. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (stating that full
foreign affairs powers descended to the federal government from the British Crown). Although
Curtiss-Wright has been subjected to sustained and trenchant criticism, see, e.g., Lofgren, United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An HistoricalReassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973),
it retains considerable vitality, see, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 705 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

(REVISED) § 352 comment a (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980).
60. See A. HAMILTON & J. MADISON, THE LETTERS OF PACIFICUS AND HELVIDIUS 9-10
(1845 & facsimile reprod. 1976) (Pacificus Letters of Hamilton).
61. See, e.g., Thurow, PresidentialDiscretionin ForeignAffairs, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 71
(1973) (citing the views of Locke, Montesquieu, and Hamilton).
62. Rostow, Response, 61 VA. L. REv. 797 (1975); see Henkin, "4 More Effective System"for
Foreign Relations: The ConstitutionalFramework, 61 VA. L. REV. 751, 754-57 (1975). For a similar list of the theories on which presidential primacy may rest, see Comment, Resolving Treaty
Termination Disputes, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1189, 1198-99 n.53 (1981).
63. See, e.g., Berger, The PresidentialMonopoly ofForeign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1
(1972); Casper, Response, 61 VA. L. REV. 777, 778 (1975) (arguing that "[the Framers] chose to
grant Congress the dominant role in foreign affairs").
64. See, e.g., Bennet, Congressin Foreign Policy: Who Needs It, 57 FOREIGN AFF. 40 (1978);
Manning, The Congress,the Executive andlntermestic Affairs: Three Proposals, 55 FOREIGN AFF.
306 (1977).
65. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-2, at 161 (1978).
66. CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONSULTATION ON FOREIGN POLICY: STRENGTHENING EXECUTIVE BRANCH PROCEDURES 5 (House Foreign Affairs Comm. Print
1981) [hereinafter cited as FOREIGN POLICY CONSULTATION]. See generally T. FRANCK & E.
WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS (1979) (analyzing the shift of foreign policy power

from the President to Congress after the Vietnam War).
67. Cf.J. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 294 (1981) (noting the
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explored the conflict between the arguments for presidential primacy
and the revisionist criticism of those arguments.
L Termination of the Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty.-President
Carter's most striking assertion of presidential policymaking authority
in foreign affairs was his unilateral termination of the Taiwan Mutual
Defense Treaty. 68 In December 1978, the President declared that after
January 1, 1979, the United States would recognize the People's Republic of China as the "sole legal Government of China. ' 69 At the
same time, President Carter announced that the Mutual Defense
Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China (Taiwan)
would be terminated on January 1, 1980, in accordance with article X

of that treaty, which provided for termination by either party on one
year's notice. 70 Although presidents may have occasionally terminated
treaties unilaterally in the past, none were as important as the Taiwan
Mutual Defense Treaty. 7 t In seeking a rapprochement with China after the rigors of the Cold War and Vietnam, President Carter acted
72
with a unilateral style reminiscent of those earlier periods.
The major argument against the termination of the Taiwan treaty
was constitutional; it asserted that the President had no power to undo
a policy that reflected the popular consensus manifested through a
form of legislative action. 73 The argument rested upon an analogy between a treaty and a statute. According to the supremacy clause, both
treaties and statutes constitute the "law of the land"; 74 for the same
argument that historically "the so-called normal period [of presidential hegemony in] 1941-1967
was in fact an aberration. . . and the new period of congressional assertiveness was in truth the
norm").

68. Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, United States-Republic of China, Dec. 2-10, 1954, 6
U.S.T. 433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178 [hereinafter cited as Taiwan Treaty].
69. Address by President Carter to the Nation, Diplomatic Relations Between the United
States and the People's Republic of China, 2 PUB. PAPERS: JIMMY CARTER 2264 (1978) (quoting
from Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States
of America and the People's Republic of China). For a discussion of the normalization of relations between the two nations, see C. VANCE, HARD CHOICES 75-83, 113-22 (1983).
70. See Taiwan Treaty, supra note 68, at art. X.
71. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 959-60 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 617 F.2d 697
(D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
72. President Carter's recognition of the Peking government was also subject to congressional
criticism because it had been effected without prior congressional consultation. One former Administration official argued that President Carter's failure to consult with Congress on this issue
was an unfortunate exception to the Administration's usual practice of consultation. See Atwood,
supra note 2, at 224-25. But see FOREIGN POLICY CONSULTATION, supra note 66, at 32 (noting
that Congress did not hold the same high opinion of President Carter's willingness to consult).
73. See Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 962-65 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C.
Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Berger, The President's UnilateralTermination ofthe Taiwan
Treaty, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 577, 620-22 (1980).
74. U.S. CONsT. art. VI.
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reason that the President cannot repeal a statute, therefore, the President cannot unilaterally repeal the form of "law" represented by a
treaty. According to this argument, the repeal of a treaty requires the
advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate (the method by which
the "law" was enacted), or an act of Congress terminating the treaty in
accordance with ordinary legislative procedures. 75 Moreover, it is the
President's duty under the Constitution to take care that the "laws"--including treaties-are faithfully executed and not to countermand
76
them.
The Carter administration marshalled three primary arguments
against this position. First, the Administration sought to distinguish
the termination of a treaty from the repeal of a statute by flatly asserting that "[u]nder the Constitution the power to terminate treaties...
resides in the President and not in the Congress," 77 and by suggesting
that this presidential power may be immune from congressional limitation.78 These arguments rested primarily on claims of extra-constitu75. The argument for congressional participation in treaty termination is derived from the
general grant of legislative power to Congress in U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 1. Since a treaty is a "law,"
abrogation of a treaty is a legislative act, and any legislative act not otherwise specifically provided for can be effected only by Congress through the ordinary lawmaking process. See, e.g.,
Berger, supra note 73, at 621 ("Once made, a treaty is a 'law' and like other 'laws' can only be
repealed by Congress."); see also The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (finding
that Congress may alter the domestic effect of a treaty by ordinary legislation if the "subject" of
the treaty lies "within the power of Congress"); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884)
(noting that congressional repeal of a treaty is preferable to repeal by President and Senate, because "all three of the bodies participate"); Henkin, The Treaty Makers andthe Law Makers: The
Law of the Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 929-30 (1959) (arguing that
Congress possesses the power to annul the domestic effect of any treaty under a general congressional foreign affairs power).
76. U.S. COtsT. art. II, § 3. For an exposition of this argument, see Goldwater v. Carter, 481
F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated 444 U.S. 996 (1979). For a critique of this argument, based on the view that the treaty was not "law" because it was not selfexecuting, see Comment, supra note 62, at 1216-17.
77. Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 3, Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C.), rev'd 617 F.2d
697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated 444 U.S. 996 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Defendants' Brief], reprintedin
Treaty Termination: Hearingson S Res. 15 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 91, 100 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Treaty Termination Hearings];see also Treaty
Termination Hearings,supra, at 147 (memorandum of Legal Adviser, Department of State).
78. The State Department maintained that a statute requiring congressional approval as a
prerequisite to the termination of treaties would raise "serious Constitutional questions," and "[a]
reservation [in a specific treaty, prohibiting the President from terminating the treaty without
Senate or Congressional consent] would . . . raise the same Constitutional questions." Treaty
Termination Hearings,supra note 77, at 202, 213 (statement of State Department). Before the
District of Columbia Circuit, the government argued that even if a statute purported to continue
the Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty in force, "'Congress could not end [the President's unilateral
power to terminate the treaty] by passing a law, and the President could not waive it by signing a
law.'" Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 703 n. 13 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting oral argument of John
Harmon, counsel for the Administration), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); see also Treaty Termination Hearings, supra note 77, at 209-12 (statement of State Department) (arguing that congres-
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tional power, but the President also argued that the authority to
terminate the treaty arose from his powers as Commander in Chief and
from the general grant of executive authority in article J1.79 The
breadth and tone of these constitutional arguments resembled vigorous
assertions of executive power by Administrations of the Cold War era.
The government also implied that a stronger popular consensus is necessary for entering into treaties than for dissolving them. The Framers
intended that it should be easier to undo "entangling" alliances than to
establish them, and therefore the President could terminate the treaty
80
unilaterally.
Second, the government asserted that the President's action was
authorized by the treaty itself or by statute.8 1 Both the Administration
and its opponents sought support from ambiguous legislation enacted
two months before termination of the treaty which stated "the sense of
Congress" that there should be "prior consultation . . . on any proposed policy changes affecting the continuation in force of' the Taiwan
Treaty. 82 Critics in Congress asserted that the required consultation
had not taken place, while the Administration argued that the legislasional repeal of a treaty affects domestic law only and that the international obligation remains
unless the President terminates the treaty).
79. See, e.g., Defendants' Brief, supra note 77, at 4, reprintedin Treaty Termination Hearings
at 101 ("[Tlermination of a defense treaty which creates no domestic law obligations falls squarely
within the President's authority as Commander in Chief."); Treaty Termination Hearings, supra
note 77, at 204-05 (statement of State Department) (arguing that the power to terminate treaties is
included in the "executive power" of article II). In upholding the President's action, the District
of Columbia Circuit relied in part on this ground. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 704-05
(D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
80. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 77, at 27-28 (quoting L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE CONSTITUTION 169 (1972)), reprintedin Treaty Termination Hearings at 124-25.
The Administration also supported its position by citing what it claimed were 12 historical
examples of unilateral presidential treaty termination. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 77, at
33-38, reprintedin Treaty TerminationHearings at 130-35. The proper weight to be attributed to
these examples was sharply disputed. Compare Treaty TerminationHearings,supra note 77, at 207
(statement of State Department) (claiming that several of the Administration's examples "involved important treaties"), with Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 959-60 (D.D.C.) (finding
that the treaties cited by the Administration did not approach the Taiwan Treaty in importance),
rev'd 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
81. The government relied on article X of the Treaty, which permitted termination on one
year's notice by either "party." See Taiwan Treaty, supra note 68, art. X. According to the government, the word "party" should be read to refer to the President because of his special role in
foreign affairs. See Defendants' Brief,supra note 77, at 23-24, 38-39, reprintedin Treaty Termination Hearings at 120-21, 135-36. Moreover, the government invoked the Formosa Resolution,
Pub. L. No. 84-4, 69 Stat. 7 (1955), which was enacted at the same time as the Mutual Defense
Treaty and granted the President discretion to deploy or withdraw American forces in Taiwan.
The Administration argued that this discretionary power over military assistance to Taiwan implied a similar authority over the Mutual Defense Treaty. Reply Brief for Defendants at 18-19,
Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S.
996 (1979).
82. International Security Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-384, § 26, 92 Stat. 730, 746
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 note (1982)).
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tion "implies an acknowledgement that the President could issue the
'83
Notice of Termination without congressional approval.
The third and strongest argument for the President rested on the
special circumstance that the Taiwan Treaty was terminated in connection with the recognition of the People's Republic as the sole legal government of China. In United States v. Pink,8 4 the Supreme Court held
that the President has unilateral power to recognize foreign governments and a measure of "implied power" to remove obstacles to the
effective exercise of that authority.8 5 The Carter administration argued
that the President was empowered to terminate the Taiwan Treaty in
order to remove an obstacle to the exercise of his power to recognize
the People's Republic of China. 86 Warren Christopher, a State Department official, asserted that the People's Republic had "made it clear
that continuation of the treaty was incompatible with normalization of
relations and that without its termination, normalization was
87
impossible."
The argument based on Pink, however, was not conclusive. In
Pink, the executive agreement had been undertaken without contrary
legislative action.8 8 In contrast, the termination of the Taiwan Mutual
83. Defendants' Brief, supra note 77, at 3, reprintedin Treaty Termination Hearings at 100.
The Administration contended that consultation had taken place. Declaration of Richard Holbrooke at 2, Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.),
vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (asserting that "suggestions of the members [of Congress] were carefully weighed by the Administration"), reprintedin Treaty Termination Hearings,supra note 77, at
85, 86. But see Javits, Congress and ForeignRelations: The Taiwan Relations Act, 60 FOREIGN
AFF. 54 (198 1) (asserting that there had been no effective consultation). The Administration also
argued that the provision was not intended to be mandatory. Defendants' Brief, supra note 77, at
43-45, reprintedin Treaty Termination Hearings at 140-42.
Additional statutory issues were raised by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 968, 93 Stat. 14 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3316 (1982)), which was enacted after the President's
recognition of the Peking government. The Act affirmed existing treaties and other agreements
with Taiwan, although the Taiwan government-now no longer recognized by the United
States-was replaced by an entity called "the governing authorities on Taiwan." Id § 4(c), 93
Stat. at 16. The statute conceivably could be read as continuing the Mutual Defense Treaty in
effect. Even if this were the case, the Administration argued, Congress was powerless to annul the
presidential termination of the treaty. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. The government
suggested, however, that the Taiwan Relations Act actually ratified the President's termination of
the treaty. See Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 954 n.18 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 617 F.2d 697
(D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
84. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
85. Id at 229 (upholding presidential authority to settle certain claims in connection with
recognition of the Soviet government).
86. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 77, at 39, reprintedin Treaty Termination Hearings at
136.
87. Declaration of Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State at 2, Goldwater v. Carter,
481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated 444 U.S. 996 (1979), reprinted
in Treaty Termination Hearings,supra note 77, at 65, 66.
88. Indeed, the Pink Court noted that "Congress tacitly recognized" the policy embodied in
the agreement. 315 U.S. at 227.
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Defense Treaty arguably involved a direct presidential repudiation of a
legislative act-the advice and consent of the Senate. The termination
therefore may fall within the category of actions in which the President's power is at its weakest. 89 Thus, the argument that the President's
power to recognize foreign regimes implies the power to terminate a
related treaty is more problematic than the assertion of power to settle
certain claims, which was upheld in Pink.90
The Taiwan Treaty termination was challenged by certain members of Congress in Goldwater v. Carter.9 1 At the outset, the government argued that the case should be dismissed as a political question
because the judiciary is ill-equipped to determine the difficult issues of
policy and fact raised by the termination. 92 The Administration also
argued that the plaintiffs were not "injured in fact" by the termination
of the treaty, and therefore the complaint should be dismissed for lack
of standing. 93 Ultimately, considerations of justiciability proved dispositive in the Supreme Court. 94 Four Justices concluded that the case
must "be controlled by political standards." 9 5 A fifth Justice found
that the case was not ripe for decision because Congress had not offi89. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). But see S. REP. No. 7, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1979) (arguing that the termination
did not fall in that category).
90. On the other hand, the Administration suggested that the termination of the Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty was less intrusive than the action in Pink, because termination of the treaty
did not affect private commercial rights. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 77, at 18, 41-42, reprintedin Treaty Termination Hearings at 115, 138-39; cf.Tribe, A ConstitutionalRed Herring,
Goldwater v. Carter, NEw REPUBLIC, Mar. 17, 1979, at 15, 16 (asserting that the case for congressional participation is stronger in termination of a commercial treaty involving private rights than
in a mutual defense treaty which "ordinarily leaves private rights intact").
91. 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
92. According to the Administration, "[Tihe President's decision involved considerations of
global strategy of the most profound character and implications." Defendants' Brief, supra note
77, at 11, reprintedin Treaty Termination Hearings at 108. Standards are lacking "when a court
attempts to evaluate the fruits of complex diplomatic negotiations." Id at 12, reprintedin Treaty
Termination Hearings at 109. The Administration also maintained that foreign states would be
entitled to accept the President's notice of termination, even though "for domestic law purposes
the Court's decree would govern." Id at 13, reprintedin Treaty Termination Hearings at 110.
Consequently, the "possibility of such contrary results in domestic and international law provides
a cogent example of 'the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question,'" one element of the political question doctrine. Id (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
93. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 77, at 19-22, reprintedin Treaty Termination Hearings
at 116-19.
94. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
95. Id at 1003. Writing for a plurality, Justice Rehnquist noted that no specific constitutional provision governs treaty termination and that "different termination procedures may be
appropriate for different treaties." Id Consequently, no judicial standard exists. Justice Rehnquist also observed that the case was not commenced by private litigants, but was "a dispute
between co-equal branches of our government, each of which has resources available to protect
and assert its interests, resources not available to private litigants outside the judicial forum." Id
at 1004.
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cially disapproved the President's action. 96
The Taiwan Treaty affair ended with the defense agreement terminated as a practical matter, but without a definitive judicial decision on
whether the termination was constitutional. Thus, the question of
whether the President has the authority to terminate treaties is still unresolved and a principled approach to its resolution should be determined. The legal regime established by a treaty constitutes a form of
general policymaking, in which the vote of two-thirds of the Senate
replaces the vote of Congress, 97 and in which the opportunities for deliberation, public participation, and representation are almost as great
as in bicameral legislation. A functional view of the separation of powers counsels that a court should consider seriously the importance of
the treaty in deciding whether the President is empowered to terminate
or abrogate the treaty unilaterally, or whether, in contrast, a form of
legislative representation and deliberation is required. For example, a
group of major treaties forms the core of American foreign policy and
reflects fundamental decisions of international conduct. 98 These documents and their related statutory schemes represent major plans of national governance with substantial implications for domestic as well as
foreign affairs. 99 To these treaties, the Carter administration added the
Panama Canal treaties, a milestone in the relations between the United
States and the other nations of this hemisphere.10 0 In the case of most
fundamental treaties, including the Panama Canal treaties, the terms of
the agreement were debated vigorously and adopted only after extensive deliberation. Moreover, these treaties are related intimately to
questions of war and peace over which Congress has ultimate authority; a number also affect foreign commerce, a field in which congressional authority is also unquestionably supreme. 10 If the President
could unilaterally repeal an important decision of policy made by this
form of consensus, he would have a momentous degree of policymak96. Id at 997 (Powell, J., concurring). Only Justice Brennan was willing to decide the case
on its merits; he voted to uphold the President's action because presidential authority to terminate
the Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty was implied by the President's power to recognize the Peking
government. Id at 1006-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. See A. HAMILTON & J. MADISON, supra note 60, at 60 (Helvidius Letters of Madison).
98. One commentator suggests that the North Atlantic Treaty, the United Nations Charter,
and the SALT treaties fall into this category. Comment, supra note 62, at 1210-11. This Comment argues that the importance of the treaty and other substantive factors should be taken into
account in determining the President's power to terminate treaties. Id at 1207-11.
99. See authorities cited supra note 64.
100. For a discussion of the Panama Canal treaties' importance, see Remarks by President
Carter at a Question-and-Answer Session with a Group of Editors and News Directors, I PuB.
PAPERS: JIMMY CARTER 718 (1978); C. VANCE, supra note 69, at 140-57.
101. See Comment, supra note 62, at 1207-09; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting
Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations").
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ing authority with serious implications for domestic and foreign affairs.
Presidential repeal would alter a basic policy decided after legislative
deliberation and representation, without the opportunity for public
participation present in both the confirmation of a treaty and the repeal
of a statute. 0 2 Therefore, there should be substantial doubt about
presidential power to terminate an important treaty without textual authorization in the treaty or in a statute, or without other special
03
circumstances.1
In the case of minor treaties, the focus is substantially different.
Although unilateral presidential termination of any treaty might seem
to contravene a legislative determination, 0 4 the minor nature of the
treaty may itself imply a delegation of power to the President to terminate the agreement. The technique of statutory construction that interprets an act in favor of finding a delegation to the President-a
technique recently emphasized in foreign affairs cases 05-is most justifiable when the delegation affects arrangements that are not of major
significance. Thus, the relative importance of the treaty should be considered in determining whether power has been delegated to the President to terminate or abrogate a treaty.
In Goldwater, the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the argu06
ment that a court could assess the relative importance of treaties.'
According to the court, "[tlhere is no judicially ascertainable and manageable method of making any distinction among treaties on the basis
of their substance, the magnitude of the risk involved, the degree of
controversy which their termination would engender, or by any other
07
standards." 1
The court overstated the difficulties that exist. Although the importance of some treaties may not be easily assessable, others can be
classified unquestionably as fundamental foreign policy decisions.' 0 8
102. Moreover, the decision to terminate an important treaty is not necessarily a simple choice
to have one less "entangling" alliance. The United States has relations with most nations and
dissolution of a treaty is likely to be part of a process in which relations with one nation are
replaced by closer relations with that nation's rivals. In a unilateral treaty termination, therefore,
the President effectively may be replacing one set of risks and relationships, approved by both the
President and two-thirds of the Senate, with a new set of risks and relationships approved only by
the President. See Treaty Termination Hearings,supra note 77, at 308 (statement of Prof. Abram
Chayes).
103. See infra note 113.
104. See supra text accompanying note 89.
105. See infra text accompanying notes 158-69.
106. 617 F.2d at 707.
107. Id
108. See, e.g., Treaty Termination Hearings,supra note 77, at 388 (statement of Prof. Michael
Reisman) ("It seems to me that when we deal with security agreements we are dealing with agree-
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The Taiwan Treaty itself, for example, could not be otherwise classified, and the Administration did not attempt to do so. 10 9 In cases of
real uncertainty about the importance of a particular treaty, however,
the President's role in foreign affairs suggests that his judgment may be
accorded a measure of deference.
Any such deference, however, must be subject to a significant
qualification. If the treaty indicates that congressional action is necessary for termination, that determination should control. In such a case,
the "law" itself indicates that it constitutes an important decision of
policy which can only be undone through legislative action.' 10 Moreover, a similar declaration in a statute would reflect a determination by
Congress, under the necessary and proper clause, that in an instance of
such importance the powers of the treatymaking "department" of government--composed equally of the President and the Senate-can be
carried out adequately only by preventing the decision of that "department" from being countermanded by the President alone.
Moreover, related congressional action also should be taken into
account. If the treaty is part of an extensive web of legislation, the high
level of legislative activity may imply that Congress considers the subject to be an important policy area over which it has retained authority."' In such cases, the President's role might be characterized as
having been "preempted" or precluded in an area of shared
2
competence."1
In this manner, many issues of treaty termination may be handled
as questions of statutory interpretation. Although the underlying question will be the importance of the treaty, the judicial focus will shift to
the congressional assessment of importance as indicated by the degree
and nature of congressional action related to the treaty. If the treaty is
very important or very minor, a court may be able to act on its own; it
is in the intermediate areas that the search for congressional guidance
can avoid the twin dangers of judicial foreign policy judgments and
total deference to executive claims. Although this approach may be
ments that pose the greatest commitment of the destiny of the republic, and that they overshadow
all other agreements. They should be given a very special status.").
109. But see Comment, supra note 62, at 1219-20 (asserting that the Taiwan Treaty had become less "fundamental" in recent years).
110. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED)

§ 352 comment a (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980).
I11. See, e.g., Treaty Termination Hearings, supra note 77, at 389-92 (statement of Prof.
Michael Reisman) (arguing that the Mutual Defense Act of 1949 and related treaties indicate that
the President was not authorized to terminate the Taiwan Treaty).
112. Cf.Gewirtz, supra note 6, at 80-83 (discussing the preemption argument in domestic and
foreign affairs).
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qualified in narrow areas of direct presidential authority," 3 it provides
a general starting point for a serious inquiry into executive treaty
termination.
2. The Iranian Hostage Affair.-The Iranian hostage affair
presented President Carter with issues considerably different from
those raised by the termination of the Taiwan Treaty. While the treaty
termination was a considered judgment reached after long reflection,
the hostage crisis forced President Carter to make quick decisions in
response to rapidly changing circumstances.
After President Carter's decision to admit the deposed Shah of
Iran into the United States for medical treatment, militant student
groups seized the American Embassy in Tehran and its personnel.
When the Iranian government failed to secure the release of the Americans, President Carter issued an executive order that blocked exchange
transactions with Iran and prevented Iranian assets, valued between six
and twelve billion dollars, from being transferred out of the jurisdiction
of the United States."14 The Carter administration engaged in extensive diplomatic efforts to obtain the release of the American hostages.
The Administration also secured a judgment in the International Court
of Justice declaring that Embassy personnel were being held in violation of international law."- 5 When diplomatic measures reached an impasse, the Administration tried another alternative.

113. For example, the President may have greater authority to terminate a treaty unilaterally
if the termination is linked to the recognition of a foreign government. See Goldwater v. Carter,
444 U.S. 996, 1006-07 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of some difficulties with
this position, see supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. For other special circumstances in
which presidential authority may be recognized, see, e.g., Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913)
(suggesting that the President may terminate a treaty if it is breached by the other party).
114. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1980), reprintedin 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (Supp. V
1981); see also 31 C.F.R. pt. 535 (1983) (accompanying regulations). The President possessed
authority to block the assets under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977
(IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. V 1981). The IEEPA grants the President substantial
power over the property of foreign nationals in times of emergency. See infra text accompanying
note 158.
115. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3
(Judgment of May 24); see Janis, The Role of the InternationalCourt in the Hostages Crisis, 13
CONN. L. REV. 263 (1981). The Administration also required all Iranian students in the United
States to report for a special check on the validity of their visas. See Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d
745 (D.C. Cir. 1979); infra subpart III(C). As the crisis deepened, the Administration imposed
additional economic sanctions, denied travel visas to Iranian nationals, and suspended diplomatic
relations with Iran. See Remarks by President Carter, I PuB. PAPERS: JIMMY CARTER 611-12
(1980-1981) (discussing the sanctions); The Situationin Iran: HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on
ForeignRelations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-25 (1980) (discussing the visa policy) [hereinafter cited
as Situation Hearing]. See generally J. CARTER, supra note 2, at 505 (discussing the rationale
behind the sanctions).
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(a) The attemptedrescue of the hostages.-On April 24, 1980,
President Carter ordered helicopters and transport planes to fly to a
remote portion of the Iranian desert in the first step of a plan to rescue
the hostages.1 1 6 The dispatch of war planes to an unfriendly country
raised two related questions: first, whether the President had exceeded
his constitutional authority, and second, whether his failure to consult
with Congress before the mission violated the 1973 War Powers

Resolution.
On the constitutional issue, the President argued that the attempted rescue fell within his powers as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief of the armed forces. 17 Similarly, the President's
counsel concluded that "[tihe President's constitutional power to use
the armed forces to rescue Americans illegally detained abroad is
clearly established." '"18 The Administration also argued, without a
clear textual basis, that the President has an "inherent power" of rescue
that is derived from international law.' '9 According to these views, a
rescue mission falls into the category of presidential actions that require secrecy and dispatch and therefore cannot be subject to congressional publicity or deliberation. Under some circumstances, however,
rescue efforts raise fundamental questions of policy; an armed rescue in
a hostile country could lead to war, the declaration of which is the responsibility of Congress. 20 Consequently, there is a strong argument

for a congressional role.
The functional approach advocated in this Article suggests that, in
116. The attempt was abandoned because of equipment failure. Several American servicemen
were killed in a collision that occurred during the evacuation. See generally Brzezinski, The Failed
Mission, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 28 (describing the rescue attempt). Secretary of State Vance opposed the mission and resigned after its tragic conclusion. See C. VANCE,
supra note 69, at 409-13.
117. J. CARTER, USE OF U.S. ARMED FORCES IN ATTEMPTED RESCUE OF HOSTAGES IN IRAN:
COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 96-303, 96th

Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as

COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT].

President

Carter also stated that in the case of physical punishment or execution of the hostages, he was
"prepared to make a direct military attack on Iran"-action that presumably would have rested
on similar constitutional claims. See J. CARTER, supra note 2, at 466.
118. Situation Hearing,supra note 115, at 48. The State Department took a similar position in
1977, before the hostage crisis. See War Powers Resolution: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on
ForeignRelations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 193 (1977) (statement of Herbert J. Hansell) (asserting that
the President could introduce armed forces into hostilities without congressional authorization in
a rescue situation) [hereinafter cited as 1977 War Powers Hearings].
119. Situation Hearing, supra note 115, at 40, 42 (testimony of Warren Christopher, Acting
Secretary of State).
120. See, e.g., CongressionalReview of InternationalAgreements: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on InternationalSecurity and Scientf~fc Affairs of the House Comm. on InternationalRelations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976) (statement of Gerhard Casper) (stating that rescue operations
may pose the same questions as war) [hereinafter cited as 1976 International Agreements
Hearings].
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analyzing this issue, substantial consideration should be given to the
potential impact of the President's action. If the operation does not
threaten serious consequences, the need for congressional authorization
is lessened. If a major conflict may result, however, procuring legislative approval is more important because the Constitution grants Congress the basic power to decide questions of war and peace.
Nonetheless, in the case of a rescue, two factors ordinarily militate
against a judicial resolution. First, it may be difficult to draw a line
between rescue operations that do or do not threaten serious consequences; a court may not be able to decide such complex issues of fact
in the short period of time that is available. Second, prevailing doc12
trines of standing and mootness may render a case nonjusticiable. '
These factors, however, do not necessarily indicate that deference is
owed to the President in all cases. Rather, they support the need for
the exercise of congressional authority under the necessary and proper
clause to assure that Congress' own power to participate in decisions
22
that may lead to a state of war is effectively preserved.
Accordingly, a prior consultation provision may be viewed as a
congressional attempt to accommodate executive and legislative interests without undertaking the difficult task of allocating authority in ad23
vance. The consultation provision of the War Powers Resolution,
for example, is an attempt to reproduce, within the confines of a particular crisis, the deliberation that the issue of war would receive in Congress. Although the provision does not require that Congress' views
prevail, its purpose is to open the closed circle of presidential advisors
124
to the opinions of responsible sources with divergent points of view.
Although some Senators expressed skepticism about the President's constitutional power during committee hearings on the Iranian
rescue mission,125 the debate focused on the impact of the War Powers
Resolution. The President's counsel noted that the Resolution was not
"'intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of

121. Cf.Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
936 (1974) (stating that a member of Congress had no standing to challenge the bombing of
Cambodia).
122. See generally Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in DeterminingIncidental Powers ofthe
Presidentandofthe FederalCourts: A Comment on the HorizontalEffect ofthe "Sweeping Clause"
36 OHIO ST. L.J. 788 (1975).
123. "The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing
United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances ...." 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (1976).
124. See H.R. REP. No. 287, 93rd Cong., IstSess. 3-7 (1973).
125. See, e.g., Situation Hearing,supra note 115, at 46 (statement of Senator Javits).
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the President'"126 and argued that the Resolution was therefore not
intended to affect the President's constitutional power to undertake rescues. 2 7 The most sharply debated issue under the War Powers Resolution, however, was the scope of the consultation clause. 2 8
The Carter administration argued that, because the rescue plan
was suspended in its "initial phase" while the aircraft were still at a
remote desert location, no "imminent involvement in hostilities" was

"clearly indicated" and that as a result the consultation provision of the
Resolution was inapplicable.1 2 9 The President claimed that he would
have consulted with Congress before undertaking the "second phase"
of the plan-an attack on the occupied embassy to free the hostages. 130
The Administration also contended that the language of section 1542,
which calls for prior consultations "in every possible instance," confers
on the President the authority to determine whether considerations of
safety and secrecy permit consultations in any particular case.13 ' The
Administration argued, therefore, that the President was able to decide
32
that prior consultation raised an unacceptable risk of disclosure.
The hostage rescue attempt illustrated the weakness of the consultation provisions of the War Powers Resolution. The requirement is
126. Situation Hearing,supra note 115, at 48 (legal opinion of Lloyd Cutler, quoting 50 U.S.C.
§ 1547(d)(1) (1976)); COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 117, at 2.
127. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. An Administration spokesman also argued that the rescue attempt was authorized by another section of the Resolution, which recognizes presidential power to commit forces in the event of an "attack upon the United States, its
territories or possessions, or its armed forces." 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (1976):
I think the seizure of the Embassy by the militants and the latter [sic] ratification of that
action by the Government of Iran clearly could be characterized as an attack upon the
United States because it was an attack upon the United States Embassy or its armed
forces, because there were Marines and Army men there.
Situation Hearing,supra note 115, at 42 (statement of Warren Christopher, Acting Secretary of
State).
128. See Situation Hearing,supra note 115, at 4; J. CARTER, supra note 2, at 511. According to
former Senator Javits, President Carter's failure to consult with Congress before the rescue mission was the "most notorious transgression of the statute's consultation requirement." Javits &
Wheeler, Book Review, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 848, 854 (1982).
129. See Situation Hearing,supra note 115, at 48 (legal opinion of Lloyd Cutler). This argument is unconvincing; ordering helicopters and troop transport planes into a hostile country will
increase the likelihood of hostilities, even though it is hoped that the hostile nation will remain
ignorant of the incursion. During the mission, although no Iranian warplanes appeared before the
American forces withdrew, the American aircraft were observed by Iranian civilians. See J.
CARTER, supra note 2, at 515. President Carter's alternative argument that the Resolution did not
apply because of the "humanitarian" nature of the mission was also ill-founded. See Javits &
Wheeler, supra note 128, at 854 n.41.
130. See Situation Hearing, supra note 115, at 4 (statement of Warren Christopher, Acting
Secretary of State).
131. See id at 5, 13.
132. The President's counsel also argued that, because the President possessed "inherent constitutional authority" to undertake the rescue operation, an interpretation of the War Powers Resolution that required consultation risked imposing an unconstitutional burden on presidential
power. See Situation Hearing,supra note 115, at 48 (legal opinion of Lloyd Cutler).
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vague: no specific members of Congress are required to be "consulted," and the nature and duration of the required consultations are
not specified. Furthermore, in this as in other respects, the War Powers
33
Resolution lacks an explicit enforcement mechanism.
In retrospect, the history of the Carter administration's attitude toward the War Powers Resolution is illuminating. Early in Carter's
presidency, Administration spokesmen pledged compliance with the
Resolution.1 34 Despite these protestations, however, the actions of
President Carter suggest that abstract promises by executive officials
are of limited value. When confronted by what he perceives to be an
authentic crisis, time pressures and security fears may impel a President
to avoid complying with the Resolution, and particularly the consultation provisions.13 5 Without a reliable enforcement mechanism, the Executive's resistance may take the form of narrow interpretation of the
Resolution's requirements. 136 The President can rebut claims that the
133. See Glennon, Strengthening the War Powers Resolution: The Casefor Purse-String Restrictions, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1975); Pollak, The Constitution as an Experiment, 123 U. PA. L.
REv. 1318, 1337-38 (1975).
Another weakness of the War Powers Resolution is its failure to limit paramilitary operations
conducted by employees of intelligence agencies rather than by the regular armed services of the
United States. Although covert operations may be acts of war with serious policy consequences,
they are normally subject only to a reporting requirement, instead of the more stringent limitations of the War Powers Resolution. From 1974 to 1980, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, 22
U.S.C. § 2422 (1982), required that a "timely" report of the CIA's covert operations be furnished
to several congressional committees. In 1980, a new statute provided that the required notice was
to be sent only to the two intelligence committees, but also required that prior notice ordinarily
should be furnished before the operation is undertaken. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-450, 94 Stat. 1975, 1981 (1980) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 413 (Supp. V
1981)). See generally Highsmith, PolicingExecutive Adventurism: CongressionalOversightof Military and ParamilitaryOperations, 19 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 327 (1982); infra note 463.
In general, covert operations were not a major issue during the Carter presidency, although
the Administration apparently felt unduly constrained by congressional limits on covert aid to
forces in Angola. See J. SUNDQUIST, supra note 67, at 298-99. Under President Reagan, however,
covert activity has been extended in Central America and actions such as CIA assistance in the
mining of Nicaraguan harbors have aroused grave congressional concern. See N.Y. Times, Apr.
16, 1984, at A8, col. 4.
134. See 1977 War Powers Hearings,supra note 118, at 187-91, 206-07 (statements of Herbert
Hansell and Douglas Bennet); Vance Nomination: HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1977) (statement of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State designate).
The Administration's position was reached "after much internal debate." Atwood, supra note 2,
at 221. One of the Resolution's authors, Senator Javits, noted that Congress "had to fight the
preceding Administrations" on the war powers issue and that the Carter administration's pledge
was the "first compact" between Congress and the President on this issue. 1977 War Powers Hearings, supra note 118, at 191, 197.
135. Some Senators also argue that Presidents are reluctant to consult with Congress because
they wish to avoid receiving discouraging advice. Subsequent disclosure of the advice may be
politically embarrassing if the President's initiative fails. See SituationHearing,supra note 115, at
7 (statement of Senator Church); id at 38 (statement of Senator Lugar).
136. See, e.g., id. at 39 (statement of Senator Lugar) ("[A] President who feels it is absolutely
vital will look for ways to find that the War Powers Act is not quite operative in that instance.");
Marks, Legislatingandthe Conductof Diplomacy: The Constitution'sInconsistentFunctions, in THE
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Resolution has been misinterpreted by asserting that he is the party
entrusted with the power of interpretation.137 This argument evokes
memories of the prolific use of the political question doctrine by the
Nixon administration, 3 8 and it implies strong claims of presidential
t39
hegemony in foreign affairs.
The assertive and forceful tone of the Administration's arguments
on war powers in 1980 contrasts significantly with the spirit of accommodation evident from the testimony on the Resolution given by Administration officials in 1977. This shift apparently reflects the
pressures of office on an Administration that began with an unusual
spirit of collaboration with Congress. 40 The result does not bode well
for the War Powers Resolution. If it can be circumvented easily by an
Administration that was in general accord with its purposes, it will be
even less constraining on an executive that chooses to mount an all-out
attack on its constitutionality. In the War Powers Resolution, Congress
sought to establish a framework for collaborative action, but the Resolution has been difficult to enforce when a crisis overwhelms the structural values reflected in its provisions. The problem of how to
maintain the principles of the Resolution against the pressures that
14 1
arise in individual cases remains unresolved.
TETHERED PRESIDENCY 199, 209 (T. Franck ed. 1981) ("Some interpretation can almost always be
found that would avoid strict compliance with a statutory command."). Accordingly, Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher asserted that President Carter's failure to consult with Congress before the attempted rescue did not "represent a departure" from the Administration's
cooperative policy proclaimed at the 1977 hearings. See SituationHearing, supra note 115, at 9.
Similarly, President Carter interpreted the Resolution narrowly to avoid filing a report in 1978.
See CongressionalOversight of War Powers Compliance, Zaire Airlft' Hearings Before the Subcomm. on InternationalSecurity and Scientic Affairs of the House Comm. on InternationalRelations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-38 (1978) (statement of Herbert Hansell).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 131-32.
138. See Quint, supra note 3, at 4.
139. It seems to me that, if we accept the administration's interpretation. . . it means the
President continues to adhere to the proposition that whatever he decides is the law in
this particular matter because it is within his constitutional authority to deny us consultation if he does not think it is possible. We cannot accept that in my opinion.
Situation Hearing,supra note 115, at 6 (statement of Senator Javits).
140. See supra note 134. Moreover, during the Iranian rescue crisis Congress was as reluctant
to defend its authority as it was during most of the Vietnam War. Although members of Congress
protested President Carter's violation of the consultation provisions at first, they "[fell] silent when
it was evident that the country was fully behind the president." Maynes & Ullman, Ten Years of
Foreign Policy, 40 FOREIGN POL'Y 3, 14 (1980). Maynes and Ullman suggest that the provisions
of the Resolution will be enforced "only when the military action ordered [by the President] is
unpopular, as well as unsuccessful." Id
141. Experience under the Reagan administration also reveals a departure from early statements assenting to the principles of the War Powers Resolution. The Administration's first Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, followed the pattern of Secretary Vance by declaring that he would
act in accordance with the Resolution. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97TH
CONG., 2D SEss., THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: A SPECIAL STUDY OF THE COMM. ON FOREIGN

AFFAIRS 247-48 (Comm. Print 1982) (prepared by Dr. John H. Sullivan); Javits & Wheeler, supra
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(b) The Iran executive agreement.-Sustained negotiations
in the final weeks of the Carter administration produced a settlement
between the United States and Iran contained in two "Declarations" of
the government of Algeria.' 42 Signed on the last day of Carter's presidency, the agreements provided for the hostages' release, the return to
Iran of a portion of the frozen Iranian assets, the use of some Iranian
assets to settle bank claims, and the settlement of most other American
claims against Iran by an international tribunal rather than by American courts. 143 To implement the Declarations, Presidents Carter and
Reagan issued executive orders that nullified attachments of Iranian
assets and suspended claims of Americans against Iran in American'
44
courts pending adjudication by the claims tribunal."
The resolution of the Iranian affair presented issues that were in
some ways the obverse of those raised in the Taiwan Treaty case. Innote 128, at 856. When he first dispatched troops to Lebanon in 1982, President Reagan consulted
with Congress and also withdrew the troops promptly. Seeid at 858-59. Later, however, a second
contingent of Marines was dispatched as a peacekeeping force. 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1232 (Sept. 29, 1982). Because this contingent was probably "in imminent danger of hostilities"
from the time it arrived, the Act required its withdrawal after 60 days in the absence of congressional authorization. See 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (Supp. V 1981); Javits & Wheeler, supra note 128,
at 860. Nonetheless, these forces remained for a year without congressional action. After more
than 200 Marines were killed in 1983, Congress passed a joint resolution declaring the 60-day
provision in effect, but authorizing the troops to remain for an additional 18 months under certain
restrictions. S.J. Res. 159, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 13,167-68 (1983). President
Reagan signed the resolution, arguably conceding a measure of congressional authority over the
disposition of troops, but he also expressed reservations about the applicability and constitutionality of the 60-day withdrawal provision. 19 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1422-23 (Oct. 12, 1983).
Shortly thereafter, President Reagan ordered an invasion of the Caribbean island of Grenada
without complying with the consultation provision of the Act. See Grenada War Powers: Full
Compliance ReportingandImplementation: Markup of HJ- Res. 402 Before the Comm. on Foreign
Affairs 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 8, 12-13 (1983). President Reagan also stationed military advisors in
El Salvador to assist government forces in the civil war, and the advisors have remained much
longer than 60 days without a declaration of war or other statutory authorization. Nonetheless, an
action alleging a violation of the 60-day withdrawal provision was dismissed. See Crockett v.
Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C. 1982) (asserting that the judiciary "lacks the resources and
expertise. . . to resolve disputed questions of fact concerning the military situation in El Salvador"), a/f'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
142. Declarations of the Government of Algeria, reprintedin Emergency Economic Powers:
Iran: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on InternationalEconomic Policy and Trade of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 33-44 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Emergency Economic Powers Hearing]. For discussions of the negotiations that resulted in the agreement, see
generally J. CARTER, supra note 2, at 3-14; Cutler, Negotiatingthe IranianSettlement, 67 A.B.A. J.
996 (1981); Note, The IranianHostage Agreement Under Internationaland United States Law, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 822 (1981).
143. Emergency Economic PowersHearing,supra note 142, at 33-44. Some of the frozen assets
were held as security for claims to be decided by the tribunal. See id at 35-36.
144. See Exec. Orders Nos. 12,276 to 12,285, 3 C.F.R. 104-18 (1982), reprintedin 50 U.S.C.
§ 1701 notes (Supp. V 1981) (Carter executive orders); Exec. Order No. 12,294, 3 C.F.R. 139
(1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (Supp. V 1981) (Reagan executive order suspending
claims in U.S. courts). For a general discussion of the task before the claims tribunal, see von
Mehren, The Iran-U.S.A. Arbitral Tribunal,,31AM. J. COMP. L. 713 (1983).
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stead of unilaterally terminating an important treaty, the President entered into a significant international agreement without the advice and
consent of the Senate or other explicit congressional authorization.
The Iranian agreement took its place in a long line of executive compacts that were not clearly authorized by statute or treaty, and again
raised questions about the extent of presidential authority in foreign

affairs. 145

Two central aspects of the Iranian agreement and the related executive orders were challenged in Dames & Moore v. Regan. 146 First,
Dames & Moore attacked the provisions that nullified existing attachments of Iranian assets in American courts and transferred the assets to
the Federal Reserve Bank for disposition in accordance with the agreement. 147 Second, the plaintiff challenged the suspension of American
claims against Iran then pending in American courts and the transfer of
those claims to the international tribunal.' 4 8 Dames & Moore argued
that these provisions were without statutory or constitutional basis and
deprived American claimants of their property in violation of the fifth
amendment. 149
The Administration advanced both statutory and constitutional
arguments to support its action. First, the government claimed that the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act' 50 (IEEPA) and the
Hostage Act' 5 provided express congressional authorization for the
agreements.' 5 2 The Administration also argued that the President had
the constitutional power to act unilaterally as a result of his authority
over foreign affairs. 153 The government invoked a comprehensive
"claims settlement authority derive[d] directly from the Constitution, as
a necessary incident to the Executive's plenary authority to conduct the
145. See generally Berger, The PresidentialMonopoly of ForeignRelations, 71 MIcH. L. REv. 1
(1972); Rovine, Separation of Powers and InternationalExecutive Agreements, 52 IND. L.J. 397
(1977).
146. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
147. Part of the released Iranian property was to be used to settle claims, and the rest was
returned to Iran. See Declaration of the Government of Algeria §§ 4-9, reprintedin Emergency
Economic PowersHearing,supra note 142, at 35-36.
148. See id at 33 (general principle (B)); Exec. Order No. 12,294, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1982), reprintedin 50 U.S.C.§ 1701 note (Supp. V 1981).
149. See 453 U.S. at 667.
150. 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (Supp. V 1981).
151. 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1982).
152. See 453 U.S. at 675.
153. Brief for Respondents at 40-50, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), reprinted
in 122 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
173-83 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1982) [hereinafter cited as LANDMARK BRIEFS]. Although
this brief was filed after the end of the Carter administration, it was signed by Wade McCree, Jr.,
President Carter's Solicitor General.
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Nation's foreign relations."' 54 The Administration did not rely on the
constitutional text, but upon historical practice and the need for executive flexibility in resolving international disputes. 15 5 According to the
government, the Iranian crisis presented "a particularly compelling occasion" for the exercise of presidential power.156 This claim of constitutional power arising from historical usage mirrored similar assertions
of former presidents and reflected a view that was common during the
157
"imperial" postwar period.
In Dames & Moore, the Supreme Court upheld the challenged
provisions. First, the Court found that the nullification of attachments
and the transfer of assets were expressly authorized by section 1702 of
the IEEPA,' 5 8 which empowered the President to prohibit United
States citizens from exercising rights in foreign property and to direct
the transfer of foreign property in times of national emergency. The
Court also found implicit congressional approval for the suspension of
legal claims, but here its argument was considerably more complex.
First, the Court concluded that although neither the IEEPA nor the
Hostage Act explicitly authorized the action, both statutes were "highly
relevant in the looser sense of indicating congressional acceptance of a
broad scope for executive action in circumstances such as those
presented in this case."' 5 9 The Court recognized the broad emergency
powers granted to the President under both acts. 160 Moreover, the
Court found that there was a "long-standing practice of settling [international] claims by executive agreement,"161 and that Congress had implicitly approved this practice by facilitating or implementing specific
154. Id at 57-58, reprintedin 122 LANDMARK BRIEFS, at 190-91.
155. Id at 40-50, reprintedin 122 LANDMARK BRIEFS at 173-83.
156. See id at 45 n.37, reprintedin 122 LANDMARK BRIEFS at 178. The government did not
exclude the possibility, however, that Congress may limit the President's power to settle claims if it
"speak[s] with a clear voice." Id at 58, reprintedin 122 LANDMARK BRIEFS at 191.
157. See A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
158. 453 U.S. at 675.
159. Id at 675-77. The Court concluded that the IEEPA did not explicitly authorize the suspension of claims against Iran because the claims were in personam, while the IEEPA granted
presidential authority over interests in specific property only. Id at 675-76.
160. Id at 677. The Court's view that the IEEPA did not explicitly authorize the measure, yet
supported an inference of authorization, is problematic. In establishing a comprehensive statutory
scheme relating to emergency controls over foreign property, Congress' omission of an express
authorization could be read as an implied prohibition of the power to suspend claims. Cf.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 639 (Jackson, J., concurring) (indicating
that the absence of express authorization in comprehensive legislation can be an implied prohibition); Electronic Data Sys. Corp. Iran v. Social Sec. Org. of the Gov't of Iran, 508 F. Supp. 1350,
1361 (N.D. Tex.) (finding that the IEEPA limits presidential power), mod/ied 651 F.2d 1007 (5th
Cir. 1981). But see Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800,
816-18 (1st Cir. 1981) (Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting that the IEEPA authorizes presidential
suspension of claims).
161. 453 U.S. at 679.
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executive claims settlements in the past. 162 The Court noted that it had
previously recognized some unilateral presidential power to enter into
executive agreements, 63 but nonetheless relied primarily upon congressional consent. 64
The most interesting aspect of Dames & Moore is its almost exclusive reliance upon congressional authorization through acquiescence or
tacit approval. Instead of finding inherent executive power, the Court
appeared to establish a special technique of statutory interpretation
that is applicable in determining presidential authority in foreign affairs cases. This technique is more radical than merely giving a broad
interpretation to unclear authorizing language. 65 Rather, the Court in
Dames & Moore used statutory grants of power in an analogical manner. It found that grants of power in the IEEPA and the Hostage Act
implied analogous grants that were not included in those statutes. This
technique of interpretation, which uses a statute as a source of law in
the same manner as a common law court uses a prior judicial opinion,
is relatively common in civil law systems. t66 Although this technique
has been advocated from time to time by American scholars, 67 its infrequent use in common law and constitutional adjudication makes
Dames & Moore noteworthy. 68 Similarly, the Court suggested that

congressional approval of specific executive agreements in the past impliedly authorized similar agreements in the future. This is also an an162. Id at 680-81. The Court discussed the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22
U.S.C. §§ 1621-1645 (1982), and statutes relating to claims settlements with China, East Germany,
and Vietnam. 453 U.S. at 680-81. The Court also alluded to the requirement that the Secretary of
State submit executive agreements to Congress. Id at 682 n.10 (referring to 1 U.S.C. § 112b
(1982)). The Court indicated that Congress' failure to enact stricter measures when it considered
this statute implied congressional approval of existing executive practice. Id
163. 453 U.S. at 682.
164. Id at 686.
The Court also concluded that nullification of the attachments was not a taking in violation
of the fifth amendment. Id at 674 n.6. In contrast, the Court found that the fifth amendment
issue raised by the suspension of claims was not ripe for adjudication, presumably because the
claims tribunal had not yet acted. Id at 688-90. The Court did conclude that the issue was
substantial enough to require a decision that the Court of Claims would have jurisdiction to hear
the question when it became ripe. Id Justice Stevens, however, considered the possibility of an
unconstitutional taking to be so remote that its justiciability in the Court of Claims did not need to
be decided. Id at 690 (Stevens, J., concurring). For a general discussion of the taking issue, see
Note, The U.S.-Iran Accords and the Taking Clause ofthe Fifh Amendment, 68 VA. L. REv. 1537
(1982).
165. See AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915
(1979). Kahn is discussed supra subpart II(A).
166. See Note, The Legitimacy of Civil Law Reasoning in the Common Law: Justice Harlan's
Contribution, 82 YALE L.J. 258, 265-66 (1972).
167. See, e.g., Landis, Statutes and the Sources ofLaw, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (R.
Pound ed. 1934).
168. For a rare prior example, see Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970). See
also Note, supra note 166.
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alogical approach: present acts are analogized to past acts that
Congress has approved. In adopting these techniques of legislative interpretation, the Court declined to endorse the Executive's claims of
direct constitutional authority. By carefully searching for congressional consent and avoiding broad endorsements of presidential power,
the opinion casts doubt on the existence of a plenary executive power
69
in this area.
The careful and reserved opinion in Dames & Moore contrasts
with the Court's expansive opinion in United States v. Pink, 170 which
upheld a presidential claims settlement agreement entered into in connection with the recognition of the Soviet government.'17 In Pink, the
Court found an independent presidential power to remove obstacles to
the recognition of foreign regimes, and stated that the President's discretion to determine when outstanding claims constitute obstacles is
"final and conclusive in the courts."' 172 In Dames & Moore, however,
the Court ignored suggestions by the government and some scholars
that the reestablishment of amicable relations with an unfriendly government is a kind of recognition, particularly when diplomatic relations
with the unfriendly government previously had been severed. 173 The
power to reestablish friendly relations, or to "re-recognize," could imply the power to enter into executive agreements settling claims that
might interfere with the reestablishment of those relations. Under
Pink, the President's determination that the claims settlement was es174
sential to that process would be "final and conclusive in the courts."'
The Court in Dames & Moore also declined to adopt the proposition,
strongly urged by the Administration, that the President has the constitutional authority to settle international claims, whether or not recogni169. See 453 U.S. at 688; Swan, Reflections on Dames & Moore v. Regan andthe Miami Conference, 13 LAW. AM. i, vii-x (1981). The cautious nature ofDames & Moore is in marked contrast
to an earlier lower court decision upholding the Iranian accords on the basis of inherent presidential power. Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800, 812-13 (1st
Cir. 1981) (finding that the President has the "authority to remove impediments to the peaceful
resolution of international disputes").
170. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
171. Id at 234; supra note 85 and accompanying text; see Swan, supra note 169, at x.
172. 315 U.S. at 229-30. The Court concluded that the power to remove obstacles to recognition is "implied" by the President's power to recognize governments. The source of the recognition power, however, is unclear. Some have argued that it can be found in the textual grant of
authority to "receive ambassadors," set forth in U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3. See, e.g., A. HAMILTON
& J. MADISON, supra note 60, at 12 (Pacificus Letters of Hamilton); L. HENKIN, supra note 80, at
178. In a number of opinions, however, the Supreme Court has discussed the recognition power
without relying on any specific constitutional provision. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.
203 (1942); Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38, 50-51 (1852).
173. See McLaughlin & Teclaff, The IranianHostageAgreements: A LegalAnaolsis, 4 FORDHAM INT'L

L.J. 223, 230 (1981).

174. 315 U.S. at 229-30.
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tion of a foreign government is involved. 175 Justice Frankfurter's
concurrence in Pink adopted this position and could have provided
76
support had the Court chosen to agree with the Administration.
The ease with which the Court might have found "inherent" presidential power to settle claims makes the opinion in Dames & Moore
particularly interesting. First, it reveals an unwillingness to extend
presidential power to its plausible limits. The Court could have found
independent executive power, but chose instead to find a form of congressional authority. This choice suggests that although the Court declined to pass on the constitutionality of the Vietnam War, the Justices
learned some lessons from that conflict. Had the court found inherent
presidential authority, it might have risked an unpredictable expansion
of executive power and might have "[spurred] later executive adventurism.' 1 77 Similarly, the opinion suggests that the Court is unwilling to
endorse an indefinite extension of the doctrine of "implied" executive
powers-a doctrine that was imported from the considerably different
context of McCulloch v. Maryland. 78 This doctrine raises substantial
difficulties when applied to executive rather than legislative
79
authority)
The Court's use of implied consent may also reflect the underlying
view that congressional authority ultimately controls important foreign
policy decisions. Accordingly, the opinion in Dames & Moore invites
renewed attention to the techniques of statutory construction that
should be applied when Congress has not legislated explicitly on a particular question. The technique of statutory construction employed in
Dames & Moore rested on analogical reasoning from congressional
acts, and therefore was even more permissive than the technique employed in Kahn. 180 The Dames & Moore opinion suggests that this
technique may be justifiable in foreign affairs because of the President's special role in diplomacy and negotiation.' 8 1 Even if this technique is justified in certain foreign affairs cases, however, the Court in
Dames & Moore failed to discuss the considerations that should guide
the drawing of analogies from congressional legislation or acquies175. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 153, at 40-50, reprintedin 122 LANDMARK BRIEFS
at 173-83.
176. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 240 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
177. Bruff, supra note 39, at 35.
178. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
179. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 122, at 794-809. But cf.United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 705-06 n.16 (1974) (finding that the President has an implied privilege for confidential
communications).
180. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979).
181. 453 U.S. at 678.
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cence. Using statutes or congressional acquiescence as the source of
analogical reasoning in foreign affairs cases may be justified in general,
but care must be taken to assure that the analogy is justified in the
individual case. A prominent factor in the decision should be the significance of the action that the analogical reasoning seeks to justify.
For example, the analogical value of a statute is slight if the action at
issue is considerably more important than the actions that are ordinarily authorized by the statute. Similarly, the inference to be drawn
from approval of past actions is attenuated if the present action is more
economically or socially significant than the prior actions from which
the analogy is drawn. Accordingly, the great economic and political
significance of the Iran agreement, and the concomitant need for deliberation and representation, militate against a finding of implied congressional consent for broad presidential policymaking authority in
82
Dames & Moore.1
On the other hand, the countervailing executive virtues of secrecy
and dispatch arguably play an important role. The Iranian hostage affair presents an instance in which the weight of these executive virtues
may be particularly great. 183 If congressional acquiescence in past
claims settlements implies a degree of continuing congressional authorization, this implied authorization may be particularly strong when
Congress has little time for debate. 184 A more candid discussion of the
tension between the value of legislative deliberation on important issues and the requirements of presidential secrecy and dispatch would
have illuminated the decision in Dames & Moore, and would have
made it clear that implied congressional authorization for a measure of
182. See infra text accompanying notes 195-206. The total amount of claims in the Iranian
settlement may be greater than the amounts involved in any prior claims settlement. See Note,
supra note 164, at 1537. Further, the presence of fifth amendment issues raised by the claims
settlements may also favor requiring more explicit congressional authorization. See supra note
164; infra Part III. On the other hand, however, fifth amendment rights asserted against measures
adjusting economic burdens and benefits have generally not been granted the high degree of protection accorded other constitutional guarantees. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,
428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976); Epstein, Not Deference, But Doctrine: The Eminent Domain Clause, 1982
Sup. CT. REv. 351, 352. This lesser degree of general protection for economic rights may suggest a
diminished need for a requirement of explicit statutory authorization as a special technique to
protect those rights. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, supra note 80, at 99. This is particularly true when the
Court of Claims is authorized to satisfy the requirements of the fifth amendment by giving "compensation" for any "taking" that has occurred. See Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419
U.S. 102, 124-25 (1974); supra note 164.
183. See, e.g., Christopher, CeasejFreBetween the Branches: A Compact in ForeignAffairs, 60
FOREIGN AFF. 989, 993-94 (1982) ("In formulating the hostage agreements . . . the negotiating
situation and the time constraints seemed to rule out action by the Congress.").
184. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669 (noting that the case "involv[es] responses to international crises the nature of which Congress can hardly have been expected to anticipate in any
detail").
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this importance should be limited to situations in which a serious emergency exists.
The Iranian accords were not the only executive agreements entered into by the Carter administration without explicit congressional
approval. For example, the Administration entered into Bermuda II,
an executive agreement with the United Kingdom on air routes that
replaced a 1946 executive agreement on the same subject.' 85 The Administration also reaffirmed a 1959 executive agreement with Pakistan
that provided for support in case of invasion, instead of submitting the
agreement to the Senate as a treaty.' 86 Moreover, the Administration
obtained congressional ratification of an executive agreement designed
to assure an adequate oil supply for Israel, and then sought to interpret
the legislation to permit related financial assistance that was apparently
87
beyond the scope of the authorization.
In certain cases, the Carter administration demonstrated a "slight
increase in sensitivity to the need for" congressional authorization
before entering into international agreements. 88 Major compacts like
the Panama Canal accords and the SALT II agreement were submitted
to the Senate as treaties and were "subject[ed] to intense senatorial
scrutiny."' 89 In neither instance, however, was the collaboration with185. Agreement on Air Transport Services (Bermuda II), July 23, 1977, United StatesUnited Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 5367, T.I.A.S. No. 8641, supersedingAgreement Relating to Air Services (Bermuda I), Feb. 11, 1946, United States-United Kingdom, 60 Stat. 1499, T.I.A.S. No. 1507;
see Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce v. Goldschrnidt, 627 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (challenge to agreement dismissed for lack of standing).
186. See Berger, supra note 73, at 628.
187. See Feinrider, America's Oil Pledges to Israel- IllegalBut Binding Executive Agreements,
13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 525 (1981).
In Dole v. Carter, 444 F. Supp. 1065 (D. Kan. 1977), the court upheld President Carter's
power to return the crown of St. Stephen and other national treasures to the People's Republic of
Hungary. The court relied partly upon the "traditional powers of the President" to remove "obstacle[s] which may impede the 'rehabilitation of relations'" between the United States and foreign governments. Id at 1070. Moreover, the court found that the accord "lack[ed] the
magnitude of agreements customarily concluded in treaty form" since it lacked "such fundamental characteristics as substantial ongoing defense or political commitments on the part of the
United States and substantial ongoing reciprocal commitments by co-signers." Id The Tenth
Circuit denied a motion for injunction pending appeal primarily because the controversy was not
justiciable. Dole v. Carter, 569 F.2d 1109 (10th Cir. 1977). For another minor executive agreement upheld by the courts, see United States v. Arlington, 669 F.2d 925 (4th Cir.) (holding that an
executive agreement exempting the German Democratic Republic's diplomatic mission from
property taxes is authorized by the President's recognition power and by a statute authorizing him
to specify diplomatic immunities), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 801 (1982).
188. Feinrider, supra note 187, at 568.
189. While the Panama Canal Treaties were pending ratification in the Senate, members of
the House of Representatives challenged the process and argued that U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3
required full congressional approval for a disposition of United States property. This claim was
rejected in Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978). Thereafter, Congress passed legislation implementing the treaties. Panama Canal Act of 1979, Pub. L.
No. 96-70, 93 Stat. 452. For general discussions of the Panama Canal Treaty ratification, see Z.

821
HeinOnline -- 62 Tex. L. Rev. 821 1983-1984

Texas Law Review

Vol. 62:785, 1984

out difficulty. The Canal Treaties, for example, might have been improved if the President had consulted seriously with Congress at an
earlier point.'9 0 The SALT II treaty also may have lacked adequate
consultation. 91 Moreover, President Carter threatened to adopt the
SALT II accord as a presidential executive agreement if the Senate did
not ratify it, or if Congress did not pass enabling legislation. 192 President Carter also evoked a bitter congressional reaction when he sought
to extend the SALT I agreement beyond its termination date by "parallel unilateral" statements of intent issued by the United States and the
Soviet Union. 93 This action may have violated a statutory provision
that required arms control agreements to be made pursuant to congres194
sional authorization or treaty.
One of the most important and inconclusive debates in the United
States law of foreign relations has centered on the question of presidential authority to enter into executive agreements without authorization
by statute or treaty.' 95 It is often argued that when no specific constitutional grant of power to the President exists, the importance of the international obligation should be a significant factor in determining
whether the President may enter into an executive agreement without
PRINCIPLE 134-39 (1983); J. CARTER, supra note 2, at 152-85; C.
VANCE, supra note 69, at 140-57.
190. "Many of the reservations attached to the Panama Canal Treaty of 1978, and many of the
restrictions that appeared in implementing legislation adopted by the House in 1979, might have
been avoided had President Carter reached out earlier to include key members of the House and
BRZEZINSKI, POWER AND

Senate." L. FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER 9 (1981).

191. See Percy, The PartisanGap, 45 FOREIGN PoL'Y 3, 13 (1981). But see T. FRANCK & E.
WEISBAND, supra note 66, at 147-48 (noting that congressional "advisers" were added to U.S.
SALT delegation).
192. See T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note 66, at 144. The Senate ultimately failed to
vote on the SALT II agreement because President Carter requested that consideration be suspended after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. See J. CARTER, supra note 2, at 264-65;
Letter from President Carter to the Majority Leader of the Senate, 1 PUB. PAPERS: JIMMY
CARTER 12 (1980-1981). The Reagan administration has observed SALT II even though it remains unconfirmed. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1981, at All, col. 4.
193. T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note 66, at 152-53. The Administration eventually
sought a joint resolution of Congress approving the agreement's extension, but the resolution was
not voted upon by Congress. See id at 153-54.
194. Arms Control and Disarmament Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2573 (1982). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee concluded, however, that the extension was a "non-binding" declaration of policy that fell within the President's authority. 1 M. GLENNON & T. FRANCK, UNITED STATES
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: DOCUMENTS AND SOURCES 35-37 (1980).
195. See L. HENKIN, supra note 80, at 176-84. A variation of the problem arises when Con-

gress has explicitly prohibited certain executive agreements. See, e.g., Arms Control and Disarmament Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2573 (1982) (prohibiting agreements obligating the United States to
disarm or reduce arms unless authorized by statute or treaty); Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2432
(1982) (limiting commercial agreements with nations that inhibit emigration of their citizens). For
a discussion of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, see CongressionalOversight of Executive
Agreements. HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Separation o/Powers of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary,92d Cong., 2d Sess. 329-30, 339-43 (1972) (statement of J. Fred Buzhardt) [hereinafter
cited as 1972 Executive Agreement Hearing].
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legislative authorization.1 96 Although this position has been questioned by some commentators, 197 this Article espouses a Similar view.
Significant agreements with foreign nations require important policy
decisions that normally also have implications for domestic affairs. 19 8
If the President were allowed to decide these fundamental issues, basic
decisions of national policy would be made by an individual without
the benefit of representative deliberation and consent.' 99 This argument is even stronger when the President makes an agreement than
when he terminates one because of the risk that he will enter into "en'20 0
tangling alliances.
In contrast, every minor agreement made with a foreign country
need not be adopted by the Senate as a treaty. 20 Minor agreements
that do not conflict with legislation may conceivably be authorized by
an independent executive power to enter into minor agreements with
foreign countries. 20 2 Moreover, the relative importance of an agreement should be considered in determining legislative authorization
under the analogical technique approved in Dames & Moore. Relatively minor executive agreements consistent with foreign policy established by statute or treaty may be found to have implied legislative
196. A "traditional" distinction is said to exist between treaties and executive agreements
based on the importance of the agreement. Sparkman, Checks and Balances in American Foreign
Policy, 52 IND. L.J. 433, 438 (1977); see Dole v. Carter, 444 F. Supp. 1065, 1070 (D. Kan. 1977);
Transmittalof Executive Agreements to Congress: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971) (statement of Senator Fulbright) [hereinafter cited as 1971
TransmittalHearings]; cf. OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, DEP'T OF STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED

STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 201 (1974) (stating that one factor in determining the
form of international agreements should be the "extent to which the agreement involves commitments or risks affecting the nation as a whole").
197. See, e.g., 1976 InternationalAgreements Hearings, supra note 120, at 141 (statement of
Leonard C. Meeker); Henkin, supra note 62, at 761-62.
198. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
199. Cf. T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note 66, at 142 ("[A]s the Panama Treaty experience amply illustrated, [the treaty process established by the Constitution] does ensure a full,
public consideration ofjust exactly what kind of commitment we are assuming. When the President takes a short-cut, the nation can no longer be sure what obligations are being assumed
200. But see supra note 102.
201. "[lIt is too late in our constitutional history for a purist insistence upon treaties as the
exclusive means of contracting agreements with foreign nations." Sparkman, supra note 196, at
445.
202. Some authors suggest that the Constitution embodies a distinction, originally propounded by the eighteenth century author Vattel, between treaties, which are permanent ongoing
public undertakings, and agreements of lesser stature. See E. VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk.
2, §§ 152-154 (J. Chitty ed. 1854); Riesenfeld, The Power of Congressand the Presidentin InternationalRelations: Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 643, 671-72 (1937);
Weinfeld, What Didthe Framersof the FederalConstitutionMean by "Agreements or Compacts"Z
3 U. Cm. L. REV. 453, 460 (1936). Under this view, the treaty clause is not an implied prohibition
of minor executive agreements, and authority to enter into those agreements may be found in the
general language of article II.
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authorization even though not within the specific authorizing language
of any enactment. 20 3 This technique is less satisfactory in the case of
important agreements because of the increased likelihood that Congress would have required explicit legislative approval. In rare cases in
which an agreement must be made quickly, the executive's ability to act
with dispatch may furnish a countervailing consideration in determin2 °4
ing the scope of legislative authority.
This general principle may be useful even when article II confers
specific authority on the President to enter into executive agreements.
The importance of the agreement should be taken into account in determining whether it falls within the constitutional grant. For example,
the President's authority as Commander in Chief of the armed forces
may include the power to enter into "wartime agreements concerning
military matters, such as armistices, force deployments and control of
occupied areas. ' 20 5 Values of representation and deliberation indicate
that this grant to the executive probably should be viewed narrowly to
exclude fundamental policymaking to the extent possible. If the President is authorized to enter into armistice agreements, these agreements
might also contain ancillary provisions setting forth matters of detail.
To the extent, however, that the armistice seeks to govern matters of
substantial importance beyond the cessation of hostilities (such as the
long-range relations among nations), it becomes more likely that the
agreement exceeds the constitutional grant even though the matters
20 6
may be related in some sense to the armistice.
Because of the difficulty of assessing the importance of international agreements, some deference might be accorded to the President
in doubtful cases if neither individual constitutional rights nor express
congressional intent is involved. Congress, however, has the authority
to allocate this power under the necessary and proper clause, and if it is
exercised, courts should abide by the congressional allocation. Even
when the President has constitutional authority, most executive agree203. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
205. CongressionalOversight of Executive Agreements-1975: Hearingson S. 632 and S. 1251
Before the Subcomm. on Separation ofPowers ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 35 (1975) (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State) [hereinafter
cited as 1975 Executive Agreements Hearings]; see L. HENKIN, supra note 80, at 177.
206. If an armistice agreement concludes a declared war, an alternative analysis might explore
whether the agreement was authorized by language in the congressional declaration of war proposing certain goals to be achieved by the hostilities, or by other statutes governing the conduct of
the war, rather than by any form of direct presidential power. In any event, to the extent that
armistice agreements contemplate significant matters such as the proposed adjustment of boundaries or long range plans for the governance of a defeated enemy nation, some legislative authorization by statute or treaty probably would be necessary.
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ments fall within an area of shared presidential and congressional
power in which Congress' actions should control. 20 7 For example, international claims settlements related to the recognition of a foreign
regime may fall within the President's power to receive ambassadors,
but they also fall within Congress' power to regulate foreign commerce.
Therefore, legislation about foreign claims, including framework legislation regulating presidential action, should prevail over an inconsistent presidential settlement of claims even if the settlement is
undertaken in connection with the recognition of a foreign
208
government.
Although there have been several congressional attempts to legislate a framework for a more definite allocation of power, none has succeeded. 20 9 The most important general statute that relates to executive
agreements requires the Secretary of State to transmit executive agreements to Congress, or if the agreement is secret, to certain congressional committees. 2 10 Although this statute allows Congress to discover
what agreements have been made, it places no limit on the Executive's
ability to make agreements. 2 1" In contrast to its action on war powers,
207. See 1971 TransmittalHearings,supra note 196, at 27 (statement of Alexander Bickel)
(stating that the "vast bulk of executive agreements" lie within the "zone of twilight" which "may
be occupied by Congress at will"); cf. Henkin, supra note 62, at 771 (noting that ordinarily when
"the President has acted inconsistently with what Congress has prescribed, the courts have ruled
against the President").
208. See, e.g., 1976 InternationalAgreements Hearings,supra note 120, at 131 (statement of
Ruhl Bartlett); Note, Self-Executing Executive Agreements: A Separation oPowers Problem, 24
BUFFALO L. REV. 137, 154-55 (1974). Moreover, a court could consider preemption principles
when deciding whether Congress has precluded the President from exercising authority in the
area. See id at 155.
209. These attempts have focused particularly on the legislative veto. The most significant
attempt was the Morgan-Zablocki Bill, H.R. 4438, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 5569
(1975), which would have allowed a concurrent resolution of Congress to annul executive agreements contemplating the introduction, basing, or deployment of United States troops abroad or
the provision of military training or equipment to a foreign nation. See 1976 InternationalAgreements Hearings,supra note 120, at 2-3. For other proposals that provided for the nullification of
executive agreements by concurrent resolutions, see 1972 InternationalAgreementsHearings,supra
note 195, at 7 (discussing S. 4375, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972)); 1975 Executive Agreements Hearings, supra note 205, at 243, 254 (discussing S. 632, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) and S. 1251, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)). For a discussion of the apparent demise of the legislative veto see infra
subpart II(C).
It has also been proposed that Congress enact a provision similar to the State Department
procedure that requires consultation with "congressional leaders and committees" on the question
of whether a given agreement should be entered into as an executive agreement or as a treaty. See
1975 Executive Agreements Hearings,supra note 205, at 152-53 (statement of Adrian S. Fisher);
OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 196, at 202. This measure would be
analogous to the consultation provision of the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (1982),
and would allow the Executive to determine ultimately whether a particular agreement should be
submitted to the Senate as a treaty after the requisite "consultation" with Congress is completed.
210. See 1 U.S.C. § 112b (1982).
211. The history of this Act suggests the perils of half measures. Although Congress considered stronger means of controlling executive agreements, it enacted a reporting requirement only.
The Supreme Court cited this history as evidence that Congress has failed to object to executive
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therefore, Congress has failed to act comprehensively on problems
raised by executive agreements with foreign nations.
In summary, although the President prevailed in the Taiwan
Treaty and Iran agreement cases, the Supreme Court did not return to
the outer limit of presidential power proclaimed in Pink 21 2 and CurtissWright.2 13 The Carter administration invoked these decisions and argued for broad assertions of independent constitutional authority, but
the Court declined to endorse those claims. Particularly in Dames &
Moore, the Court was careful to base the result on inferences of congressional consent. 2 14 The Court neither denied the necessity of legislative authorization nor foreclosed the possibility of authoritative
congressional legislation on foreign affairs. Although the Court deferred to the President, what proved to be deference to the Executive in
the absence of specific congressional action may become deference to
Congress if it chooses to act.
C. CongressionalLimitations on Executive Action-The Case of the
Legislative Veto
When the Executive seeks to exercise broad policymaking powers
in either domestic or foreign affairs, judicial control of executive action
is limited by many factors. As the cases discussed above reflect, the
principles for allocation of policymaking authority are broad and difficult to apply; in foreign affairs cases especially, the requisite factual
determinations may be complex and far-reaching. Accordingly, it is
unlikely that the judiciary will be an effective bulwark against extensions of policymaking power. Rather, the history of Vietnam and the
Nixon administration suggests that effective limitations on the Executive must come from Congress. Congress began to confront this role
late in the Nixon era,215 and the extent of congressional limitations on
presidential power was a recurring issue during the Carter administration. As Congress soon discovered, however, the imposition of statutory limitations on the Executive raises its own difficult problems.
When Congress seeks to protect its policymaking role by limiting
or regulating executive action, it has a range of options from which to
choose. Perhaps the least restrictive method of congressional regula-

claims settlement agreements "even when it has had an opportunity to do so." Dames & Moore,
453 U.S. at 682 n.10.
212. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
213. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
214. 453 U.S. at 688.
215. See J. SUNDQUIST, supra note 67, at 199-314.
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tion is a requirement that the Executive report a specified type of action
to Congress.2 1 6 This device permits Congress to know that a significant
event has occurred and affords it an opportunity to react.2 1 7 A slightly
more intrusive method is to require consultation with Congress before
certain executive actions are undertaken. 218 Consultation provisions
may have only a limited effect, however, because a consultation requirement is easily circumvented by executive interpretation.2 19 A
third type of nonintrusive control requires executive certification that a
220
certain state of affairs exists before a particular action can be taken.
Although this appears to be a mandatory device, it is actually hortatory
in nature because the Executive's certification is ordinarily not subject
22
to effective review. '
In contrast, the most intrusive forms of congressional limitation
are carefully limited delegations of power or specific restrictions delineated by statute. 222 Although these limitations can theoretically restrict
the Executive effectively, they raise their own problems. First, because
the future cannot be readily predicted, it is difficult to define narrow
categories of authorization that will be adequate for unforeseen situations or for the regulation of rapidly changing problems. 2 23 Second,
the need for some executive flexibility does not coexist easily with rigid
2 24
statutory prohibitions enacted in advance.
216. E.g, I U.S.C. § 112b (1982) (requiring that executive agreements be reported to Congress
or congressional committees); 50 U.S.C. § 413 (Supp. V 198 1) (requiring that intelligence activities
be reported to congressional intelligence committees); War Powers Resolution, id § 1543 (1976)
(requiring that the dispatch of troops be repoited to Congress in certain cases).
217. Reporting requirements, especially those that require prior reports, can sometimes have
important effects. For example, the Reagan administration apparently cancelled a plan for a
covert operation aimed at overthrowing the government of Surinam after objections by congressional committees. See N.Y. Times, June 1, 1983, at Al, col. 5.
218. E.g, War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (1976) (requiring consultation with Congress before troops are dispatched into hostilities or imminent hostilities); International Security
Assistance Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 note (1982) (requiring consultation with Congress before
policy changes affecting the continuation in force of the Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 135-37.
220. E.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2370 note (1982) (making military aid to El Salvador conditional on
presidential certification of human rights progress).
221. For example, when President Reagan recently certified that significant progress in
human rights had been made in El Salvador, many doubted that the certified progress had been
made. One member of Congress remarked: "In the El Salvador situation, we were asking the
President to certify the uncertifiable knowing that the President would do so." N.Y. Times, July 5,
1983, at A12, cols. 3-5; see Billet, Book Review, 20 HARV. J. ON LEois. 663, 668-69 (1983).
222. E.g., Joint Resolution of July 1, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-52, § 108, 87 Stat. 130, 134 (withdrawing funds for bombing and other combat activities in Cambodia after August 15, 1973).
223. Commentators have noted that the time and prescience required for detailed statutory
drafting are often unavailable to a contemporary legislature. See Javits & Klein, Congressional
Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 455, 465 (1977);
McGowan, Congress, Court, and Controlof Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1119 (1977).
224. Cf. T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note 66, at 34-45 (arguing that a statutory prohibition of military aid to Turkey unduly restricted flexibility in foreign policy).
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The group of statutory devices referred to as the "legislative veto"
represents an intermediate position between the hortatory reporting,
consultation, and certification requirements, and inflexible prior statutory limitations. The increased use of this technique in the legislation
of the 1970s reflected its value as a device for retaining congressional
control over policy without unduly limiting the flexibility of executive
action. The legislative veto seeks to restrain executive policymaking
without resort to a reluctant judiciary. Instead of relying on adjudication, it represents an attempt to establish effective countervailing political power. The debate over the veto during the Carter administration
was of great significance because it questioned an important political
technique by which Congress attempted to create an equipoise to executive power across a broad range of government activity.
A legislative veto is a statutory provision that subjects executive or
agency action to the acquiescence of one or both houses of Congress or
a committee as a condition precedent to its effectiveness. 225 A veto dilutes the natural advantage of the executive branch as the acting
branch of government. Ordinarily, if the Executive or an agency acts
under a claim of statutory or independent authority and Congress disapproves, Congress must bear the burden of the time, effort, and political compromises required to pass a statute that makes such actions
impermissible.2 26 By suspending the validity of certain executive actions pending Congressional approval or disapproval, the device mitigates the Executive's advantage, and in some instances reverses the
burden of political action.
The magnitude of the interests at stake is reflected in the condem225. Congress has enacted a wide variety of legislative veto provisions. See generally Dixon,
The Congressional Veto and SeparationofPowers- The Executive on a Leash, 56 N.C.L. REv. 423
(1978); Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at CongressionalControl ofthe Executive, 63 CALIF.
L. REv. 983 (1975). Some provisions, for example, allow executive or administrative action to
become effective unless Congress acts to block the measure. Other provisions require affirmative
approval before the measure can become effective. Under various statutes, power to exercise the
veto is granted to one or both houses of Congress or to one or more congressional committees.
A less effective variant of the veto is the "report and wait provision," which requires the
reporting of proposed regulations or other executive action to Congress and delays the effectiveness of that action for a specified period while Congress has the opportunity to invalidate the
measure by ordinary legislation. See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 15 (1941).
226. Even if the statute passes both houses of Congress, it may be vetoed by the President and
the veto can be sustained by a small minority of Congress--one-third plus one of the members of
either house. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7. Moreover, even if the statute is enacted, it cannot undo
executive actions already taken. Although a court may find the Executive's action unauthorized
by statute, this result is unlikely in the case of a broad delegation of power. See, e.g., AFL-CIO v.
Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir.) (en band), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979). Judicial interference
is particularly unlikely in foreign affairs. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654
(1981).
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nation of the legislative veto by all recent presidents.2 27 President
Carter did not vary this pattern; he considered the legislative veto to be
both unconstitutional and unwise.228 According to President Carter,
the device often injects the Congress into administration and "infringe[s] on the Executive's constitutional duty to faithfully execute the
laws. '229 Moreover, it has "the effect of legislation while denying the
President the opportunity to exercise his veto." 230 President Carter
threatened to disregard legislative veto provisions because of their asserted unconstitutionality and in at least one instance carried out that
threat. 23 1 Often, however, political exigency required the President to
sign bills with legislative vetoes, and administration officials sometimes
acquiesced in legislative veto provisions. 232 Moreover, President
227. See INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2779 n.13 (1983). But see id at 2794-95 & n.5
(White, J., dissenting) (noting occasional presidential approval of legislative veto provisions).
228. Message from President Carter to Congress, I PUB. PAPERS: JIMMY CARTER 1146 (1978),
reprinted in Regulatory Reform and CongressionalReview of Agency Rules (Part 1): Hearings on
H.R. 1776 Before the Subcomm. on Rules ofthe House Comm. on Rules, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 375
(1979) [hereinafter cited as CongressionalReview Hearings].
229. Id at 1147, reprintedin CongressionalRediew Hearings at 375.
230. Id In sum, the veto "threatens to upset the constitutional balance of responsibilities
between the branches of government of the United States. It represents a fundamental departure
from the way the government has been administered throughout American history." Id at 1146,
reprintedin CongressionalReview Hearings at 375.
231. In 1980, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti advised the Secretary of Education not to
recognize the congressional veto of certain regulations by concurrent resolution, because to do so
would neglect the responsibility of the executive branch. See Oversight Hearingon Congressional
Disapprovalof EducationRegulations: HearingBefore a Subcomm. of the House Commr on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Education Hearing]; Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Administrative Law: Delegation, the Legislative Veto, and the
"Independent"Agencies, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1064, 1078 (1981). As a result, the Secretary continued
to enforce a regulation that Congress had vetoed. See id at 1078-79 n.55.
In other instances, President Carter announced that legislative veto provisions would be
treated either as "report and wait" requirements or as advisory statements. See, e.g., 2 PUB. PAPERS: JIMMY CARTER 2186-87 (1977) (provision for terminating a presidentially declared "national emergency" by concurrent resolution of Congress); 2 id at 1696-97 (1978) (committee
approval provision in Futures Trading Act of 1978); id at 1718 (provision for a one-house veto of
Amtrak route recommendations); id at 1721 (provision for a one-house veto relating to the personnel system of the Agency for International Development); id at 1999-2000 (provision requiring
a concurrent resolution of Congress to permit certain exchanges of federal for private lands); 1 id
at 432-33 (1980-1981) (committee veto provision in National Parks and Recreation Act amendments); 2 id at 1592 (two-house veto provision for marine sanctuary designations); id at 1668
(provision requiring a concurrent resolution of Congress to permit Defense Department Authorization Act waivers); 3 id at 2803 (two-house veto provision in National Historical Preservation
Act amendments); id at 2837 (two-house veto provision in Farm Credit Act amendments).
President Carter occasionally vetoed legislation because it contained legislative veto provisions. See, e.g., 2 id at 1925-26 (1978) (Navajo and Hopi Relocation Bill); I id at 4-5 (1980-1981)
(bill providing for a study of the health effects of dioxin). President Carter also called for a swift
constitutional test of a two-house veto provision relating to Federal Trade Commission regulations. 2 id at 982-83.
232. See, e.g., L. FISHER, supra note 190, at 106 (noting that Carter administration officials
acquiesced in legislative veto provisions relating to arms sales and war powers); id at 94-95 (noting that President Carter approved a one-house veto provision in a proposed gasoline rationing
plan); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDIES ON THE LEGISLATIVE
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Carter supported a one-house veto in an executive reorganization bill,
and Attorney General Bell issued an opinion endorsing its

constitutionality.

233

In some areas, such as war powers and impoundment, legislative
veto provisions have imposed congressional limitations on executive
assertions of independent constitutional power.2 3 4 More typically,
however, Congress has included legislative veto provisions in statutes
that delegate broad authority to the Executive or to an administrative
agency to act in a particular area.2 35 The effect of this arrangement is
to confer a substantial amount of policymaking authority upon the Executive or agency, but to subject that authority to continuing congressional review.
In these cases, the imposition of the legislative veto can be viewed
in at least three different ways. First, because the legislative veto prevents the Executive from taking action that might otherwise fall within
a statutory delegation, the veto can be viewed as new legislation withdrawing authority that Congress had previously granted to the Executive. The Carter administration adopted this view, and argued that the
device is unconstitutional because it circumvents the requirements for
236
the passage of new legislation set forth in the presentation clause,
2 37
and particularly the provision for a presidential veto.
VETO 2 (Comm. Print 1980) (noting that the Office of Management and Budget supported a onehouse veto provision in the Impoundment Control Act).
233. 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 10 (1977). Although Bell viewed legislative veto provisions as
"constitutionally suspect," he argued that the proposed executive reorganization statute was distinguishable from other legislation containing congressional vetoes. Because reorganization plans
would be proposed by the President and would become effective if neither house objected, "the
two Houses of Congress and the President [would possess] the same relative power as under the
normal Article I legislative process." Id President Carter held the same opinion. See Message
from President Carter to Congress, supra note 228, at 1146-47, reprintedin CongressionalReview
Hearings at 375; ProvidingReorganizationAuthority to the President: Hearingson HR. 3131, H.R.
3407, and HR. 3442 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 95th
Cong., Ist Sess. 26-55 (1977) (testimony of various Administration officials) [hereinafter cited as
Reorganization Hearings]. As ultimately enacted, the Reorganization Act of 1977 contained a
broad delegation of power to the President, coupled with a one-house veto provision. 5 U.S.C.
§§ 901-912 (1982). See generally J. CARTER, su.pra note 2, at 69-71.
234. See, ag., War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (1976) (requiring the withdrawal of armed forces upon concurrent resolution of Congress); Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. § 684 (1982) (authorizing a single house veto of
executive deferrals of authorized expenditures); see also Henry, The Legislative Veto: In Search of
ConstitutionalLimits, 16 HARV. J. ON LEcis. 735, 736 n.6 (1979) (discussing legislation requiring
the withdrawal of United States technicians monitoring Sinai agreement, upon concurrent resolution of Congress).
235. See Abourezk, The CongressionalVeto: A ContemporaryResponse to Executive Encroachments on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L.J. 323, 324 (1977).
236. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
237. See, e.g., CongressionalReviewHearings,supra note 228, at 448-49 (memorandum of Justice Department); id at 375 (message of President Carter); Education Hearing,supra note 231, at
15 n.7 (letter from Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti).
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Second, a legislative veto can be viewed as a declaration by Congress or a part of Congress that the measure taken by the Executive or
238
an agency exceeds the authority delegated by the underlying statute.
Attorney General Civiletti responded to this view by asserting that if it
were correct, the veto would be unconstitutional because the interpretation of legislation is ordinarily entrusted to the judiciary or to the Exec2 39
utive in the implementation of legislation, but not to Congress.
A third possible view, however, is that a legislative veto does nothing more than set forth a reasonable condition precedent to the effectiveness of legislation or related regulations. 240 If Congress can require
the approval of two-thirds of the affected tobacco growers before certain agriculture regulations become effective, 24 ' Congress should be
able to require a vote of one or both of its houses (or their silence) as a
condition precedent to the validity of other executive or administrative
regulations. 242 According to this argument, Congress possesses power
under the necessary and proper clause to assure that action taken under
a statute has a substantial measure of democratic support at the time of
its implementation. 243 The purpose of the condition precedent is to
provide this assurance. Under this view, the legislative veto is a
method of maintaining democratic and representative control of
government. 244
238. Some statutes expressly limit the legislative veto to instances in which the vetoing body
finds that the executive action exceeded statutory authority. See Bruff & Gelihorn, Congressional
Controlof,4administrativeRegulation: 4 Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1369, 1386
(1977) (discussing the 1974 General Education Provisions Act amendments); see also Education
Hearing,supra note 231, at 2 (statement of Rep. Carl D. Perkins) ("[In exercising legislative vetoes] I feel strongly that we in Congress have a responsibility to see that the laws we write are
properly implemented by the executive branch and that the regulations promulgated by the Department do not go beyond the statutes.").
239. See Education Hearing, supra note 231, at 8 (letter of Attorney General Benjamin
Civiletti).
240. See, e.g., CongressionalReview Hearings, supra note 228, at 143 (statement of Rep.
Mickey Edwards); Abourezk, supra note 235, at 336-37; Ginnane, The Control ofFederalAdministration by CongressionalResolutionsand Committees, 66 HARV. L. REV. 569, 595 (1953) (offering a
summary and critique of this view).
241. See Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1939).
242. See, e.g., Cooper & Cooper, The Legislative Veto andthe Constitution, 30 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 467, 475-76 (1962).
243. See infra note 244.
244. See, e.g., Reorganization Hearings, supra note 233, at 91 (testimony of Laurence Tribe)
("[T]he legislative veto provision, when Congress seeks to use it as a method of more closely
policing administrative agencies or the executive branch, may well be a perfectly constitutional
device for enhancing constitutional accountability."). But see Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 238, at
1417 (arguing that "political accountability is likely to be attenuated in practice").
Certain forms of the legislative veto raise intricate conceptual issues of representative control.
If the veto is effected by one house, for example, a minority arguably is denying the Executive the
benefit of a statutory policy on which a consensus has been achieved. On the other hand, a statute
that contains a broad delegation may represent a consensus only on a general approach to the
problem, and more specific measures contained in regulations subject to the veto arguably should
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In 1983, the Supreme Court struck down a legislative veto provision in INS v. Chadha.245 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger adopted the first view of the legislative veto-the view also held by
President Carter 246-and delivered a sweeping opinion that discussed
far more than the narrow issue presented to the Court. 247 According to
the Chief Justice, when "any Branch acts, it is presumptively exercising

the power the Constitution has delegated to

'

it."248

Consequently, the

House's veto of a Justice Department ruling exempting an alien from
deportation was "presumptively" a legislative act. Moreover, because
the statute permitted the House to alter legal rights and duties and replaced an historical practice of congressional enactment of private immigration bills, the House had acted legislatively.2 49 The Court then
found the legislative veto provision to be unconstitutional on the
ground that under article I legislative action may be taken only by a
vote of both houses and presentment to the President for his signature
or veto.250 Although the case was susceptible of a more limited resolution, Chief Justice Burger's opinion seemed to refer to all uses of the
be re-endorsed by a majority in order to assure that these measures are also the product of popular
support. If neither house disapproves of a regulation, there is evidence of continued popular
support. Conversely, the disapproval of one house may indicate a lack of popular consensus.
Therefore, a one-house veto may not violate principles of bicameralism. See CongressionalReview
Hearings,supra note 228, at 144 (statement of Rep. Mickey Edwards) ("[T]he principle of bicameralism is not violated by the one-house veto. The principle of bicameralism requires in essence
that both houses approve in the cases where the principle applies. If one house disapproves of an
administrative rule, then both houses do not approve of it."); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I,
285 n.30 (1976) (White, J., concurring) ("Disapproval [by one house] nullifies the suggested regulation and prevents the occurrence of any change in the law. . . It is as though a bill passed in
one House and failed in another."). In contrast, a veto of executive action by a congressional
committee is more difficult to justify on the grounds of continuing popular support. See general ,
Nathanson, supra note 231, at 1091-92 (discussing committee vetoes in the administrative process).
245. 103 S.Ct. 2764 (1983). Later in the same term, the Supreme Court issued memorandum
opinions striking down other legislative veto provisions. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983) (invalidating a one-house veto of a natural
gas pricing rule); United States Senate v. FTC, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983) (invalidating a two-house
veto of an FTC regulation). For an earlier example of a lower court decision upholding a legislative veto, see Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (upholding a one-house veto of
salary increases proposed by the President for federal judges), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
246. See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
247. Chadha was a peculiar case for a sweeping opinion, because it considered an unusual
provision allowing the legislative veto of an executive decision concerning a specific individual,
rather than the veto of an executive or administrative rule. Section 1254(c)(2) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982), authorized either house to veto a Justice Department decision permitting a deportable alien to remain in the United States on grounds of
"extreme hardship." After Mr. Chadha's visa expired, the Justice Department determined that
deportation would subject him to extreme hardship and recommended suspension of his deportation. It was this determination that was "vetoed" by a vote of the House of Representatives. See
103 S.Ct. at 2770-71.
248. Id at 2784.
249. Id at 2784-86.
250. Id at 2787.
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legislative veto. According to the Chief Justice, "Congress must abide
by its delegation of authority until that delegation is legislatively altered
25 1
or revoked.
In a powerful dissent, Justice White argued that the legislative
veto has not been used as a means of congressional aggrandizement,
but rather as a defense against the growth of executive and administrative power. 252 He argued that the increased complexity of government
forced "Congress [to] rely on the legislative veto as the most effective if
not the only means to insure their [sic] role as the nation's
lawmakers. '2 53 Thus, he concluded that the Court's decision, which
"strikes down in one fell swoop provisions in more laws enacted by
Congress than the Court has cumulatively invalidated in its history,"
'254
may have a profound impact on the "modem administrative state.
The crux of Justice White's dissent was the argument that even
though the congressional veto may be "legislative," it does not follow
that the sole participation of one or both houses in this form of "legisla251. Id at 2786 (emphasis added). In his concurrence, Justice Powell observed that the
Court's decision "apparently will invalidate every use of the legislative veto." Id at 2788 (Powell,
J., concurring). "The breadth of this holding," Powell continued, "gives one pause. Congress has
included the veto in literally hundreds of statutes, dating back to the 1930s." Id Justice Powell
favored a narrower holding based on what he argued was Congress' attempt to exercise judicial
power by "decid[ing] rights of specific persons." Id at 2792.
As Justice Powell indicated, the peculiar form of the legislative veto at issue in Chadhawhich gave Congress the power to determine the rights of specific individuals-may well violate
that aspect of the separation of powers principle which is intended to further the rule of law. One
of the primary functions of the separation of powers is to implement the rule of law by assuring
that burdens are not imposed on individuals except pursuant to general rules known in advance.
If burdens can be placed on individuals without a prior general rule, there is an increased danger
of arbitrary or discriminatory government action. See Quint, supra note 3, at 39-40. Although
these dangers are most commonly raised by executive action undertaken in the absence of a prior
legislative rule, see, e.g., infra Part III, the dangers are not confined to the acts of executive officers. For example, a legislative bill of attainder violates this fundamental principle because in
enacting such a statute the legislature proceeds against an individual without a general rule set
down in advance. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); see also Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (stressing the dangers posed by congressional committees that
are unrestrained by prior general rules). Similarly, when a single house of Congress imposes
burdens on a specific, named individual through the type of legislative veto employed in Chadha,
basic separation of powers principles are violated because the action is taken without the restrictions of a prior general rule: there were no statutory limitations on the factors that could be
considered by the House in vetoing Mr. Chadha's exemption from deportation. This argument is
not affected by the fact that the veto in Chadha canceled an exception to a legal burden, instead of
imposing a new legal burden. The risk of discriminatory or arbitrary action is still present. Cf.
Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 426 n.23 (9th Cir. 1980) (" 'In immigration matters, in particular,
[the one-house veto provision] frustrates proper administration andputsapremium on extraneous
considerationsin the determination oflegalrights.' ") (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, WHOM SHALL WE WELCOME 213-14 (1953)) (emphasis added),
af'd, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
252. 103 S. Ct. at 2796 (White, J., dissenting).
253. Id at 2798.
254. Id at2810-11.
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tive" act violates the requirements of article I.255 The force of this argument is most apparent if it is disentangled from the peculiar facts of
Chadha 256 and applied to the most common form of legislative vetothe veto of an executive or administrative rule.257 Certainly the exercise of a congressional veto is "legislative" in the sense that any step in
the establishment or rejection of a general rule governing conduct is
legislative. In the same sense, issuance of a rule by the Executive under
delegated authority is "legislative," and therefore Congress could supersede any executive rule by statute, except in the rare instances in
which the Executive is exercising an independent and exclusive
power.25 8 Despite the basically legislative nature of rulemaking, the
Constitution permits the delegation of much legislative responsibility to
the Executive. Indeed, as Justice White remarked, "For some time, the
sheer amount of law-the substantive rules that regulate private conduct and direct the operation of government-made by the agencies
has far outnumbered the lawmaking engaged in by Congress through
2 59
the traditional process."
Consequently, the exercise of delegated power by the Executive,
particularly the power to make broad general rules, could be considered improper legislation in violation of various provisions of article I,
including the presentation clause. 260 Despite this possible argument,
the executive and administrative agencies are permitted to undertake
this lawmaking function because Congress possesses the power under
the necessary and proper clause to choose the means by which its decisions are implemented, and these include broad or general delegations
of rulemaking authority. 26' Congress has this power even though its
255. Id at 2802-04.
256. See supra note 247.
257. This basic argument has been advanced in Schwartz, CongressionalVeto in the Conduct of
Foreign Policy, in THE TETHERED PRESIDENCY 77 (1981); see also 1976 InternationalAgreements
Hearings,supra note 120, at 43-44 (statement of Gerhard Casper); Abourezk, supra note 235, at
332-33.
258. Although early decisions did not view executive rulemaking as legislative, see, e.g.,
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), that fiction has
long been abandoned, see, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
Recent cases have explicitly recognized the legislative character of executive rulemaking. See,
e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474-75 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (finding that under OSHA, "the decision-making vested in the Secretary [of Labor] is legislative in
character"). See generally Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power (pts. I & II), 47
COLUM. L. REv. 359, 561 (1947).
259. 103 S. Ct. at 2802 (White, J., dissenting). For a similar view, see Rosenberg, Beyond the
Limits of Executive Power: PresidentialControl of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order
12,291, 80 MIcH. L. REv. 193, 209 (1981).
260. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; see Schwartz, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution-A Reexamination, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 351, 370, 374 (1978).
261. When individual rights are not involved, the doctrine that limits Congress' ability to dele-
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choice of means may violate certain formal distinctions between legislative and executive functions.2 62 When individual rights are not at
issue, therefore, the generality of the necessary and proper clause allows Congress to grant legislative authority to the Executive in a manner that overrides what might otherwise be the apparent structural
requirements of the separation of powers.
If Congress has the power under the necessary and proper clause
to disregard certain aspects of article I in granting legislative power to
the Executive, it is not clear why Congress may not condition the exercise of this power in ways that lessen the danger of the delegation by
retaining some form of congressional review such as the legislative
veto. The Court's argument that these conditions constitute impermissible lawmaking without the formalities required by the presentation
clause misses the point. As Justice White pointed out, once one has
reached the conclusion that the necessary and proper clause enables
Congress to delegate broad power to agencies to "issue regulations having the force of law without bicameral approval and without the President's signature," it is "not apparent why the reservation of a veto over
the exercise of that legislative power must be subject to a more exacting
test. In both cases, it is enough that the initial statutory authorizations
'263
comply with the Article I requirements.
Justice White's view complements the proposition urged in this
Article that the need for congressional deliberation and support of a
policy becomes more pressing as the social importance of the policy
increases. This principle requires the choice of values along a continuum based on complex factual determinations that are often better left
to Congress than to the courts. Accordingly, the imposition of a legislative veto provision can be seen as a congressional determination that
in a particular area executive policy decisions are likely to be of sufficient importance to require continuing congressional supervision. In
both domestic and foreign affairs, Congress may not be able to identify
the specific future actions that will require its supervision; instead, a
gate power is widely thought to be "moribund." See Federal Power Comm'n v. New Eng. Power
Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352-54 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring). But see Industrial Union Dep't, AFLCIO, v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (arguing
that the nondelegation doctrine should have some continuing force). The decision to grant broad
policymaking powers to the Executive is itself a congressional policy decision. For example, the
decision may be that the regulated area is poorly understood or in a state of flux, and that it is
therefore not susceptible to the imposition of narrower standards with the inflexibility of statutory
law. It is also a decision, however, that regulatory power should be vested in the Executive, even
though detailed principles of regulation may not be agreed upon. Political consensus has determined the necessity of some general form of regulation.
262. See Abourezk, supra note 235, at 332.
263. 103 S. Ct. at 2802 (White, J., dissenting).
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device is needed to facilitate congressional intervention when necessary. A legislative veto provision reflects the determination under the
necessary and proper clause that, although practicality requires certain
important decisions to be made by the Executive in the first instance,
uncabined executive power presents an undue risk of unrepresentative
executive lawmaking in areas that are of basic social importance and
therefore of fundamental legislative concern.
This analysis suggests that the Chadha Court failed to address a
pivotal issue. The Court neglected to consider its own proper role in
adjudicating the allocation of policymaking authority between Congress and the President. Proponents of executive power have frequently argued that separation of powers questions involving the
proper allocation of policymaking authority should generally be remitted to the political process rather than to the courts. 264 When individual rights are not at stake, this view has some merit because the
disputed interests are majoritarian and institutional in nature and thus
amenable to the political process. This proposition, however, should
counsel judicial restraint in reviewing legislative as well as executive
action. A principal function of congressional power under the necessary and proper clause is to permit continuing majoritarian adjustment
of structures that affect the allocation of policymaking authority. This
certainly seems to have been the premise of the cases that upheld broad
delegations of policymaking power and established the contours of the
modern administrative state.265 To deprive Congress of all legislative
vetoes is to withdraw an important political tool for allocating general
policymaking authority between the legislative and the executive
branches. This result will make it more difficult to resolve majoritarian
disputes by majoritarian political processes in a manner that preserves
both executive flexibility and the values of legislative deliberation and
consent.
The fundamental, continuing question raised by Chadha is what
practical restraints may be imposed upon executive policymaking by
Congress after the demise of the legislative veto. Following a reaction
against excessive executive claims in the early 1970s, the legislative veto
assumed a major role in a practical political accommodation. The importance of the veto is evidenced by its inclusion in almost 200 statutes
264. See, e.g., Mikva & Hertz, Impoundment of Funds-The Courts, the Congress and the President: A ConstitutionalTriangle, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 335, 352-55 (1974) (discussing the Nixon administration's claim that executive impoundment presented a nonjusticiable political question).
Various commentators have also taken this position. E.g., J. CHOPER, supra note 12, at 263; Levi,
Some Aspects of the Separation ofPowers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371 (1976).
265. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
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and in framework legislation such as the War Powers Resolution and
the Impoundment Control Act.266 President Carter asserted that the
legislative veto was an undue limitation on the Executive. 267 More accurately, however, the legislative veto did not restrain the Executive
unduly, but sought to redress an historical imbalance of power. In
striking down the veto, the Court has interfered with this historic accommodation. As is not unusual when the Court interferes with broad
political adjustments of power, the ultimate effects of the decision are
difficult to predict. 268 It remains to be seen whether Congress can fashion alternative devices that will achieve legislative control over executive policymaking without unduly limiting executive and
administrative flexibility.
III.

Executive Actions That Endanger Individual Liberties

The preceding section considered the allocation of general policymaking authority between Congress and the President in domestic
and foreign affairs and discussed the issues involved in determining
which branch is better suited to make various decisions of policy. A
different separation of powers problem arises when the Executive takes
action that threatens to infringe individual liberties without specific
legislative authorization. In these cases, the separation of powers doctrine involves more than the institutional question of the proper allocation of decisionmaking competence; it involves the fundamental
question of how best to protect individual rights. 269 Executive action
taken against individual constitutional interests without the prior enactment of a congressional rule poses several dangers. First, there is an
increased risk that the action may have been undertaken to penalize the
266. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. This technique also figured prominently in
legislative proposals to regulate presidential executive agreements. See supra note 209.
267. See supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text.
268. One immediate question raised by Chadha is the extent to which the decision invalidates
actions previously taken under statutes with legislative veto provisions. See, e.g., EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 570 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D. Miss. 1983) (holding an EEOC regulation invalid because
the EEOC received its authority to issue the regulation under a 1978 reorganization statute that
contained a legislative veto provision); N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1983, at AS, col. 6 (discussing arguments of former Nixon aides that regulations for the custody of Nixon historical materials are
invalid because they were issued after prior regulations were struck down by a legislative veto).
Moreover, the precise coverage of the Chadha holding must still be defined. See, e.g., National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Watt, 571 F. Supp. 1145 (D.D.C. 1983) (stating that a committee veto of proposed oil leases may be valid because Chadha may not apply to congressional action under U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 3); Javits, Who Decides on War, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at
106, col. 2 (suggesting that Chadha may not apply to the concurrent resolution procedure in the
War Powers Act).
269. The points set forth in this and the following paragraph are discussed in detail in Quint,
supra note 3, at 39-52.
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individual on impermissible bases, such as political hostility. Without
the restrictions of a specific prior rule, the Executive may be able to
proceed against an individual and mask impermissible motivations
with a post hoc, neutral justification. 270 Second, unless the specific
prior rule is made by Congress, members of the executive branch who
tend to identify strongly with the government's interest may assign the
legitimate government interest an unduly high weight and undervalue
the liberty interest of the individual. Recent history indicates that this
danger of distorted assessment by the Executive is particularly great in
disputes concerning law enforcement and national security-precisely
those areas in which some of the most severe risks to individual rights
are presented. 27 1
Therefore, judicial enforcement of an executive action against individuals in the absence of clear legislative authority is particularly
troublesome when individual constitutional rights are affected. When
a court upholds a government action against a claim that a constitutional right has been violated, the court has accepted to some extent the
government's claim that its interest is strong enough to overcome the
countervailing constitutional interest.2 72 Since the government's claim
may rest on distorted weighing or discriminatory motivations, executive action potentially endangering individual constitutional rights ordinarily should not be permitted unless Congress has weighed the
government and constitutional interests and explicitly authorized the
273
executive action at issue.
The Carter administration took several actions that illustrate the
dangers to individual liberties that occur when the Executive acts without specific legislative authorization. In each of these instances, the
Administration convinced the courts that the measures should be upheld against individuals. These measures included enforcement of
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) secrecy agreements, the withdrawal
270. Moreover, when the Executive acts against a political critic without a prior rule, political
hostility may result in more oppressive treatment than would otherwise have been chosen. See id
at 45.
271. For a discussion of the structural pressures that encourage this tendency in the Executive,
see id at 47-52.
272. See id at 53-54.
273. See id at 52-65 (discussing structural opportunities for the balanced protection of individual rights that are present in congressional consideration). Specific legislative authorization
should be viewed as a necessary but not sufficient condition to the constitutionality of executive
action that threatens the constitutionally protected interests of individuals. If a court finds that the
executive action is specifically authorized by statute-the court must then proceed to determine the
constitutionality of the authorized action. Cf. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990
(W.D. Wis.) (testing a prior restraint that was specifically authorized by statute against the applicable first amendment doctrine), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
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of a passport from a dissident former CIA agent, selective enforcement
of student visa regulations against Iranian nationals, and warrantless
electronic surveillance of individuals. In these cases, the Carter administration advanced strong claims of executive power that bore a resemblance to those urged by the Department of Justice under President
Nixon. 274 On the other hand, the Carter administration also attempted
to implement a degree of self-limitation by executive rulemaking when
certain constitutional rights of individuals were threatened. 275 These
attempts, however, were tentative and incomplete. Their ultimate fate
illustrates the fragility of executive self-restraint as an adequate protection for constitutional liberties.
A.

Restrictions on Publicationsby Former CIA Agents-Snepp v.
United States

The vigorous and innovative action of the Carter administration
against the publishing activity of former CIA agents was an important
example of executive action that threatened the constitutional rights of
individuals without explicit statutory authorization. In 1977 Frank
Snepp, a former agent, published a "highly critical account" of the
CIA's actions during the 1975 American evacuation of Saigon. 276 The
book was published without prior clearance by the CIA, in violation of
277
a secrecy agreement that Snepp signed when he joined the Agency.
Since the government had not foreseen the publication of this volume,
it could not obtain an injunction against publication, such as that issued against a former agent in an earlier case. 278 Instead, the Justice
Department filed a civil action against Snepp, seeking contract damages for violation of the secrecy agreement or an accounting of al profits resulting from the publication. 279
The arguments of the Justice Department in this unprecedented
274. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Quint, supra note 3, at 9-14, 18-25.
275. See infra notes 304-14 and accompanying text.
276. United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 931 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd in part, 444 U.S. 507
(1980) (per curiam); see F. SNEPP, DECENT INTERVAL (1977).
277. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 511 (1980) (per curiam).
278. An injunction against publication was issued in United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972); see also Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d
1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975) (a later proceeding in the Marchetti litigation).
After President Carter took office, the new Administration apparently was asked to relax the
government's position on the injunction against Marchetti, but declined to do so. See Freedom of
Information Act: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Administrative Practiceand Procedureof the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118-19 (1977) (statement of ACLU attorney
Mark Lynch) [hereinafter cited as 1977 FOZA Hearings].
279. United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Va. 1978), rev'dinpart, 595 F.2d 926 (4th
Cir. 1979), rev'dinpart, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam) (reinstating the district court judgment);
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action required some ingenuity because there was no specific statutory
authorization for the secrecy agreement, and therefore no statutorily
authorized method of enforcement. 280 The Administration sought to
establish Snepp's liability by relying on commercial conflict of interest
cases against government and private employees and on cases enforcing commercial noncompetition agreements. 28 1 The Administration
argued that these cases supported the conclusion that Snepp had violated a fiduciary relationship created by the CIA secrecy agreement
and that a constructive trust-an accounting of profits from the bookwas the appropriate remedy.2 82 In effect, the government argued that
commercial noncompetition cases, which raise no first amendment or
other constitutional claims, should furnish a rule of decision when first
amendment interests confront the government interest in national security and foreign relations. Reliance on this "authority" indicates the
extent to which the judiciary was writing on a clean slate, and therefore
the degree to which the Executive was asking the judiciary to implement an executive policy that potentially infringed first amendment
283
rights without legislative guidance.
The Supreme Court upheld the district court's imposition of a constructive trust on Snepp's profits. 28 4 According to the Court, the CIA
see Quint, supra note 3, at 65-69. Both Attorney General Bell and CIA Director Turner favored
filing suit against Snepp. See G. BELL, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW 128-29 (1982).
280. The government relied on the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3)
(1976), which requires the Director of Central Intelligence to protect "intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure." See also id § 403g (exempting CIA from disclosing personnel information). For arguments that these statutes do not provide authority for the secrecy
agreement, see Quint, supra note 3, at 65-67; Note, Enforcement of CI4 Secrecy Agreements. 4
ConstitutionalAnaolsis, 15 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 455, 461-67 (1980); Comment, National
Security andthe FirstAmendment: The C14 in the Markeiplaceof Ideas, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 655, 693-98 (1979).
281. See, e.g., United States v. Drumm, 329 F.2d 109 (1st Cir. 1964) (holding that a poultry
inspector breached a fiduciary duty when he served as a consultant to a company being inspected);
Singer v. A. Hollander & Son, 202 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1953) (holding that a factory manager who
disclosed his employer's trade secrets to a company in which the manager had an interest violated
a fiduciary duty). For other cases relied on by the government, see Brief for the Appellee at 61-65,
United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd in part, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per
curiam) [hereinafter cited as Brief for the United States].
282. See Brief for the United States, supra note 281, at 60-68; Easterbrook, Insider Trading,
Secret Agents, EvidentiaryPrivileges, and the Productionof Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 309,
339-52.
283. [I]t is important to recognize that the issue should not be viewed as a simple matter
[T]hese non-disclosure agreements are not really contracts.
of private contract law ....
They are laws enacted by the Government, imposed upon Government employees and
ex-employees that deeply affect the whole system of freedom of expression. They must
be viewed in First Amendment terms, not private contract terms.
EspionageLaws andLeaks: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Legislation of the House Permanent
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 179 (1979) (statement of Professor Thomas I.
Emerson) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Espionage Laws Hearings].
284. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam), rev'g inpart 595 F.2d 926 (4th
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secrecy agreement was authorized by Congress, and the constructive
trust and prospective injunction remedies did not violate the first
amendment. 285 Furthermore, the opinion in Snepp acknowledged a
degree of executive power actually broader than that claimed by the
government. For example, the Court suggested that even without a
contractual arrangement the CIA might impose enforceable secrecy restrictions against former employees by regulation. 28 6 Moreover, the
Court implied that an enforceable fiduciary relationship might arise
without express agreement or regulation from "the nature of Snepp's
duties and his conceded access to confidential sources and materials."' 287 This language suggested that other government employees
with access to "confidential sources and materials" might be subject to
enforceable fiduciary duties of confidentiality even without a secrecy
agreement or express regulation. 288 Snepp has been widely viewed as a
portentous and disturbing decision with unclear implications for first
289
amendment doctrine.
After its victory in Snepp, the government commenced similar actions against other former CIA employees who had failed to submit
their manuscripts to the CIA for clearance before publication. 29 0 One
Cir. 1979), rev'g inpart456 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Va. 1978). The Court reversed the Fourth Circuit,
which had held that a constructive trust was improper and had remanded the case for assessment
of possible exemplary damages.
285. Id at 509 n.3. For statutory authority, the Court relied on 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1976).
See supra note 280.
286. 444 U.S. at 509 n.3.
287. Id at 511 n.6; see id at 515 n. 11 (noting that an employee has a fiduciary duty to protect
confidential information).
288. This inference may be qualified by the Court's observation that "[flew types of governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that reposed in a CIA employee with
Snepp's duties." Id at 511 n.6. It has also been argued, however, that Snepp might allow an
agency to excise "harmful" or "detrimental" information from an employee's publications, even
though the information is neither classified nor classifiable pursuant to executive order. See PrepublicationReview andSecrecy RequirementsImposed upon FederalEmployees: HearingBefore the
Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary,96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 19 (1980) (statement of Professor Charles C. Marson).
289. See, e.g., NationalIntelligence Act of 1980: Hearingson S, 2284 Before the Senate Select
Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (stating that
Snepp may have a chilling effect on executive department "whistleblowers") [hereinafter cited as
1980 Senate Intelligence Hearings];Medow, The FirstAmendment and the Secrecy State: Snepp v.
United States, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 775 (1982) (analyzing Snepp from a first amendment
perspective).
290. See, e.g., United States v. Stockwell, No. 80-207-A (E.D. Va. filed Mar. 3, 1980). Stockwell was a former agent who published a book about CIA involvement in Angola without prior
review. J. STOCKWELL, IN SEARCH OF ENEMIES (1978). Stockwell apparently settled the case by
assigning the book's future profits to the government and by promising to submit future material
to the CIA for prepublication review. See Comment, Snepp v. United States: The CIA Secrecy
Agreement and the FirstAmendment, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 662, 664 n.9 (1981).
More recently, the Justice Department under the Reagan administration reached a settlement
with former CIA Director William Colby in which Colby transferred profits from the European
edition of his memoirs to the government. Colby's publisher had apparently sent a copy of the
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of these defendants was Philip Agee, a former CIA agent who was the
author or co-author of works about the CIA that criticized activities of
the Agency and revealed the names of alleged agents.2 9 ' The Justice
Department pursued Agee vigorously, exercising particular ingenuity
in overcoming procedural difficulties posed by Agee's foreign domicile. 292 Agee's case suggests the increased dangers of selective enforcement that are presented when the Executive acts pursuant to a broad
and inexplicit rule. One of Agee's defenses was that the CIA had selectively enforced the secrecy agreement against its critics, without proceeding against other violators who had written more favorably about
the Agency.2 93 The argument met with some success; on cross-motions
for summary judgment, the district court declined to impose a constructive trust on Agee's profits because of the possibility of selective
enforcement.2 94 The question of a constructive trust was postponed until trial.295 There seems little doubt, however, that selective enforcement had taken place; the "CIA has conceded in congressional
manuscript to a French publishing company without prior CIA review. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 1,
1982, § 1,at 24, cols. 4-5. Ironically, the CIA recently sought to delete portions of a book being
written by former CIA Director Stansfield Turner, one of the Carter administration officials who
reportedly pressed for the suit against Snepp. See N.Y. Times, May 18, 1983, at Al, cols. 1-2.
This action may raise questions about the Agency's motives. According to one press report, "Senior intelligence officials acknowledged that there was a growing enmity between Admiral Turner
and high-level officials in the Reagan administration, including William J. Casey, the current
Director." Id
291. See Agee v. CIA, 500 F. Supp. 506 (D.D.C. 1980); Note, The CI4 Responds to its Black
Sheep--the Cases of Philip Agee, 13 CONN. L. REV. 317, 342-47 (1981). Agee was a focus of
attention because he had announced a "campaign to fight the United States CIA" by exposing its
agents. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 283-85 (1981). For Agee's explanation of his actions, see
Agee, On Naming CIA. Agents, 1981 NATION 295. Agee's explanation was itself subject to prior
review by the CIA, as required by the injunction described infra note 295. See Agee, supra, at
295. Congress recently passed a statute that prohibits public identification of CIA agents in many
circumstances. Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-200, 96 Stat. 122 (to
be codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 421-426). The constitutionality of the measure has not been tested.
See generally Note, The Constitutionalityof the Intelligence IdentitiesProtectionAct, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 727 (1983) (concluding that part of the Act is unconstitutional).
292. The government overcame its inability to obtain foreign service of process by intervening
in a Freedom of Information Act action commenced by Agee in a federal district court and
presenting its action to enforce the secrecy agreement as a counterclaim in that action. See Agee
v. CIA, 87 F.R.D. 350, 352 (D.D.C. 1980).
293. Agee v. CIA, 500 F. Supp. 506, 508 (D.D.C. 1980).
294. The court noted that
Agee . . .has presented evidence indicating that the CIA's past enforcement record
bears a considerable correlation with the agency's perception of the extent to which the
material is favorable to the agency. . . . [He] thus has raised a factual issue as to
whether the Government's past enforcement has been clouded by content considerations
rather than wholly legitimate concerns for security.
Id at 509. Snepp made similar arguments, but they were rejected. See Brief for the United
States, supra note 281, at 43-47.
295. The district judge, however, issued an injunction against written or oral statements by
Agee about the CIA without prior review by the Agency. Agee v. CIA, 500 F. Supp. 506, 509
(D.D.C. 1980).
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hearings that it has selectively enforced the prior-approval requirement
' 296
against authors of books that are critical of the Agency.
The claim of selective enforcement, which was raised unsuccessfully in Snepp and with some success in Agee, emphasizes the dangers
of executive action in the absence of an explicit legislative standard.
When the Executive is allowed to act without clear legislative guidance,
the opportunities for impermissibly motivated actions are increased
with a concomitant threat to constitutional values. 297 An executive rule
drafted as broadly as the prepublication review standard for CIA employees allows an agency to exert prior restraint over al of its former
employees with the correlative ability to waive scrutiny of those it considers favorably disposed to the agency or its goals.
Moreover, when an agency's interests are opposed to the liberty
interests of individuals, the agency's actions may reflect a process in
which the government's interest has been overvalued and the individual interests have been discounted or ignored. Consequently, when the
CIA is permitted to proceed without clear statutory guidance against a
person who has violated its secrecy agreement, the Agency may overestimate the government interests in enforcing the agreement and underestimate the first amendment interests of the former agent and his
audience. These dangers are suggested in Snepp because the government made no claim that Snepp's book actually revealed classified information. 298 Instead, the government asserted the more diffuse claim
that the publication of a former agent's book without prior clearanceeven if the book contained no information that the CIA could have
prevented from being published-increased the reluctance of foreign
intelligence agencies and other persons to contribute information to the
CIA in the future. 299 The likelihood and gravity of such an occurrence
were assessed solely by the CIA; the Court deferred to this executive
finding. Indeed, when CIA Director Stansfield Turner asserted this
government interest at trial, cross-examination on the gravity of the
30 0
danger was curtailed.
Without a legislative determination of the likelihood of this occur296. Comment, supra note 290, at 697 (citing Wash. Post, Apr. 6, 1980, at A 10); see also id at
664 n.9 ("Although dozens of former CIA employees have published books relating to CIA activities without submitting manuscripts for prepublication review ... Snepp was the first person the
government sued after publication for violation of the secrecy agreement.").
297. Although the Executive may enforce even the narrowest statute selectively, the opportunities are greatly increased when the rule has no clearly defined limits. See Quint, supra note 3, at
43-47.
298. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 516 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
299. See id at 512.
300. See id at 522-23 & n. 13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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rence and its relative weight in comparison with first amendment values, the Court was forced to rely on the Executive's assessment of the
danger-an assessment that may well have been inflated by the atmosphere of secrecy and suspicion endemic in intelligence agencies and
influenced by the fact that the Agency was the focus of the volume's
"highly critical account."' 30 ' As a result of these pressures, Snepp's first
amendment interests in expressing his views, and those of the public in
receiving information necessary to judge the CIA's performance, may
have been undervalued or ignored. 30 2 A more neutral assessment of
the likelihood and magnitude of the danger to the governmental interests, and a more neutral balancing of that assessed danger against the
first amendment interests of the individual and of the public in receiving certain criticisms of the CIA, could have been furnished by a congressional assessment. If the judiciary were to uphold executive action
taken pursuant to explicit legislation, it would be deferring to a more
careful and evenhanded judgment than that of an executive agency
30 3
whose own interests are opposed to individual liberty interests.
Perhaps abashed by the completeness of the government's victory
in Snepp, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti issued guidelines for future enforcement of secrecy agreements required by the CIA and other
agencies. 3°4 Civiletti apparently intended the Guidelines to mitigate
the danger of selective enforcement and also to restrain enforcement of
301. See United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 931 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd inpart, 444 U.S. 507
(1980) (per curiam). There is evidence that the CIA's assessment was in fact inflated. "Some
Congressional aides involved with intelligence oversight den[ied] that any foreign agency has refused to cooperate with the CIA because of the danger of disclosure." Franck & Eisen, Balancing
National Security and Free Speech, 14 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 339, 353 (1982).
302. See generally Quint, supra note 3, at 65-69. In Snepp, the countervailing first amendment
interests may have received particularly short shrift from the Administration. Attorney General
Bell observed:
I virtually had to order the Justice Department's Civil Division to file the suit [against
Snepp]. Its lawyers kept warning that the press would attack me on [the ground] that I
was eroding the First Amendment's guarantee of a free press. I told them that the suit
concerned breach of contract and had nothing to do with the First Amendment or
censorship.
G. BELL, supra note 279, at 128-29 (1982) (emphasis added).
303. For a discussion of some limitations that Congress might consider in drafting such a
statute, see Quint, supra note 3, at 68. The District of Columbia Circuit recently upheld the constitutionality of some of the "substantive criteria" used in the CIA's prepublication review against
a first amendment challenge by a former agent whose magazine article had been partially censored. See McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The court held that a de novo
review was required to decide whether the material was properly classified, but concluded that
deference should be accorded to "reasoned and detailed CIA explanations of [its] classification
decision." Id at 1148.
304. Guidelines for Litigation to Enforce Obligations to Submit Materials for Predissemination Review, 45 Fed. Reg. 85,529 (1980), revoked 46 Fed. Reg. 45,052 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Guidelines].
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secrecy agreements when the governmental interest was weak.30 5 The
Guidelines are an example of attempted self-limitation by the executive
branch-a course of action undertaken more seriously by President
Carter than by most other recent Presidents. 30 6 Executive self-limitation, however, generally is not acceptable as a substitute for explicit
legislative rulemaking when executive action may infringe individual
liberties.
The weaknesses of executive self-restraint are well illustrated by
the Civiletti Guidelines. First, although they purported to impose restrictions on the Executive, the Guidelines were generally expressed as
"principles" or "considerations" and contained little that actually limited executive conduct. The text expressly precluded any judicial enforcement of the Guidelines. 30 7 Moreover, some of the "general
principles" or "considerations" were those mandated by the Constitution, and others stated common sense considerations that one would
expect the government to take into account in any event as a matter of
prosecutorial discretion or its civil analog.30 8 Similarly, the procedural
305. See Department of Justice, Press Release (Dec. 12, 1980).
306. In recent years, executive rulemaking has received considerable attention as a device for
inhibiting arbitrary or discriminatory executive action against individuals and as a technique that
generally would implement the rule of law. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUsTicE 52-96
(1969). The Ford administration also attempted executive self-limitation. President Ford promulgated the first executive order that comprehensively regulated activities of the intelligence agencies, Exec. Order No. 11,905, 41 Fed. Reg. 7703 (1976), reprintedin 50 U.S.C. § 401 note (1976),
supersededby Exec. Order No. 12,036, 3 C.F.R. 112 (1979), and Attorney General Levi also developed guidelines for FBI domestic security investigations and for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence investigations. See J. ELLIFF, THE REFORM OF FBI INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS ch.
5-6 (1979). Executive Order 11,905 has been superseded by intelligence executive orders issued by
Presidents Carter and Reagan, while Attorney General Levi's domestic security guidelines have
been replaced by less restrictive guidelines issued by Attorney General William French Smith.
See infra note 320.
307. See Guidelines, supra note 304, § IV(B).
308. An example of the former is General Principle 1(a):
In deciding whether to recommend that the Attorney General file suit, the political content of a disclosure and the political viewpoint of the individual shall not be considered.
Disclosures favorable to or critical of the agency shall be accorded equal treatment, and
embarrassment to the agency by the disclosure shall be treated as irrelevant.
Id § II(B)(l)(a). Cf. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir.) (noting that a
former agent's right to criticize the CIA is protected by the first amendment), cert. denied,409 U.S.
1063 (1972). The Guidelines, however, apparently do allow consideration of individual political
views in deciding certain questions of intent. See Guidelines, supra note 304, § II(B)(l)(a).
Predictably, most of the specific considerations applicable to the filing of civil actions following disclosure of information are based on the intentional nature of the disclosure and the seriousness of the perceived danger. See, e.g., id § II(B)(2)(a). Some sections are slightly more specific;
for example, various sections recommend consideration of whether the disclosure includes "specific information about operations, structures, personnel, and activities of the agency," id
§ II(B)(2)(a)(v), whether "the disclosure is likely to result in substantial harm to particular operations of the agency or endanger individual lives," id § II(B)(2)(a)(vi), and "whether the disclosure
contains material or information that is properly classifiable," id § II(B)(2)(a)(iii). These factors,
however, are only "considerations" and do not limit the filing of enforcement actions. As such,
they may be overridden by other "considerations" set forth in the Guidelines or elsewhere.
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guarantees in the Guidelines were only of marginal value. 30 9 Perhaps
the most significant aspect of the Guidelines was the Justice Department's statement that it would not proceed against employees who
might be subject to suit by virtue of a "fiduciary duty" alone, without
an express contractual secrecy provision or relevant regulation. 310 In
this instance, therefore, the Justice Department may have denied itself
authority that was suggested by the opinion in Snepp.311 Finally, the
Guidelines also set forth principles for enforcing constructive trusts
such as the trust imposed in Snepp. 31 2 Although these principles counsel moderation in general terms, 3 13 they prescribe only the vaguest
limits.

3 14

The history of the Guidelines illustrates two infirmities of executive self-restraint as a means of protecting individual constitutional liberties. First, the limitations are so bland and imprecise that it is
difficult to endow them with much content, except as a general promise
to exercise an undefined measure of restraint. Correlatively, the
Guidelines expressly disclaim the possibility of judicial enforcement,
which might have given them a certain body and substance. Second,
unlike legislative limitations in a statute, executive guidelines can be
revoked by the Executive at any time; in fact, William French Smith,
Attorney General under President Reagan, revoked Attorney General
Civiletti's Guidelines in September of 1981. 3 15 Moreover, President
309. For example, the declaration that "[o]nly the Attorney General may authorize the filing
of suits subject to these guidelines," id § II(A), is qualified substantially by a subsequent provision that defines "Attorney General" as "the Attorney General of the United States [or] a designee." Id § V. Under this provision, the Attorney General could presumably "designate" any
Justice Department official to make the relevant determinations.
310. According to the Guidelines, the Attorney General "will not" ordinarily authorize suit
"in the absence of any express clearance obligation imposed by contract or regulation." /d
§ II(B)(3). Even without an "express obligation," however, the Attorney General may seek an
injunction if it appears "that disclosure of the material or information. . . will pose a serious and
imminent threat to the national security or foreign policy of the United States." Id § III(A)(2).
Furthermore, the government may seek an injunction "against individuals or organizations that
actively solicit persons subject to [express] obligations to violate those obligations." Id Under
this provision, therefore, the government might proceed against a reporter or publisher who "actively solicits" an individual to violate a government secrecy agreement or regulation. This provision goes beyond the dicta in Snepp and raises additional first amendment problems.
311. See supra notes 287-88 and accompanying text.
312. See Guidelines, supra note 304, § III(B).
313. See, e.g., id § III(B)(2)(b) ("The Government does not seek to reduce defendants to penury ..

"). But cf. A. NEIER, THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION IN SOCIAL CHANGE 166 (1982) (noting

that the Justice Department's action left Snepp "flat broke and in debt").
314. In one respect, moreover, this section of the Guidelines exceeds the scope of the dicta in
Snepp. The Guidelines permit monetary relief to be measured by gross receipts or net receipts.
Guidelines, supra note 304, § III(B)(2)(c). In Snepp, however, the Court imposed a constructive
trust on profits only. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 516 (1980) (per curiam). A remedy
based on gross receipts could be considerably more draconian.
315. See Attorney General Policy Governing Litigation to Enforce Obligations to Submit
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Reagan recently issued a directive that purported to extend the secrecy
agreement requirements, including prepublication review of manuscripts in many cases, to "[a]ll persons with authorized access to classified information."' 3' 6 The directive would extend the requirement to
many additional employees in agencies like the State Department, Defense Department, and Justice Department as well as the White
House. 3 17 After congressional objection,3 1 8 President Reagan suspended the plan, but one official suggested that it might be reimposed
if President Reagan is reelected. 31 9 The Carter administration's actions
against Snepp, as endorsed by the Court, accordingly have assumed
greater and more ominous importance, while the Carter administration's attempt at executive self-limitation has vanished with little
320
effect.
Materials for Predissemination Review, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,052 (1981). The new policy retains the
portion of the Guidelines that excludes consideration of a defendant's official rank or political
views in a decision to file suit. See id at 45,052-53. In contrast to Civiletti's Guidelines, the more
recent policy requires the Attorney General's authorization before an enforcement action can be
filed-the authorization of a designee is insufficient. Id at 45,052.
316. Presidential Directive on Safeguarding National Security Information, National Security
Decision Directive No. 84 (Mar. 11, 1983).
317. The directive would subject 100,000 government employees to prepublication review, and
would apparently encompass all of their political articles and memoirs for the rest of their lives.
See Lewis, The Secrecy Muddle, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1983, at A3 1, cols. 1-2.
318. See Pub. L. No. 98-164, § 1010, 97 Stat. 1017, 1061 (1983) (curtailing the directive's prepublication review provisions until April 15, 1984).
319. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
320. In another effort directed toward executive self-limitation, President Carter issued standards for the activities of intelligence agencies in foreign and domestic affairs. See Exec. Order No.
12,036, 3 C.F.R. 112 (1979), supersededby Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted
in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note (Supp. V 1981). No explicit statutory authority for a comprehensive
intelligence order existed, but President Carter asserted that the order was drafted with an unprecedented degree of congressional participation. Remarks on Signing Executive Order No. 12,036, 1
PUB. PAPERS: JIMMY CARTER 189, 193 (1978).

Although the executive order follows the basic structure of the original intelligence directive
issued by President Ford, see supra note 306, President Carter's order imposed tighter restrictions
on the intelligence agencies in certain areas involving constitutional rights. See Civiletti, Intelligence Gathering and the Law.- Conflict or Compatibility, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 891 n.41
(1980). Moreover, President Carter's order did not authorize covert operations by the CIA in the
United States. Exec. Order No. 12,036, supra, §§ 4-212, 1-808. President Carter's order, however,
has been criticized for "an overreliance on secret guidelines." R. MORGAN, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE: MONITORING DISSENT IN AMERICA 77 (1980). Moreover, at least one section of the order

may exceed express statutory limitations. See Marks v. CIA, 590 F.2d 997, 1009 n.16 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (Wright, J., dissenting).
Nonetheless, President Carter's executive order was a step toward a system of rational limitations on intelligence agencies. These executive restrictions are fragile, however, because a subsequent Executive may impose his own policy. Thus, in 1981 President Reagan issued a new
intelligence executive order that relaxed several of the limitations in President Carter's order,
including the ban on covert CIA activities in the United States. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3
C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note (Supp. V 1981). The new order permits
certain covert activities in the United States if they are approved by the President. Id §§ 1.8(e),
3.4(h).
The Carter administration generally favored legislative restrictions on intelligence activities,
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B. Passport Withdrawal-Haigv. Agee
Philip Agee's conflicts with the government were not limited to the
enforcement of his secrecy agreement. Shortly after Americans were
taken hostage in Tehran, it was rumored that Agee had been invited to
participate in a tribunal to try the hostages. 321 Secretary of State Vance
revoked Agee's passport pursuant to a regulation that allowed revocation if "[tihe Secretary determines that the [passport holder's] activities
abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national
security or the foreign policy of the United States. ' 322 The government
claimed authority for this regulation in the Passport Act of 1926, which
states that "[t]he Secretary of State may grant and issue passports...
under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe for and
on behalf of the United States ....
-323 Agee sued to recover his passport and prevailed in both the district and circuit courts, which held
that the Act does not authorize the withdrawal of a passport for national security and foreign policy reasons in peacetime. 324 The lower
courts construed prior decisions of the Supreme Court to require express congressional authorization for passport withdrawals or at least
an inference of congressional approval based on prior administrative
practice. 325 The lower courts required clear congressional authorization because the denial of the passport might impair constitutional
and supported a legislative "charter" for the intelligence agencies. The charter, however, never
came to a vote in Congress. See 1980 Senate Intelligence Hearings, supra note 289; The National
IntelligenceAct of1980: Hearingson Hi.R. 6588 Be/ore the Subcomm. on Legislation ofthe House
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980
House Intelligence Hearings]. Only scattered portions of the proposed legislation were enacted.
See, e.g., supra note 133.
The Carter administration supported a legislative charter for the FBI, but it also failed.
Without this legislation, the 1976 executive guidelines issued by Attorney General Levi for the
purpose of limiting and defining the role of the FBI in "domestic security" investigations remained in effect. See generally J. ELLIFF, supra note 306, at 55-64 (discussing the Levi guidelines).
In 1983, Levi's domestic security guidelines were superseded by new guidelines issued by Attorney
General William French Smith. Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering
Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations (Mar. 7, 1983), reprintedin Attorney
General's GuidelinesforDomestic Security Investigations (Smith Guidelines): Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
53-65 (1983). The new guidelines apparently permit more intrusive FBI investigations of domestic
political groups than were allowed under Levi's guidelines. See id at 61-63.
321. See Note, supra note 291, at 379 n.309. According to the government, Agee offered the
Iranians his assistance in the analysis of captured CIA documents. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S.
280, 286 n.8 (1981).
322. 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1983); see also id § 51.71 (a) (allowing passport revocation when
denial would have been authorized).
323. 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1982).
324. See Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C.), af'dsub noma. Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d
80 (D.C. Cir. 1980), rev'dsub nom. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
325. Both courts relied on Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), and Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1958).
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rights of travel and expression. 326
In the Supreme Court, the government argued that an inference of
congressional authorization could be drawn from Congress' failure to
revise the statute in light of what was claimed to be a "longstanding
administrative construction" of the statute to permit withdrawal of a
passport for national security and foreign policy reasons. 327 Although
the government did not rely on "inherent" executive power over passports, it implied that the statute should be construed infavor of executive authority in an area in which the President possesses "inherent
responsibilities under the Constitution. ' 328 Thus, in the interpretation
of the statute, the implications arising from a claimed grant of executive power were arrayed against the countervailing implications from
the individual rights at issue. The Administration argued that executive power should prevail.
In Haig v. Agee, 329 the Supreme Court agreed and reversed the
judgment below. The Court adopted the government's view that ambiguous or vague statutes relating to foreign policy and national security should be construed to favor executive authority. 330 The Court
quoted from earlier cases that endorsed broad presidential power in
foreign affairs, 33 ' and emphasized that "'Congress-in giving the Executive authority over matters of foreign affairs-must of necessity
paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in domestic
areas.' "332 The Court also noted that the judiciary has a minimal role
in reviewing foreign policy and national security matters.3 33 After this
prologue, the Court found that Congress had tacitly adopted the Executive's administrative construction of the statute to allow passport withholding for reasons of foreign policy and national security. Therefore,
326. Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S.
280 (1981); see Quint, supra note 3, at 69-70 n.302.
327. Brief for Petitioner at 35, Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981), reprintedin 122 LANDMARK
BRIEFS, supra note 153, at 601.
328. Id at 49, reprintedin 122 LANDMARK BRIEFS at 615; see also id at 13, reprintedin 122
LANDMARK BRIEFS at 579 ("[The decision below] has impermissibly interfered with the Executive's ability to carry out its constitutional duties in the fields of foreign affairs and national

security.").
329. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
330. Since the Court found statutory authorization, it reserved the question of whether passport withdrawal by the Executive can rest on constitutional power alone. Id at 289 n.17.
331. Id at 291 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319
(1936)).
332. Id at 292 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965)) (emphasis omitted). The Court
also stated that under the broad authority of the 1926 Act a consistent administrative construction
ordinarily should be followed, and "[t]his is especially so in the areas of foreign policy and national security, where congressional silence is not to be equated with congressional disapproval."
I d at 291.
333. Id at 292.
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the regulation was authorized by the Passport Act. 334
In his dissent, Justice Brennan pointed out that the Court had accepted a type of "authorization" by inference from administrative construction that was quite different from the authorization from prior
manifestpractice required in earlier cases like Kent v. Dulles.335 Justice
Brennan noted that the requirement of prior administrative practice
should be understood "as a preference for the strongest proof that Congress knew of and acquiesced in that authority"-a degree of proof that
is necessary in light of the "presence of sensitive constitutional questions in the passport revocation context. ' 336 Furthermore, he argued
that "broad statements by the Executive Branch relating to its discretion in the passport area lack the precision of definition that would
follow from concrete applications of that discretion in specific
cases." 3 37 Congress cannot know precisely what it is approving if it is
found to approve broad administrative policy without the content that
would be given to the policy by specific instances of enforcement. Justice Brennan concluded that "[t]he Constitution allocates the lawmaking function to Congress, and I fear that today's decision has handed
' 338
over too much of that function to the Executive.
Justice Brennan's view is generally consistent with the position advanced in this Article. Before the Executive may take action that potentially endangers individual rights, a congressional balancing of the
government interest against the individual constitutional interest
should take place. The clearest evidence of congressional balancing is
an explicit delegation to the Executive in the statutory text. Although
less clear, congressional adoption of a longstanding and well-understood administrative practice affords greater assurance that congressional balancing actually has been undertaken than congressional
adoption of a broad and abstract administrative rule. Under the principles advocated in this Article, neither the explicit adoption of a vague
334. The Court emphasized Congress' failure to take affirmative steps to reject the Executive's
interpretation of the Act, particularly when Congress amended the statute in 1978 without changing the regulation. Id at 300-01. The Court also found that the withdrawal of Agee's passport
violated neither his constitutional freedom to travel nor his first amendment rights. Id at 306-09.
335. Id at 312-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958),
and Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965)).
336. Id at 315. Justice Brennan also argued that
[o]nly when Congress has maintained its silence in the face of a consistent and substantial pattern of actual passport denials or revocations-where the parties will presumably
object loudly, perhaps through legal action, to the Secretary's exercise of discretion--can
this Court be sure that Congress is aware of the Secretary's actions and has implicitly
approved that exercise of discretion.
Id
337. Id
338. Id at 319.
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rule by Congress nor the adoption of such a rule by congressional acquiescence is sufficient to authorize executive action that potentially
infringes individual rights.
The Court rejected Justice Brennan's position and turned its back
on the imperatives of the "clear statement" doctrine elaborated in earlier passport cases. Although the Court's method of statutory construction may have owed something to the expansive dicta in CurtissWright,3 39 the Haig technique is substantially more questionable than
the technique employed in the earlier case. In Curtiss-Wright, the
Court found that a broad delegation of authority to the President in
foreign affairs may be constitutional even if a similar delegation in domestic affairs might raise serious constitutional doubts. 340 In Haig,
however, the Court did not address the constitutionality of the delegation, but rather sought to determine the extent of the delegation under
a cryptic statute. The Haig Court invoked the language of CurtissWright to justify interpretinga statute to confer a delegation of authority that might not have been found in domestic affairs. This technique
was employed in a case, unlike Curtiss-Wright, in which individual
constitutional interests were threatened. Thus, while the result in Curtiss-Wright granted nothing to the President that Congress did not
clearly intend to grant, the decision in Haig may grant unintended authority to the President-authority Congress may have thought it was
denying. 34 1 This result is particularly questionable when individual
rights may be infringed and the clearest possible indication of legisla342
tive support should be required.
The potential breadth of discretion that Haig accords to the Executive creates a substantial risk that the Executive will impose burdens
on individuals because of their political views or activities, but claim
that the measure is justified for the protection of foreign policy or pur339. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
340. Id at 319-21.
341. See, e.g., Farber, NationalSecurity, the Right to Travel,and the Court, 1981 Sup. CT. REV.
263, 279-82, 284 (noting that "the legislative record demonstrates almost complete hostility to
travel control for over twenty-five years before Agee"); Comment, Authority of Secretary ofState
to Revoke PassportsforNationalSecurity or ForeignPolicy Reasons: Haig v. Agee, 66 MINN. L.
REv. 667, 680 (1982) (arguing that Congress' recent actions reflected a desire to narrow executive
discretion over travel rather than to broaden it).
342. To some extent, the judicial technique of Haig resembles the technique of Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). See supra notes 159-82 and accompanying text. In both
cases, the Court inferred congressional acquiescence from silence and recognized that the presidential role in foreign affairs should be considered in determining legislative authority. In Dames
& Moore, however, the Court reasoned from executive practice approved by Congress, while in
Haig it relied upon executive construction without practice. See Comment, Illuminationor Elimination ofthe "Zone of Twilight"? CongressionalAcquiescenceand PresidentialAuthorityin Foreign
Affairs, 51 U. CIN. L. REv. 95, 116 (1982); see also supra note 182.
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suant to another legitimate government goal. 343 One need not look far
into the past to find an era in which the Executive's disapproval of an
applicant's political views or speech resulted in denial of a passport on
the pretext that its issuance would be contrary to the national interest.344 Moreover, since the Secretary of State is responsible both for the
conduct of diplomacy and for the issuance of passports, there is a particular danger that undue weight may be attributed to the government
interest in foreign policy and diplomacy when it confronts the constitutional interests of travel, association, and speech. 345 The Court's reminder in Haig that "[m]atters intimately related to foreign policy and
346
national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention"
may presage more extended deference to what may be distorted or sus347
pect executive judgments.
343. This risk was suggested in a striking manner by the remarks of Solicitor General Wade
McCree, Jr., during oral argument in Haig. When McCree was asked whether the Secretary of
State could deny a passport to a person wishing to travel to El Salvador "to denounce" American
policy, he replied:
I would say, yes, he can. Because we have to vest these-the President of the United
States and the Secretary of State working under him are charged with conducting the
foreign policy of the Nation, and the freedom of speech that we enjoy domestically may
be different from that that we can exercise in this context.
Haig, 453 U.S. at 319 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting oral argument of Solicitor General
Wade McCree, Jr.). Such unchanneled power raises a severe danger that a passport will be withdrawn in response to the domestic impact of the speech, rather than its supposed danger to foreign
policy. This is particularly the case when a power, like the power to control passports, has been
used capriciously in the past. See The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REv. 93, 205
(1981).
344. See Boudin, The ConstitutionalRight to Travel, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 47 (1956); Hurwitz,
JudicialControlover PassportPolicy, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 271 (1971) (discussing restrictive passport policies during the Cold War era).
345. Cf.Hurwitz, supra note 344, at 278 (noting that the State Department once argued that
foreign relations would be jeopardized if the Department was required to give reasons for passport
cancellation).
346. 453 U.S. at 292.
347. In another action that related to rights of travel during the hostage affair, President
Carter threatened to penalize former Attorney General Ramsey Clark and others for their trip to
Iran to participate in a public discussion of issues. See Interview with the President, 2 PuB. PAPERS: JIMMY CARTER 1087-90 (1980-1981). The Administration argued that Clark was subject to
civil and criminal penalties under regulations that blocked economic transactions with Iran
promulgated under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-1706 (Supp. V 1981). This threat was ironic because President Carter tried to use Clark as
an envoy to Iran at the start of the hostage affair, but Clark was denied entry to Iran. See H.
JORDAN, CRISIS: THE LAST YEAR OF THE CARTER PRESIDENCY 33-38 (1982); C. VANCE, supra
note 69, at 376. The threat of prosecution was ultimately withdrawn. One commentator suggested
that proceedings against Clark would not have been authorized under the IEEPA in light of more
explicit travel controls in other legislation and because of the threat to constitutional interests.
Note, ConstitutionalProtectionof Foreign Travel, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 902, 930 n.139 (1981).
The Reagan administration recently made a similar attempt to restrict foreign travel to Cuba
by invoking the IEEPA and the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1976 & Supp.
V 1981). The regulation in question was upheld in Regan v. Wald, 52 U.S.L.W. 4966 (U.S. June
28, 1984).

852
HeinOnline -- 62 Tex. L. Rev. 852 1983-1984

The Separation of Powers
C

Immigration Restrictions on'IranianStudents in the United
States-Narenji v. Civiletti-

With its atmosphere of permanent crisis and flashes of ethnic hostility, the Iranian hostage affair provided another instance of executive
action that threatened to invade individual constitutional liberties. The
immigration crackd3wn against Iranian students illustrates the dangers
posed by executive action during a period of heightened emotion. On
November 13, 1979, shortly after American Embassy personnel were
taken hostage in Tehran, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti issued a
regulation requiring university students of Iranian nationality to submit special proof of their continued eligibility for student visa status;
failure to comply would subject the students to deportation. 348 The
regulation was. ostensibly intended to exert diplomatic pressure on the
Iranian government. 349 In Narenji v. Civiletti,350 the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the regulation against a challenge based on the
equal protection component of the fifth amendment's due process
35
clause. 1
The regulation in Narenji raised serious problems because no explicit congressional authorization existed for special enforcement action against aliens of a specified nationality. The Attorney General
asserted authority under a general provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act that directed him to administer and enforce the Act
and to "establish such regulations. . and perform such other acts as
he deems necessary for carrying out his authority" under the Act. 352 In
an action commenced by Iranian students, the district court enjoined
the Attorney General's program. 353 The court applied the "clear statement doctrine" of Kent v. Dulles,354 and held that the program was not
authorized by Congress because the regulation threatened constitutional rights without explicit statutory authority "to discriminate
348. 44 Fed. Reg. 65,727 (1979).
349. See Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957
(1980). At approximately the same time, President Carter prohibited further importation of oil
from Iran, blocked the transfer of Iranian assets, and ordered most Iranian diplomats to leave the
United States. Brief for the Appellants at 8, Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
cer. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980).
350. 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980).
351. 617 F.2d at 747-48; Cf Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that the fifth
amendment due process clause contains guarantees of equal protection).
352. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1982);see also id § 1184(a) (duration and conditions of aliens' admission). The government also cited id § 1251(a)(9) (deportation authority), and id § 1303(a) (authorizing special regulations for registration of certain aliens).
353. Narenji v. Civiletti, 481 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979), Cer.
denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980).
354. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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among aliens on the basis of national origin. ' 355 Although distinctions
on the basis of nationality had been made by Congress in immigration
statutes for many years and had survived due process attacks, the district court found that more explicit congressional authorization was re356
quired before the Executive may make such a classification.
On appeal, the government's position in Narenji approached an
outright claim of inherent executive authority. Although the government's basic position was that the Attorney General's regulation was
authorized by statute, 357 the government also emphasized that under
Curtiss-Wright the Executive had some direct authority in foreign affairs "inherent in our country's status as a sovereign nation. ' 358 The
government relied on Curtiss-Wright for the proposition that "in addition to any authority conferred upon the Executive Branch by delegation from the Congress, the President is vested with independent and
inherent foreign affairs powers of his own under traditional principles
of federal sovereignty as well as under specific constitutional provisions. '3 59 The government argued that, despite some doctrinal confusion, "it is apparent that the President can often act in areas where
' 360
Congress could have legislated.
The District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court in an
opinion that conceded a broad scope to presidential authority in the
355. 481 F. Supp. at 1141.
356. The district court stressed that aliens possess the right to be free from unequal treatment
on the basis of national origin. See id at 1138-39. In some instances, this right protects aliens
against discriminatory law enforcement on the basis of nationality. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886). The court conceded that the "imperative of events" and constitutional principles
lent some support to a claim of inherent executive authority, but concluded that "if the violation
of equal protection inherent in the regulation at issue here is to be countenanced, 'it must be
pursuant to the law-making functions of the Congress.'" 481 F. Supp. at 1143, 1145 (quoting
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958)).
357. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 349, at 38.
358. Id at 38-39.
359. Id at 39 n.30.
360. Id at 39 n.31 (citing L. HENKIN, supra note 80, at 118). The government supported its
suggestions of "inherent" executive power over aliens by quoting from United States ex re.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950):
The right to [exclude aliens] stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the
executive power to control the foreign affairs of the Nation. . . . When Congress
prescribes a procedure concerning the admissibility of aliens, it is not dealing alone with
a legislative power. It is implementing an inherent executive power.
Brief for the Appellants, supra note 349, at 40. The government acknowledged that the President
ordinarily would not contravene a direct congressional directive, but implied that the President's
inherent authority permitted him to act in the absence of a contrary statement. See id at 41. The
government concluded, however, that "there is no need for this Court to explore the depths of the
President's inherent authority in this area, for . . . he has ample delegated authority." Id Although the government ultimately relied on delegated authority, it apparently argued in the district court that inherent executive power was sufficient. See 481 F. Supp. at 1141-42.
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area of immigration.3 61 The court found that the executive action was
adequately authorized by the general statutory grants of enforcement
power to the Attorney General. 362 The court also found that the regulation did not violate due process because "[d]istinctions on the basis of
nationality may be drawn in the immigration field by the Congress or
the Executive. .

.

. So long as such distinctions are not wholly irra-

tional they must be sustained. ' 363 In finding that the regulation had a
rational basis, the court extended substantial deference to presidential
fact-finding abilities and conceded a measure of inherent presidential
364
authority in this area.
In Narenji as in Haig, the courts were required to consider the
countervailing implications of presidential power and individual liberties in the process of statutory construction. The District of Columbia
Circuit, however, failed to acknowledge that the presence of individual
constitutional rights might influence the interpretation of the statute. 365
Indeed the court failed to discuss Kent v. Dulles,3 66 the locus classicus of

the clear statement doctrine in foreign affairs. Although Kent involved
passport regulations and their effect on travel rights, rather than immigration and equal protection, it emphasized the propriety of narrow
367
construction of delegated power as a protection for individual rights.
Accordingly, Kent should have been distinguished carefully if an explicit congressional delegation was unnecessary in Narenji.368 In both
Narenji and Haig, when presidential action in foreign affairs
threatened individual liberties, the strict construction technique of Kent
was abandoned and the courts found statutory authorization for presi361. 617 F.2d at 747.
362. Id; see supra note 352 and accompanying text. The court argued that the statute need
not "specifically authorize each and every action" if the action is reasonably related to the Attorney General's duties. 617 F.2d at 747.
363. 617 F.2d at 747.
364. The court observed that "the present controversy ... lies in the field of our country's
foreign affairs and implicates matters over which the President has direct constitutional authority." Id at 748. The court concluded that the inexperience of the judiciary in these matters
precluded it from judging the President's foreign policy decisions. Id
365. This point, however, was noted by the four judges who voted to grant a rehearing en
banc. 617 F.2d at 754 n.4 (Wright, Robinson, Wald, and Mikva, JJ., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc).
366. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
367. Id at 129.
368. For an attempt to distinguish Kent from Narenji, see 617 F.2d 750-51 (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (prospective travelers in Kent were American citizens
who had not violated the law, in contrast with the "non-immigrant aliens who are in violation of
our immigration laws," who might be subject to deportation in Narenji) (emphasis in original).
Judge MacKinnon also argued that Iranian nationals had been made a separate class for equal
protection purposes because of "the violent and lawless acts which their government has allowed
to be committed against the United States." Id at 751.
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dential actions in questionable circumstances. 369
Narenji is troublesome because an executive classification based
on nationality in a foreign affairs crisis poses the danger that the Executive will overvalue the government interest and undervalue the individual constitutional interest. In a severe crisis, the political and
psychological pressures on the Executive are extreme.3 70 In this situation, executive measures may be motivated by frustration or desperation rather than by an assessment of their actual usefulness, or they
37
may reflect little more than a desire to appear stem and decisive. '
Conversely, in times of crisis the individual interests of persons selected
for special burdens may be grossly undervalued. Indeed, the virulence
of popular feeling against Iranian nationals during the hostage crisis
raises the possibility that the Executive, in imposing special burdens on
Iranian students, may have been reflecting to some extent a constitutionally impermissible hostility based on national origin. 372 The atmosphere during the hostage crisis was marked by a hostility directed
at citizens of Iran that resembled to some extent the hostility that is
frequently directed towards citizens of an enemy nation during a
war.

373

369. The selective enforcement upheld in Narenji was only one of several measures taken by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service against Iranian nationals during the hostage crisis.
Although some of these measures were even more intrusive than the selective enforcement in
Narenji, they were upheld on similar grounds. See, e.g., Malek-Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d 113
(4th Cir. 1981) (upholding regulation limiting the discretion of immigration judges to set voluntary departure times for Iranian nationals after visa expiration); Shamsian v. Ilchert, 534 F. Supp.
178 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (upholding regulation restricting extensions of stays for Iranian nationals);
Akbari v. Godshall, 524 F. Supp. 635 (D. Colo. 1981), a'd, No. 81-2275 (10th Cir. June 9, 1983)
(upholding denials of student extensions of stays for Iranian nationals); see also Yassini v. Crosland, 618 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding revocation of deferred departure dates previously
granted to Iranian nationals).
370. President Carter called the hostage crisis "the most difficult period of my life." J.
CARTER, supra note 2, at 459.

371. There is also the danger that the Executive, frustrated in an attempt to affect the situation
abroad, might seek to use persons in the United States as scapegoats. The Iranian students may
have served that function. For example, some Americans probably identified Iranian students
studying in America with the students who seized the embassy in Tehran. Cf. Narenji 617 F.2d at
752-53 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc). Indeed, the government's
brief in Narenji suggested this confusion at one point. See Brief for the Appellants, supra note
349, at 55 n.39 (justifying application of the regulation to Iranian students in the United States
partly because "it need hardly be added that those who hold our hostages in Tehran have been
identified as students").
372. Although President Carter urged restraint and fairness in the treatment of Iranian nationals in the United States, a White House statement noted that the seizure of the embassy "has
provoked strong feelings here at home. There is outrage. There is frustration. And there is deep
anger." Statement Issued by the White House Concerning American Hostages in Iran, 2 PUB.
PAPERS: JIMMY CARTER 2102 (1979).

If the President ultimately defers to popular feelings of

hostility, constitutional violations are threatened even if the Executive also urges "restraint."
373. Cf. J. CARTER, supra note 2, at 460 ("American anger and frustration had risen as the
days passed and the prisoners were not released."). The government did not entirely avoid inflammatory material of questionable relevance in its brief. Brief for the Appellants, supra note
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When only the allocation of power between Congress and the
President is at stake, broad congressional authorization may be sufficient to justify executive action. 374 When constitutional rights are
threatened, however, the dangers of an improper or biased balancing of
government and individual interests-particularly during a severe foreign policy crisis--counsel against executive flexibility of this kind.
Congressional debate on a statute specifically authorizing executive actions would be more likely to accommodate both government and individual interests; therefore, the technique advocated in this Article
would require specific congressional authorization as a prerequisite for
executive classifications based on nationality. 375 If a court deferred to
this legislation, it would be deferring to a process that probably would
give more balanced consideration to individual constitutional interests
than the regulation in Narenji issued by the Executive in a time of ex376
traordinary stress.
D.

WarrantlessElectronic Surveillance-Humphreyand Truong

President Carter's assertion of inherent executive power to engage
in warrantless electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence cases
evoked memories of the Nixon period. Although President Carter's
surveillance lacked the political motivation of certain intrusions of the
Nixon era, 377 dangers to individual rights remained. To investigate re349, at 4 ("[The captors] have paraded some of the hostages-blindfolded and hands tied behind
their backs-around the Embassy compound in public view; and they have reportedly kept the
hostages bound-sometimes both hand and foot.").
374. See supra notes 260-62 and accompanying text.
375. This type of authorization has been enacted for certain immigration problems. Eg., 8
U.S.C. § 1253(g) (1982) (authorizing the Secretary of State to discontinue issuance of immigrant
visas to nationals of a country that refuses to accept the return of its nationals from the United
States).
376. For another argument supporting a strict nondelegation doctrine in federal equal protection cases, see Note, A MadisonianInterpretationofthe Equal ProtectionDoctrine, 91 YALE L.J.
1403 (1982).
The asylum claims of Haitian nationals during the Carter administration also raised questions of unequal executive treatment of aliens based on national origin. The decision in one leading case, however, rested on procedural violations rather than violations of equal protection
guarantees. Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), modJf ed sub
nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Jean v. Nelson, 711
F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding that enforcement of the Reagan administration's policy for
detention of nondocumented aliens discriminated against Haitian nationals in violation of the
fifth amendment), vacated on rehearing en banc, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) (upholding the
Reagan administration's policy, but remanding for further findings on possible abuse of discretion
in discrimination by lower level officers). For another recent case involving the equal protection
claims of aliens, see Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding President Ford's order excluding aliens from most civil service employment); cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (striking down a similar order issued earlier by the Civil Service Commission on the ground that the order lacked congressional or presidential authorization).
377. See Quint, supra note 3, at 21-23, 26-29.
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ported transmissions of classified documents to the government of Vietnam, Attorney General Griffin Bell authorized various forms of
electronic surveillance of Truong Dinh Hung, a Vietnamese citizen,
and Ronald Humphrey, a government employee suspected of transmitting information to Truong. 378 These measures were imposed without
statutory authorization or a warrant, under a claim of inherent executive power to undertake warrantless surveillance for foreign national
security reasons.379 The press reported that both President Carter and
the Attorney General viewed these cases as excellent opportunities for
380
the reassertion of executive power over electronic surveillance.
In prosecutions of Truong and Humphrey for espionage offenses,
the defendants argued that the warrantless electronic surveillance was
illegal. 381 The district court upheld the surveillance in part and observed that a warrant is not required if "the President, or the Attorney
General acting at the President's designation, feels it necessary to electronically eavesdrop in his conduct of foreign affairs. ' 382 The court
concluded that the primary focus of the inquiry shifted from foreign
intelligence to law enforcement on July 20, 1977, and that all fruits of
378. Attorney General Bell authorized a wiretap on Truong's telephone, microphone surveillance of Truong's apartment, and television surveillance of Humphrey's office. See G. BELL,
supra note 279, at 109-10 (1982).
379. See Quint, supra note 3, at 24 & n.104. For Attorney General Bell's account of the
Truong and Humphrey case, see G. BELL, supra note 279, at 108-13 (1982).
380. E.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1978, § 1, at 2, col. 6. For another instance of warrantless
foreign intelligence surveillance defended by Attorney General Bell, see United States v. Ajlouny,
629 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1980). Moreover, President Carter's executive order on intelligence purported to authorize warrantless searches and surveillance if there was probable cause to believe
that the subject was "an agent of a foreign power." Exec. Order No. 12,036, supra note 320.
Although the issue has been raised in lower federal courts, the Supreme Court has not decided whether there is an exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement for foreign
national security surveillance. The question was expressly reserved in United States v. United
States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), in which the Court invalidated warrantless surveillance in
domestic national security investigations. Lower courts that have considered the issue, however,
have generally found a foreign national security exception. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 484
F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 960 (1974). See generally Quint, supra note 3, at
23-24 & nn.101-02.
In 1978, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811
(1976 & Supp. V 1981), which imposes warrant requirements for certain types of electronic surveillance in foreign national security matters. See infra note 387. The warrantless electronic surveillance of Truong and Humphrey was undertaken before the effective date of the Act; to the
extent that the Executive complies with the provisions of the Act, therefore, many of the issues in
Truong will not recur. It is possible, however, that an Executive might undertake surveillance in
contravention of the Act on the ground that the President possesses "inherent" national security
power that cannot be limited by Congress. Indeed, congressional opponents of the Act argued
that the President possessed such power. See Note, The ForeignIntelligence SurveillanceAct." Legislatinga JudicialRole in NationalSecurity Surveillance, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1116, 1117 & nn.9-10
(1980).
381. United States v. Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Va. 1978), affdsub nom. United States
v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
382. Id at 55.
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warrantless intrusions conducted after that date must be suppressed. 3 83
On appeal, the government asserted inherent presidential authority to impose warrantless surveillance in foreign national security matters, but did not argue that the President possessed this authority under
all circumstances. 3 84 Rather, the government acknowledged that certain issues of foreign intelligence surveillance fall within a category in
which congressional regulation may supersede otherwise existing presidential power, and asserted that the absence of a "carefully crafted statutory framework" for foreign intelligence surveillance was controlling
in this case. 385 The government argued that the judiciary's lack of expertise and information on foreign intelligence and the difficulty of defining standards rendered the conclusion that a court could override
the President's judgment a "startling doctrine. ' 386 The government acknowledged, however, that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 represented an appropriate legislative framework for judicial decision.38 7 Thus, although it did not concede that Congress could prohibit all warrantless foreign national security surveillance, the Carter
administration did recognize congressional authority to limit presidential power by requiring warrants in some foreign intelligence cases.
The Administration's acknowledgment of congressional authority was
consistent with its prior and contemporaneous support of the Foreign
8
Intelligence Surveillance Act in Congress. 38
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court's finding that a
383. Id at 59. In contrast, the government argued that no warrant should be required "if
surveillance is to any degree directed at gathering foreign intelligence," even though law enforcement might be the primary goal. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915 (4th Cir.
1980).
384. See Brief for the United States at 17, United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908
(4th Cir. 1980).
385. "[I]n
the absence of such a precise statutory guideline, the constitutionalresponsibility of
the President properly to conduct this nation's foreign affairs creates a necessary exception to the
warrant requirement as regards the use of [electronic] surveillance in counter-intelligence investigations." Id (emphasis in original). The government implied that warrantless surveillance could
be restrained adequately by the Executive's own restrictions. Id at 22-23 n.32.
386. Id at 21-26.
387. See supra note 380. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act requires a warrant for
many forms of foreign national security surveillance. 50 U.S.C. § 1801-1811 (Supp. V 1981).
Warrants are issued by a special federal court composed of federal judges selected by the Chief
Justice. Id § 1803(a). To obtain a warrant, the Act requires less than the full probable cause
standard of criminal investigations, but requires a showing that approaches that standard for surveillance of United States citizens and resident aliens in most cases. Id §§ 1801(b)(2), 1805. According to the government, the Act "delicately balances the rights of individual privacy against the
needs of effective 'counter-intelligence'." Brief for the United States, supra note 384, at 16-17.
For the history of the Carter administration's position on the legislation that became the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, see Quint, supra note 3, at 60-62.
388. See Quint, supra note 3, at 60-62. This deference contrasts with the Administration's
argument in Goldwater v. Carter that the President possesses inherent treaty termination power
that cannot be limited by Congress. See supra note 78.
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foreign affairs exception to the warrant requirement applied. 38 9 The
court found that the Executive "possesses unparalleled expertise to
make the decision whether to ,conduct foreign intelligence surveillance" 390 and remarked that the President is "constitutionally designated as the pre-eminent authority in foreign affairs. ' 39 1 Further, the
court argued that "the complexity of [the newly enacted Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978] suggests that the imposition of a warrant requirement, beyond the constitutional minimum described in this
opinion, should be left to the intricate balancing performed in the
'392
course of the legislative process by Congress and the President.
The court emphasized that an appropriate balancing of individual and
national security interests required legislative rather than judicial
393
techniques.
As the court noted, the history and final form of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act suggest the superiority of legislative balancing
over judicial balancing for the purpose of devising a warrant requirement for foreign intelligence surveillance. 394 What the Fourth Circuit
did not recognize, however, was that the history of the Act also tends to
demonstrate the superiority and greater evenhandedness of legislative
balancing in contrast with executive balancing in surveillance cases. 395
This history suggests that the Executive tends to overestimate the na389. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980), affg United States v.
Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Va. 1978).
390. Id at 913.
391. Id at 914. The court emphasized, however, that the foreign security exemption applied
"only when the object of the search or the surveillance is a foreign power, its agents or collaborators." Id at 915 (citing Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 613 n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
392. Id at 914 n.4.
393. According to the court, a judicial standard would "be pahicularly ill-advised because it
would not be easily subject to adjustment as the political branches gain experience in working
with a warrant requirement in the foreign intelligence area." Id..at 915 n.4.
394. Id at 914 n.4.
395. In 1977, for example, the Carter administration supported legislation providing that a
warrant for foreign intelligence surveillance should issue upon a minimal showing by the government. See Quint,supra note 3, at 61. In Senate hearings, however, the Administration was unable
to advance a convincing justification for such limited protection of fourth amendment rights. See
id Thereafter, Congress adopted a more stringent standard that approached the ordinary probable cause requirement for most foreign intelligence surveillance of American citizens and resident
aliens. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(b)(2), 1805 (Supp. V 1981). Subsequently, Administration officials have
acknowledged that the "intelligence agencies are functioning well" under the Act. See Civiletti,
supra note 320, at 892 n.50. In this instance, the opportunity for discussion of differing views and
sharp questioning of Administration officials by members of Congress probably encouraged a
more deliberate and evenhanded consideration of individual and government interests than was
likely to have taken place in executive consideration alone. See Quint, supra note 3, at 62.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act has been upheld against several constitutional
challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (first, fifth,
and sixth amendment challenges); United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(first, fourth, and sixth amendment challenges); Note, supra note 380. Even commentators who
approve of the Act, however, have criticized some of its provisions. See, e.g., Schwartz, Oversight
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tional security interest and underestimate or ignore the countervailing
liberty interest in striking an appropriate balance. 39 6 Since the judiciary must rely on some form of government balancing in this area-and
reliance may be particularly strong in this situation because of the judiciary's lack of expertise 397-a reliance on executive rather than legislative balancing unduly jeopardizes fourth amendment rights. Rather
than deferring to executive judgment in the absence of a statute, the
Truong court should have considered the view urged in this Article that
the President is not authorized to impose warrantless surveillance with398
out clear statutory authority.
Another important issue in Humphrey and Truong was whether
duplication of classified documents and transmission of the copies violated section 641 of Title 18 of the United States Code, which prohibits
the theft of government property. 39 9 Here again, the Executive invoked
a broad and inexplicit statute to achieve a result that might endanger
constitutional rights under some circumstances. 40 0 The government argued that transmission of classified foreign policy information is
"theft" because that information is "closely analogous to . . . other
'40
types of intellectual property which are subject to legal protection." '
The government brushed aside possible first amendment issues because
the defendants had made no attempt to distribute the information publicly and because "firm government policy [generally] precludes the use
of [section] 641 to bring a prosecution for theft of government information where the property was obtained or used 'primarily for the purpose
,-402
of disseminating it to the public ....
of Minimization Compliance Under the Foreign Intelligence SurveillanceAct: How the Watchdogs
are Doing TheirJobs, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 405 (1981).
396. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
397. See Nesson, Aspects of the Executive's Power over National Security Matters: Secrecy
Classfilcationsand Foreign Intelligence Wiretaps, 49 IND. L.J. 399 (1974).
398. In other litigation arising from the Humphrey-Truong affair, Attorney General Bell and
several FBI employees were held not liable in a civil damage action brought by persons whose
conversations were overheard during the wiretapping of Truong's telephone. Chagnon v. Bell,
642 F.2d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 911 (1981). The court made no finding on
the legality of the wiretap, but held that the defendants were protected by the qualified immunity
ordinarily accorded to federal officers in constitutional tort actions. See infra Part IV.
399. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1982).
400. Serious first amendment issues may be raised by invoking § 641-a statute that prohibits
the theft of government property in general-to prohibit the unauthorized transmission of government information. See infra note 404 and accompanying text. These issues were raised in the
prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg under § 641 for delivering photocopies of the Pentagon Papers to
the New York Times. Ellsberg's indictment was dismissed on procedural grounds, however, and
the first amendment issues were not resolved. See generally Nimmer, NationalSecurity Secrets v.
FreeSpeech: The Issuer Left Undecidedin the Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN. L. REv. 311 (1974).
401. Brief for the United States, supra note 384, at 62 n.72.
402. Id at 66 n.77.
The defense argued that the trial court's instructions to the jury did not require that the jury
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In a thoughtful opinion, Judge Winter argued that section 641 was
inapplicable. 40 3 He noted that "government information forms the basis of much of the discussion of public issues and, as a result, the unclear language of [section 641] threatens to impinge upon rights
protected by the first amendment. '' 4°4 If section 641 penalized the disclosure of classified information, "it would greatly alter [the] meticulously woven fabric of criminal sanctions" by effectively superseding
explicit statutes that penalize the disclosure of classified government
information only in narrowly defined circumstances. 40 5 Moreover,
Judge Winter noted that Congress had several opportunities to enact a
comprehensive criminal statute for the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, but consistently declined to do So.4 0 6 These factors
led Judge Winter to conclude that Congress did not intend to penalize
the disclosure of classified information under section 641.407
This position is consistent with the technique of statutory construction advocated in this Article. Without explicit congressional adoption
of a criminal penalty for actions with first amendment implications, it
is not clear that Congress has undertaken the delicate balancing required when national security and first amendment interests collide. If
a court defers to the Executive's balancing of interests in construing the
statute, it may well be deferring to a balance in which the government
interest has been overvalued and the individual constitutional interests
have been undervalued or ignored.
In sum, the Carter administration made strong assertions of executive power in four areas that affected individual rights: CIA secrecy
agreements, passport restrictions, selective enforcement of visa requirements, and warrantless electronic surveillance. In each of these areas,
the Administration's position prevailed in the courts. In none of these
cases, however, did the courts subject the government's interest to carefind the information to be classified in order for it to be covered by § 641; the instructions required "only that [the information be] contained on government paper or in a government office
somewhere." Brief for Truong Dinh Hung at 78 n.43, United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629
F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980). The defense contended that this construction made § 641 "far more

serious than the establishment of an 'Official Secrets Act,'" which would protect classified information only. Id The defense also argued that the statute was unconstitutional for vagueness and
overbreadth. See id at 82.
403. 629 F.2d at 922-28 (opinion of Winter, J.). Two members of the panel declined to review
the conviction under § 641 because the sentences under that section were concurrent with the
sentences under the other counts. Id at 931 (Russell & Hall, JJ., concurring and dissenting).
404. Id at 925 (opinion of Winter, J.).
405. Id
406. Id

at 926.
at 927.

407. But see United States v. Lambert, 446 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1978) (holding that the sale
of information "derived from" the Drug Enforcement Administration computer violates § 641),
affdsub nomL United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979).
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ful scrutiny. Rather, the courts accepted the Executive's statement that
the government interest should prevail over the individual constitutional interests, despite the danger of a distorted executive balancing of
interests. Since courts cannot always effectively probe the bases of the
Executive's decisions, the dangers of distorted executive balancing suggest that the judiciary should not uphold executive action that threatens
constitutional rights without the safeguard of congressional balancing
evidenced by explicit statutory authorization.
IV.

Executive Privileges and Immunities

In addition to the two basic types of separation of powers issues,
which are discussed in Parts II and III, there is a third category that is
best viewed as ancillary to the the more fundamental issues of the first
two. This category includes questions that do not directly involve the
substantive authority of Congress and the Executive, but rather concern the attributes of the respective branches that are necessary for the
adequate performance of their roles. Sometimes these issues arise from
specific textual provisions, such as the President's appointment
40 9
power 40 8 or the legislator's immunity for speeches and debates.
During the Carter administration, however, the most important disputes focused on claims of executive privileges and immunities that are
not specified in the Constitution, but may be implied by the general
functions of the executive branch or the structure of the federal government. In recent years, several Administrations have asserted
of
vigorously that implied privileges or immunities protect members 410
the executive branch from the imposition of ordinary legal burdens.
These Administrations have argued that special doctrines are necessary
for the Executive to function, and courts have sometimes been sympa41
thetic to this argument. '
Executive privileges and immunities, however, can affect the allocation of policymaking power and imperil individual rights. Indeed,
few assert that these doctrines possess intrinsic value; to do so would be
to revert to mystical concepts of monarchy. Rather, executive privileges and immunities must be justified by their value in carrying out
appropriate executive functions. Accordingly, these privileges and immunities should be rejected if they are unnecessary for this purpose, or
408. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
409. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1; see, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
410. See L. TRIBE, supra note 65, § 4-14, at 202-12.
411. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (upholding absolute presidential tort
immunity).
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if they unduly impair underlying values of the separation of powers
discussed in Parts II and III by limiting the congressional role in basic
policymaking or by threatening the protection of individual rights. Executive privileges and immunities, therefore, should be analyzed in the
context of the underlying separation of powers issues discussed above.
During the Carter administration, litigation arose over two types
of privileges and immunities issues. First, several cases considered the
extent of the Executive's ability to withhold information from Congress
and the public. In some instances, the Administration adopted a
favorable position toward disclosure of information by the executive
branch. For example, in litigation over President Nixon's papers and
tape recordings, the Carter administration defended congressional regulation and opposed Mr. Nixon's assertion of an executive prerogative
of secrecy. 4 12 Moreover, the Administration generally favored increased disclosure by adopting new policies on Freedom of Information Act exemptions, classification of national security information,
and transmission of information to Congress. 41 3 In litigation by individuals against various intelligence officials, however, the Carter administration asserted a broad "state secrets" privilege that insulated
national security information from disclosure. 4 14 These claims of executive necessity seriously imperiled the availability of redress for the violation of individual constitutional rights.
A second type of issue arose when President Carter's Justice Department argued that executive officials are absolutely immune from
civil liability for illegal or unconstitutional acts. The Department, representing former President Nixon and members of his administration,
strongly favored the insulation of executive power over the protection
of individual rights. 4 15 Although asserted by the Department as an advocate, this position was in accord with other instances in which the
Administration supported the imperatives of executive power against
4 16
individual constitutional rights.
A.

Executive Withholding of Information

- Continuing Litigation over the Nixon Tapes and Other "Presidential Historical Material"-At the end of the Watergate affair,
412. See infra notes 431-37 and accompanying text. The Carter administration viewed this
litigation as a dispute between a past Executive and a present Executive rather than as a true
separation of powers controversy. See infra note 435 and accompanying text.
413. See infra notes 445-68 and accompanying text.
414. See infra notes 475-95 and accompanying text.
415. See infra notes 509-32 and accompanying text.
416. See infra note 509 and accompanying text.
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United States v. Nixon 4 17 set the stage for future consideration of executive privileges of confidentiality. In ordering the delivery of White
House tapes to the district judge, the Supreme Court concluded that the
President does not possess an absolute privilege that insulates him from
revealing confidential communications under all circumstances. 4 18 The
Court also found that the President is not absolutely immune from judicial process while he remains in office. 4 19 Although the immediate
effect of the decision was to limit certain executive claims, the opinion
recognized a constitutionally based privilege for confidential communications to the President. 420 Moreover, the Court appeared to acknowledge a sweeping constitutional privilege for military, diplomatic, and
4 21
state secrets.
Disputes over the publication of presidential and other executive
records affect both the allocation of policymaking authority and the
protection of individual rights. Administrations have argued that secrecy is necessary for presidential decisionmaking because it encour4 22
ages candor among executive officials when they give advice.
Publication of presidential documents, however, assists Congress and
the citizenry in scrutinizing and evaluating the Executive's decisions.
Furthermore, when continuing policy choices by either the Executive
or Congress rest on earlier executive decisions, the record of those deci423 If
sions may be necessary for an adequate review of present policy.
the material relates to important policy decisions, it is difficult to justify
withholding the information from Congress and the public. As the social importance of the policy decision increases, the need for legislative
deliberation and consent and for sufficient information to make an ad-equate decision increases correspondingly.
The availability of executive documents may also be essential for
417. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). See generally Quint, supra note 3, at 29-33.
418. 418 U.S. at 705-07.
419. id at 706.
420. Id at 708.
421. See Schwartz, BadPresidentsMake HardLaw: RichardM. Nixon in the Supreme Court,
31 RUTGERS L. REv. 22, 30 (1978).
422. The Court adopted this basic position in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-06
(1974). It is unclear, however, whether confidentiality is necessary to elicit candid advice. Moreover, even with the privilege it is not certain that advice to the President will remain confidential.
See, eg., Z. BRZEZINSKI, supra note 189 (memoirs of President Carter's National Security Advisor
describing advice given by named advisors on various issues to be decided by President Carter);
C. VANCE, supra note 69, at 37 (noting that leakage of confidential information to the press was
widespread and reduced frankness).
423. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 452-54 (1977). The publication

of the Pentagon Papers, for example, provided a more complete understanding of a series of executive foreign policy decisions, and may have accelerated the congressional policies that led to the
end of American involvement in Indochina. See Quint, supra note 3, at 9-14.
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the protection of constitutional rights. For example, historical records
obtained under the Freedom of Information Act and by Congress revealed that for many years the CIA engaged in covert mail openings
and other activities that invaded the constitutional rights of individuals.424 These revelations led to the curtailment of continuing CIA programs that threatened individual rights. 4 25 Similarly, the publication of
presidential records may reveal whether the President or his close advisors have engaged in activities that imperiled the constitutional rights
of individuals. 426 Claims of executive privilege, therefore, raise the
question of whether special protections are necessary for the executive
branch to carry out its assigned responsibility, or whether special protection would unduly insulate executive officials from political responsibility, historical evaluation, and appropriate judicial control.
The scope of the privileges acknowledged in United States v.
Nixon continued to be the subject of litigation during the Ford and
Carter administrations. Shortly after President Nixon's resignation in
1974, Congress enacted the Presidential Recordings and Materials
Preservation Act 427 to ensure government control of the famous White
House tape recordings
and other presidential material of the Nixon administration. 428 The Act required the Administrator of General
Services to take immediate possession of the tapes and presidential papers
and to review the material for the purpose of separating historical from
purely personal matter.429 The statute contemplated that personal
items would be returned to former President Nixon, while public access
424. See 3 SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S.
REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 559-636 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 3 INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY
REPORT]; see also 1980 Senate Intelligence Hearings,supra note 289, at 181, 249 (discussing the
CIA programs).
425. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978) (imposing liability for
the CIA's mail opening program).

426. Cf. Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), afj'dper curiam by an equally
divided Court, 452 U.S. 713 (1981) (warrantless electronic surveillance of a government official by
President Nixon and his advisors).

427. 44 U.S.C. § 2107 note (1976).
428. With respect to the Nixon materials, the Act superseded a 1955 statute which assumed
that a former President owned his presidential materials and contemplated that he might donate
the materials to a presidential library under conditions that he would determine. The 1974 Act
also invalidated an agreement entered into between former President Nixon and the Administrator of General Services under President Ford, which accorded former President Nixon extensive
control over the disposition of the presidential material of his Administration. See Letter of
Agreement Between President Nixon and General Services Administrator Arthur Sampson, 10

WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 1104-05 (Sept. 8, 1974). Previously, Attorney General Saxbe had
issued an opinion which concluded that former President Nixon's presidential materials were his
personal property. 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 1 (1974); see Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d 430, 439-40 n.81
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
429. 44 U.S.C. § 2107 note (1976).
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eventually would be granted to most of the remaining historical
430
material.
Immediately after passage of the Act, former president Nixon filed
an action challenging its constitutionality. 431 The Justice Department
under President Carter argued that the statute was an appropriate
means of assuring preservation of the historical record. 432 Although
Nixon viewed the compelled retention of his papers as a violation of
the presidential privilege of confidentiality and an undue invasion of
executive power, 433 the Justice Department's argument cast the statute
in an entirely different light. The government noted that the incumbent President supported the statute and that initial review of the
Nixon material would be performed exclusively by executive department personnel. 434 Therefore, the case did not present a separation of
powers dispute between Congress and the Executive, but rather an easily soluble controversy between the claims of a past Executive and the
more pressing needs of the current Executive. 435 The government emphasized that a current administration needs the documents of past administrations for present problems and for general historical
purposes. 436 Moreover, the Administration flatly asserted that the privilege for confidential communications "does not pertain to disclosure to
'437
incumbent officials of the Executive Branch.
430. Because Congress considered President Ford's Administrator too favorable to former
President Nixon, it disapproved three sets of proposed regulations under the Act's one-house veto
provisions. See Bruff& Gellhorn, supra note 238, at 1397-1403. It was not until 1977 that a final
set of regulations was promulgated. 42 Fed. Reg. 63,626 (1977). But see supra note 268 (noting
the claim of former Nixon aides that the present regulations are invalid because they resulted
from unconstitutional legislative vetoes).
431. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321 (D.D.C. 1976), afd, 433 U.S.
425 (1977).
432. Brief for the Federal Appellees at 28-29, Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S.
425 (1977), reprintedin 98 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 153, at 369-70. Parts of the Carter
administration's brief were adapted, sometimes verbatim, from a motion filed by the Justice Department under President Ford in July 1976. See Motion of the Federal Appellees to Affirm at
14-16, Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977), reprintedin 98 LANDMARK
BRIEFS, supra note 153, at 56-58.
433. See Brief for Appellant at 52-130, Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425
(1977), reprintedin 98 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 153, at 205-83.
434. See Brief for the Federal Appellees, supra note 432, at 18-19, reprintedin 98 LANDMARK
BRIEFS at 359-60.

435. "In short, there is no violation of the principle of separation of powers when Congress
acts to preserve the Executive Branch's access to executive papers and materials, and that is all
that is involved at this stage of the operation of the Act." Id at 25, reprintedin 98 LANDMARK
BRIEFS at 366.

436. See id at 27-29 & n. 12, reprintedin 98 LANDMARK BRIEFS at 368-70 & n. 12 (emphasizing
the need for Nixon administration materials on the SALT talks, China, Vietnam, and the Middle
East).
437. Id at 32, reprintedin 98 LANDMARK BRIEFS at 373. The Administration did acknowledge, however, that the privilege could be asserted by a past President. See id at 33, reprintedin
98 LANDMARK BRIEFS at 374. It also remarked that a statute would be open to question if it
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In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 438 the Supreme
Court upheld the statute. The Court emphasized that the executive
branch retained initial custody of the documents and that Presidents
Ford and Carter supported the legislation. 439 Unlike the Justice Department, however, the Court did not find these facts to be dispositive.
Rather, the Court balanced the competing interests much as it had
done in United States v. Nixon, and concluded that the strength of the
congressional objective justified any minimal intrusion on executive
powers and confidentiality that might occur in this case.440 Temporary
custody by the executive branch and the support of an incumbent President were only factors-albeit important factors-in striking the
balance. 441
Although the use of an ad hoc balancing process may have reflected the general doctrine of the first Nixon decision, in one respect
the case against the presidential privilege was even stronger in the second Nixon case than in the first. In United States v. Nixon, no specific
statute struck the balance between the competing interests; accordingly,
the Court adjudicated the dispute without congressional guidance. In
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, however, the Court was
faced with a legislative determination that the value of public possession of Nixon's papers for the proper functioning of government outweighed any future interference or chilling effect on executive branch
44 2
activity that might arise from disclosures allowed under the statute.
The statute and its legislative history imply a congressional finding that
infringed unduly on executive confidentiality, but concluded that the Act adequately protected
those interests. See id at 31, reprintedin 98 LANDMARK BRIEFS at 372.

438. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
439. Id at 441.
440. Id at 443-46, 451-55.
441. Id at 441-55. The Court also emphasized that the tapes and documents would be
screened by trained archivists and that the statute provides an opportunity for the assertion of any
presidential privileges before the material is released. Id at 450-52.
The Carter administration's argument that the dispute was actually between a past Executive
and a present Executive was not applicable beyond the circumstances of the second Nixon case,
because the 1974 Act contemplated eventual public release of presidential material. The argument possessed whatever force it had because the Act was considered on its face only, and questions of custody and archival screening by the Administrator were the only issues ripe for
adjudication.
Indeed, the next stage of the Nixon tapes litigation involved regulations issued under the 1974
Act that contemplated public access to certain tapes. In Nixon v. Freeman, 670 F.2d 346 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1035 (1982), the District of Columbia Circuit upheld regulations that
established public "listening centers" for certain White House tapes and provided for archival
screening of tapes and dictabelts that might contain President Nixon's diary. President Carter's
Justice Department represented the Administrator of General Services and argued for the validity
of the regulations. As in the second Nixon case, the regulations were upheld on their face. See id
at 358. Thus, further challenges to the release of specific material remain possible.
442. 44 U.S.C. § 2107 note (1976).
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the understanding of executive policies likely to be fostered by the release of the Nixon papers, and the redress of constitutional violations
that might be disclosed by the materials, were values particularly worthy of protection. If the Court had found that Congress' evaluation of
the competing considerations was incorrect and that it violated an implicit presidential privilege, the Court would have decided a case in
favor of the President when his power was at its "lowest ebb"-a rare
event in constitutional adjudication. 443 Instead, the Court correctly
found that an implied generalized presidential privilege could not prevail over a statute that expressed a balancing undertaken by Congress
pursuant to the necessary and proper clause. 44
2

Executive Rulesfor the Disclosure of Information.
(a) Disclosure of information to the public.-President
Carter's rules for the release of executive branch information to Congress and the public also reflected a general policy of increased disclosure.4 5 Although routine executive branch information may not
describe policy at the same high level as presidential historical materials, it is often more useful for congressional policymaking and for public and congressional scrutiny of executive action. Since 1967, the
443. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
444. In subsequent legislative testimony, Carter administration officials acknowledged broad
congressional authority over the custody and disposition of presidential documents. Since the
1974 Act applied only to records of the Nixon administration, more general legislation was proposed for government control of presidential documents. During hearings on this legislation, a
representative of the Office of Legal Counsel stated that
it is our conclusion that the subject matter of this bill is well within the province of
Congress, that it deals with matters appropriate for congressional concern, and that its
underlying purposes may constitutionally be achieved. . . . We think. . . that, at least
insofar as declaring the President's official papers to be public property is concerned,
Congress' action is not subject to serious challenge.
PresidentialRecordsAct of 1978: Hearingson H
10998 and Related Bills Before a Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 109, 112 (1978) (statement of
Lawrence A. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel) [hereinafter cited as PresidentialRecords Hearings]. The Office of Legal Counsel did argue, however, that
a statute might be unconstitutional if executive confidentiality was not adequately protected. See
id at 118, 124-30.
In 1978, President Carter signed the Presidential Records Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207 (Supp.
V 1981), which provides for government ownership of presidential materials, excluding the private
papers of the President, with restrictions on access to certain categories of information for not
more than 12 years. After 12 years, public access is permitted under the Freedom of Information
Act. See id § 2204(c). When he signed the Act, President Carter stated that it would "make the
presidency a more open institution" and further the goal of "making sure that our Government is
not above the law." Statement by President Carter on Signing H.R. 13,500 into Law, 2 PUB.
PAPERS: JIMMY CARTER 1965-66 (1978). The statute did not apply to President Carter's term of
office, but would have applied to a second term if he had been reelected.
445. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1979), revoked by Exec. Order No.
12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983), reprintedin 50 U.S.C.A. § 401 (West Supp. 1984).
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release of executive branch documents has been governed primarily by
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),446 a statute of profound importance that was intended to produce wide public disclosure of executive and agency information. The Act requires the release of "agency
records" to any person who files a request, unless the records fall into
one of several exceptions. 44 7 Although the Act contemplates maximum
disclosure, habits of bureaucratic secrecy persist and the Executive has
often sought a narrow construction of the Act through a broad interpretation of the exceptions or otherwise. 44 8 Moreover, the Executive's position, particularly in national security matters, has often been adopted
by the courts. 449
The Carter administration announced a position on the release of
information under the FOIA that was more favorable to disclosure
than the position required by the terms of the statute. In a letter to the
heads of federal departments and agencies, Attorney General Griffin
Bell announced that "the Justice Department will defend Freedom of
Information Act suits only when disclosure is demonstrably harmful [to
legitimate public or private interests], even if the documents technically
fall within the exemptions of the Act. ' 450 According to this policy
statement, the Administration would not defend the withholding of certain material that technically might be exempt from disclosure under
the statute if the factors favoring withholding were not sufficiently
weighty. Although the overall impact of this policy is unclear, it did
provide increased disclosure in some instances. 45' Even if Attorney
446. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
447. Id
448. See, e.g., Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980)
(argument that State Department records deposited in the Library of Congress are not subject to
disclosure under the FOIA even if they were improperly removed from the State Department);
Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d 562 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (argument that researchers who worked for the CIA
on behavior modification are "intelligence sources" and that their identities are therefore exempt
from disclosure under the FOIA). For a discussion of similar arguments in the early years of the
Act, see Relyea, The Presidency andthe People'sRight to Know, in THE PRESIDENCY AND INFORMATION POLICY 31-32 (H. Relyea ed. 1981) (Johnson and Nixon administrations).
449. See, e.g., Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980);
Federal Open Mkt. Comm. of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340 (1979); Administrator, Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
450. Letter from Attorney General Griffin Bell to Heads of All Federal Departments and
Agencies (May 5, 1977), reprinted in GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRI-

VACY ACTS 87 app. B-1 (R. Bouchard & J. Franklin eds. Supp. 1983).
451. For indications that the policy had some impact on the administration of the Act, see
Letter from William G. Schaffer, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to Senator James Abourezk
(Nov. 17, 1977), reprintedin 1977 FOIA Hearings, supra note 278, at 933-35 (Exhibit 132). For an
example of the CIA's release of a document under Bell's guidelines, see Marks v. CIA, 590 F.2d
997, 999 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (release of a document relating to intelligence methods). See also
1977 FOJA Hearings,supra note 278, at 102-03, 429-32 (testimony and letter of various Carter
administration officials) (noting that after the Carter administration took office, the government
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General Bell's program was effective, however, later events illustrated
the fragility of executive self-limitation. Soon after President Reagan
took office, Bell's policy letter was withdrawn by Attorney General
William French Smith,4 52 and the Reagan administration returned to a
policy of greater secrecy under the Act.
President Carter issued another rule that favored disclosure in a
manner similar to Attorney General Bell's FOIA guidelines. Executive
Order 12,065453 set forth revised standards for the classification of "national security" information. 454 Under the order, information that
otherwise would be properly classifiable was to be declassified if "the
need to protect such information [is] outweighed by the public interest
in disclosure of the information. '455 Thus, a weighing of the benefits of
disclosure might result in the release of information that fell into a classified category. Moreover, the order stated generally that declassificachanged its position and acknowledged the CIA's sponsorship of the vessel Glomar Explorer). But
see Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of Information 4ct-1981, 1982 DUKE L.J. 423,
425 n.19 (suggesting that the policy was unsuccessful in promoting the release of information).
In contrast to the Attorney General's position favoring increased disclosure, officials of both
the CIA and the FBI objected to the breadth of disclosure required under the FOIA and suggested
amendments that would have narrowed the application of the Act. See, e.g., Impact ofthe Freedom ofInformation,4ct andthe Privacy4ct on IntelligenceActivities HearingBefore the Subcomm.
on Legislation ofthe House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-14,
162 (1979) (testimony of Frank C. Carlucci, Deputy Director of the CIA); id at 64-114 (statement
of William H. Webster, Director of the FBI); 1980 Senate Intelligence Act Hearings, supra note
289, at 18 (statement of Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA).
Furthermore, notwithstanding the apparent liberality of the Attorney General's guidelines,
President Carter's executive agencies sometimes withheld information of undeniable value to the
public in order to protect government interests of questionable weight. See, e.g., Brinton v. Department of State, 636 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (withholding State Department opinions on the
legal status of Israeli-occupied territories), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
452. Memorandum of Attorney General William French Smith (May 4, 1981), reprinted in
GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY ACTS, supra note 450, at 88-89
app. B-1.
453. Exec. Order No. 12,065, supra note 445.
454. The order superseded a previous executive order on classification issued by President
Nixon and was promulgated after the Carter administration "took the unprecedented step of soliciting public comment" on a first draft. See Fox & Weiss, The F014 NationalSecurity Exemption
and the New Executive Order, 37 FED. B.J., Fall 1978, at 1, 1. The drafting process "was characterized by a significant degree of openness and public participation." HousE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, SECURITY CLASSIFICATION POLICY AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,356, H.R.
REP. No. 731, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1982) [hereinafter cited as SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
REPORT]. One provision contained in a draft of the order-but deleted from the final version
after criticism-authorized a broad secrecy agreement requirement for employees with access to
classified information. See Comment, supra note 290, at 698 n.229.
455. Exec. Order No. 12,065, supra note 445, § 3-303. Certain senior officials were authorized
to declassify information under this provision. Id Courts that considered § 3-303 usually granted
substantial discretion to the agencies in its application. See, e.g., Salisbury v. United States, 690
F.2d 966, 972-73 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Navasky v. CIA, 499 F. Supp. 269, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). But cf.
Kanter v. Department of State, 479 F. Supp. 921 (D.D.C. 1979) (ordering an agency to undertake
a § 3-303 balancing).
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tion was favored in doubtful cases. 4 56 Although the order "continued
the pattern of the previous security classification orders in further restricting classification authority," 457 it was criticized for the breadth
and vagueness of several important definitions. 458 Like previous executive orders governing classification, this order lacked statutory author4 59
ization and rested primarily on a claim of inherent executive power.
Since the FOIA has an exception for information properly classified pursuant to an executive order, reducing the scope of classification
in an executive order should eventually result in increased availability
of government information under the FOIA. Like Bell's FOIA policy,
however, Executive Order No. 12,065 did not survive under the succeeding Administration. President Reagan issued an executive order
that superseded No. 12,065; the new order deletes the balancing provision of President Carter's order and delegates greater authority to classifiers to restrain the dissemination of information. 460 The increased
scope of classification under President Reagan's order appears to be
part of a comprehensive attempt to impose greater government secrecy
in many areas.4 61 President Reagan's new order underscores the uncertainty of executive self-limitation. Rules that seek to vindicate the imperatives of popular decisionmaking and to protect individual rights
against government secrecy are likely to achieve greater stability and
effectiveness if they are enacted by Congress as statutes that cannot be
changed by executive fiat.
(b) Disclosureof informationto Congress.-Publicdisclosure
of information serves the broadest interests of democratic decisionmaking because it makes information available to both Congress and the
electorate. Disclosure allows Congress to act with greater accuracy and
understanding in policymaking and increases the ability of Congress
456. Exec. Order No. 12,065, supra note 445, § 1-101. The Nixon administration classification
rules included a similar provision. See SECURITY CLASSIFICATION REPORT, supra note 454, at 13.
457. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION REPORT, supra note 454, at 11; see Fox & Weiss, supra note
454, at 16.
458. See SECURITY CLASSIFICATION REPORT, supra note 454, at 12, 15.

459. See id at 12.
460. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983), reprintedin 50 U.S.C.A. § 401 note (West
Supp. 1984); see SECURITY CLASSIFICATION REPORT, supra note 454, at 36. Among other things,
the new order revoked President Carter's requirement that the prospective danger posed by disclosure be "identifiable" before information can be classified. Section 1.3(b) of the new order also
allows classification of information that is not dangerous in itself, if "in the context of other information" it might damage national security. See generally Note, Developments Underthe Freedom
ofInformation Act-1982, 1983 DUKE L.J. 390, 394-401.

For a recent proposal to revive the

balancing test of President Carter's order by amending the FOIA, see S. 1335, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S7161-65 (daily ed. May 19, 1983).
461. See, e.g., supra notes 315-17 and accompanying text.
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and the electorate to monitor executive policies and executive implementation of congressional policies. Even if security concerns may
make full public disclosure undesirable, however, it is difficult to jus-

tify withholding information from Congress or specified committees
under procedures designed to limit public access. If these procedures
are effective, secrecy will be preserved and Congress will be able to
4 62
review and examine executive actions.
This view underlies the accommodation that permits the House
and Senate Intelligence Committees to monitor the work of the intelligence agencies. Instituted after the intelligence investigations of the
mid-1970s, this arrangement operated particularly well during the
Carter administration. 463 Moreover, the Carter administration provided foreign policy information to Congress with a degree of candor
that "constituted a turning point in congressional policy for the Department of State. '464 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance issued a memorandum to State Department personnel which declared that "it shall be the
policy of the Department of State to extend the full resources of the
Department so as to provide Congress with the information it requires
to fulfill its constitutional role in the formulation of foreign affairs. ' 465
The memorandum further indicated that "effective cooperation with
Congress [is] a personal responsibility for every [State Department] officer." 466 There is evidence that the memorandum had a substantial
effect in practice.4 67 In contrast, however, congressional committees
462. See supra note 217.
463. When the [Intelligence] Committees have requested information, it has been supplied, and in almost every case, in the degree of detail requested. . . .[I]n
the four years
of the Committee's existence, we have yet to have had even to suggest a subpoena. We
have been able to work out difficulties through negotiation.
ABA Conference on Intelligence Legislation 38 (June 26-28, 1980) (remarks of William G. Miller,
Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence); see FOREIGN POLICY CONSULTATION,
supra note 66, at 34.
Although the Administration claimed that it gave advance notice of covert CIA actions to the
Intelligence Committees in almost every instance, CIA Director Stansfield Turner resisted a statutory requirement of prior notice. Turner argued that a statutory requirement "would amount to
excessive intrusion by the Congress into the President's exercise of his powers under the Constitution." 1980 House Intelligence Hearings supra note 320, at 10-11. Such a measure, however, was
eventually enacted by Congress and signed by President Carter in 1980. See supra note 133.
464. FOREIGN POLICY CONSULTATION, supra note 66, at 42.
465. Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to State Department Personnel (Apr. 5,
1978), reprintedin id at 73 app. A.
466. .d
467. A Congressional Research Service Study observed that "[tlime and again [State Department] officers. . commented that 'it is now policy' that the Department make available to Congress, almost without exception, whatever it requests." Id at 42. The study concludes that the
"memorandum undoubtedly established a new environment within the Department of State for
cooperation with Congress." Id Despite the increase in available information, however, the
memorandum did not attempt to further the consultation process by requiring information to be
furnished to Congress before it was requested. Id
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other than the Intelligence Committees apparently continued to face
obstacles in obtaining intelligence information relating to foreign
46 8
policy.
When the arrangements for the flow of information to Congress
reach an impasse, a formal claim of "executive privilege" may be
raised. President Nixon, for example, asserted very broad claims of the
privilege. 469 Although the Carter administration also asserted the doctrine of executive privilege against congressional demands for information on several occasions, 470 the issues were neither as sharply drawn
nor as significant as in similar disputes during the Nixon and Reagan
administrations. 471 The executive privilege claims asserted by President Carter were resolved through the political process; indeed, almost
all disputes over information between the Executive and congressional
committees have been politically resolved. In these cases, the institutional interests of the Executive and Congress are sharply opposed, and
the judiciary has been reluctant to intervene. 4 72 If a justiciable controversy is presented, however, a court presumably would balance the
countervailing executive and legislative interests as indicated in United
States v. Nixon .473 Moreover, as this Article has advocated, a court
should consider the importance of the matter to which the requested
information is related: as the importance of a given policy decision
increases, the need for legislative deliberation and consent-and adequate information to perform those functions-increases correspondingly. If Congress enacted a statute defining rules for the delivery of
information to its committees and providing for judicial enforcement,
however, the courts should enforce the statute as they enforce the
FOIA. Congress would have made a determination under the neces468. See Glennon, Investigating IntelligenceActivities." The Process of Getting Informationfor
Congress, in THE TETHERED PRESIDENCY 141-52 (1981).

469. See Quint, supra note 3, at 29-33.
470. See J. SUNDQUIST, supra note 67, at 332; Remarks by President Carter at a News Conference, 1 PUB. PAPERS: JIMMY CARTER 1094 (1978).
471. See Quint, supra note 3, at 29-33. For an important assertion of executive privilege by
the Reagan administration, see United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150
(D.D.C. 1983) (refusal of the Administrator of the EPA to deliver documents to a House subcommittee investigating allegedly lax enforcement of an environmental statute). The Administration
eventually reversed its position and agreed to provide the information to the subcommittee. See
N.Y. Times, June 8, 1983, at A14, col. 6.
472. See Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (1974). For a rare decision on the
merits after Congress enacted a special jurisdictional statute, see Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (refusing to order delivery of
White House tapes to the Watergate investigating committee). Cf. United States v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (urging Congress and Executive to settle dispute over
committee subpoena of surveillance information without judicial intervention).
473. See, e.g., Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d
725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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sary and proper clause concerning the relative weights to be attributed
474
to the countervailing interests.
3. Executive Secrecy and Individual Liberties-The State Secrets
Privilege.-The preceding sections demonstrated that the Carter administration generally assumed a posture favorable to more disclosure
than has been common in other recent administrations. In sharp contrast with this general position, however, the Carter administration advanced a broad state secrets privilege in several cases in which the
assertion of executive power threatened individual rights. Although
statutes may possibly have supported some assertions of the privilege,475 the government's main contention was that the privilege was
derived from the Constitution. The judiciary adopted this view and
upheld the privilege in decisions that denied claimants redress for alleged deprivations of their constitutional rights. Assertions of the privilege, therefore, may have the effect of denying the underlying right and
may "[vitiate] constitutional and statutory constraints on executive
476
power."
The Carter administration invoked the state secrets privilege to defeat civil actions for alleged deprivations of constitutional rights by intelligence agencies that occurred during earlier Administrations. In
Halkin v. Helms, 477 for example, antiwar activists sued federal intelligence officials, alleging that their telephone and telegraph communications had been intercepted unconstitutionally by warrantless electronic
478
surveillance conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA).
474. For statutes that require information to be reported to Congress, but do not specifically
provide for judicial enforcement, see, e.g., Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app.
§ 13 (1982) (requiring the Attorney General to report to the Intelligence Committees on cases that
are not prosecuted because classified material might be disclosed); statutes cited supra note 216.
475. See infra note 505.
476. Note, The Military and State Secrets Privilege: Protectionforthe National Security or
Immunityfor the Executive, 91 YALE L.J. 570, 570 (1982). Invocation of the state secrets privilege
has increased in recent years because of the recognition of a non-statutory tort action against
federal officials for certain constitutional violations. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir.
1977). When this cause of action is asserted against federal intelligence officers, a state secrets
claim may be raised. More frequent assertion of the privilege may also be an after-effect of the
first Nixon case, which indicated that the privilege had a constitutional basis and suggested that it
was absolute. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974); Van Alstyne, A Political and
ConstitutionalReview of United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REv. 116, 117-18 (1974); see also
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 n.9 (1953).
477. 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978). This case, referred to below as Halkin I, was followed by a
second decision that is referred to as Halkin 11. See infra note 488.
478. The National Security Agency, a branch of the Defense Department, uses satellites and
other methods to intercept and collect international radio and telephone communications. See
generally J. BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE: A REPORT ON AMERICA'S MOST SECRET AGENCY
(1982). Although President Truman created the NSA without specific statutory authorization,
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The communications were allegedly intercepted pursuant to two NSA
programs that monitored the activities of individuals who opposed the
Vietnam War. 479 In Halkin I, the Secretary of Defense argued that the
case should be dismissed because the state secrets privilege prohibited
disclosure of information about the NSA's interception of telephone
and telegraph communications and thus prohibited disclosure of
whether plaintiffs' messages had been intercepted. 48 0 According to the
government, disclosing the identity of persons whose messages had
been intercepted might reveal which electronic circuits are monitored
by the NSA and thus permit countermeasures by hostile governments.48 1 The government also argued that the technical nature of the
surveillance and the Secretary's expertise militated against judicial
482
review.
The District of Columbia Circuit endorsed the government's position and upheld the privilege. 483 The court concluded that the plaintiffs would be unable to prove their case without the privileged material
and therefore dismissed the complaint.4 84 The court declined to shift
Congress has acknowledged the agency through appropriations and other statutory provisions.
See, e.g., National Security Agency Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-36, 73 Stat. 63, reprintedin 50
U.S.C. § 402 note (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Proposals for an NSA "charter" were included in
comprehensive intelligence legislation proposed in 1978 and 1980, but were not enacted. See 1980
Senate Intelligence Hearings,supra note 289.
479. The first program, MINARET, was a surveillance program that added the names of as
many as 1200 Americans, including antiwar and civil rights activists, to the words that triggered
the NSA's computer recording of international communications. See Halkin 1, 598 F.2d at 4. In
the second program, SHAMROCK, telegraph companies delivered copies of international telegrams to the NSA for review. See 3 INTELLIGENCE AcTiVITY REPORT, supra note 424, at 735-83.
These programs were discontinued in the mid-1970s after they were exposed by committees investigating the intelligence agencies. Id at 740-44.
480. See Brief of Official Defendants-Appellees at 29-30, Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 1978). The government made this argument, among others, in public documents and testimony. In addition, the government filed a set of in camera affidavits that were unavailable to the
plaintiffs or to the public. Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 5. Moreover, the Deputy Director of the NSA
also testified in camera. Id
481. See Brief of Official Defendants-Appellees, supra note 480, at 13-14. The government
also argued that the state secrets privilege insulated the NSA from disclosing the identity of the
plaintiffs whose telegraph messages were reviewed under the SHAMROCK program because the
disclosure might reveal the "targeted" circuits and the technical capacity of the NSA and might
have "diplomatic consequences." See id at 35-36.
482. The technology is fragile; the risks and costs of disclosure evade exact proof. Under
these circumstances, where the risks and costs are explained, a court must defer to the
judgment of the Secretary of Defense rather than substitute its own, necessarily less expert and informed, judgment for that of the head of the agency in which the expert
capability resides.
Id at 17. The government argued that the Secretary's intelligence duties arise from the President's constitutional responsibilities under article II. Id at 22. Further, the government flatly
remarked that the privilege was "within the constitutional prerogatives of the executive." Id at 40
n.48.
483. 598 F.2d at 11.
484. Id at 5, 11.
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the burden of proof, resolve issues of fact against the defendants, or
take other measures that might have compensated for the loss of the
privileged evidence. 485 The court emphasized that the state secrets
privilege is absolute and "must head the list" of privileges. 4 86 Theredeference' to executive asserfore, courts "should accord the 'utmost
4 87
privilege.
secrets
state
the
tions" of
In Halkin 11,488 the same plaintiffs alleged that they had been subject to unconstitutional surveillance by the CIA because of their antiwar activity. 489 The plaintiffs also alleged that the CIA had included
their names on NSA "watch lists," through which the CIA requested
that the NSA monitor their telephone and telegraph communications.490 Although the government conceded that some of the plaintiffs
had been under surveillance, President Carter's CIA Director, Stansfield Turner, refused to disclose additional information, including in
most instances the identities of the plaintiffs involved and the techniques used for surveillance. 49 1 Turner invoked the state secrets privilege and claimed that releasing the information would identify CIA
cooperative arsources and endanger diplomatic relations by disclosing
492
rangements with foreign intelligence agencies.
485. See id. at 10-i1.
486. Id at 7.
487. Id at 9 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)). Commenting on this
result, Judge Bazelon observed that the
decision is dangerously close to an open-ended warrant to intrude on liberties guaran[U]pholding the privilege in this case precludes all
teed by the Fourth Amendment ....
judicial scrutiny of the signals intelligence operations of NSA, regardless of the degree to
which such activity invades the protection of the Fourth Amendment. . . . As elaborated by the panel, the privilege becomes a shield behind which the government may
insulate unlawful behavior from scrutiny and redress by citizens who are the target of the
government's surveillance.
598 F.2d at 12-14 (Bazelon, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
488. Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
489. Plaintiffs alleged that they had been subject to surveillance by the CIA in Operation
CHAOS, which investigated certain American citizens who opposed the Vietnam War-purportedly to determine whether they were connected with foreign interests. See id at 981-84. See
generally 3 INTELLIGENCE AcTiviTY REPORT, supra note 424, at 679-721 (describing Operation
CHAOS).
490. Although the plaintiffs' action against the NSA defendants was dismissed in Halkin I,
plaintiffs claimed that CIA officials were liable for submitting the watch lists to the NSA. Halkin
II, 690 F.2d at 984. Even though Halkin I precluded the plaintiffs from attempting to prove that
their messages had actually been intercepted by the NSA, they argued that there should be a
presumption "that the submission of a name [to NSA] resulted in interception of the named person's communications." Id
491. See id at 985.
492. In his public affidavit, Turner asserted that
in significant part the information recoverable from the files of the CHAOS project is
information either supplied by foreign governmental liaison sources or otherwise witnessing their cooperation. While in a general sense it may be acknowledged that CIA
derives information through liaison arrangements with foreign governments, the fact of
CIA interaction with authorities of a particular foreign government may not be acknowl-
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The court accepted the government's position, and upheld the
privilege on the ground that "the disclosures sought here pose a 'reasonable danger' to the diplomatic and military interests of the United
States. '493 According to the court, disclosure "could strain diplomatic
relations. . . by generally embarrassing foreign governments who may
wish to avoid. . . allegations of CIA or United States involvements,"
494
or by subjecting those governments to "political or legal action.
Since the plaintiffs conceded that they could not prove their case
against CIA officials without the surveillance information, and because
the court
declaratory and injunctive relief were found inappropriate,
495
action.
the
of
dismissal
court's
trial
the
affirmed
The Halkin litigation is the most striking of several recent assertions of the state secrets privilege that ultimately resulted in the denial
or impairment of constitutional claims of individuals against executive
officers.4 96 Although the discussion in the Halkin cases is cast in terms
edged without damaging U.S. diplomatic or intelligence relationships with that government. . . . [B]reach of the understanding of confidentiality will predictably lead to a
diplomatic incident, or restriction and disruption of cooperative intelligence relationships, or both.
Id at 992 n.56.
493. Id at 993.
494. Id
495. Id at 1009. The court also dismissed the claims based on the CIA's inclusion of the
plaintiffs' names in the watch lists submitted to the NSA. The state secrets privilege that prevented them from proving NSA surveillance also prevented them from proving that any injury
resulted from the transmission of their names to the NSA. The court concluded that if plaintiffs
were unable to show injury resulting from the CIA's actions, they lacked standing to attack those
actions. Id at 997-1001.
In a similar case, Harrison Salisbury, a former New York Times correspondent, filed an
action under the Federal Tort Claims Act alleging that the NSA had violated his first and fourth
amendment rights by intercepting his international communications. Salisbury v. United States,
690 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The court followed Halkin I and dismissed the action on the
ground that the state secrets privilege prevented the plaintiff from proving his claim. The court
rejected Salisbury's argument that liability should be imposed on the government, or adverse inferences drawn from nonproduction of the evidence, as a price for the government's assertion of
the privilege. Id at 975-77.
496. For other cases in which the state secrets privilege significantly impaired a possible claim
for the violation of constitutional rights, see, e.g., Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (warrantless electronic surveillance); Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (surveillance of international communications); Sigler v. Levan, 485 F. Supp. 185 (D. Md.
1980) (warrantless seizure of an army counterintelligence agent's memoirs); Jabara v. Kelley, 75
F.R.D. 475 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (warrantless foreign affairs surveillance); cf Farnsworth Cannon,
Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1980) (en bane) (assertion of the privilege in nonconstitutional tort case). But see ACLU v. Brown, 619 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (partially
rejecting a state secrets claim).
The Carter administration claimed similar authority to withhold information when it asserted
an informer's privilege against political organizations that sought judicial redress for illegal surveillance and other constitutional violations. In In re Attorney General of the United States, 596
F.2d 58 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903 (1979), the district court cited Attorney General Griffin Bell for contempt after he refused to disclose files of government informants who had infiltrated the Socialist Workers Party. On appeal, Bell claimed that releasing the files would
discourage other informants and potential informants. See id at 64 n. 1I. The government also
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of an evidentiary privilege, the result denies any protection or vindication of individual constitutional rights that might otherwise have been
available through injunctive relief or damages. As Judge Bazelon
noted, these cases insulate officials from judicial redress for constitutional violations and effectively extinguish the underlying constitutional right.49 7 Indeed, under the Halkin doctrine, judicial examination
of entire classes of constitutional violations may be foreclosed. 498 The
Halkin cases accomplish this result by executive decision, without legislative balancing and with only the most superficial judicial review.
Whenever executive interests conflict with individual constitutional rights, however, Congress should initially balance the government and individual interests. 499 If an executive interest is cast as an
"evidentiary privilege," congressional balancing is still necessary if the
effect of the privilege is to impair redress for constitutional violations.
In those instances-as in cases in which more "substantive" executive
measures threaten individual rights-there is a significant danger that
the Executive will conduct a balancing of the government and individual constitutional interests that is unreliable and skewed in favor of the
government's own interest. 5 00 An executive official who possesses secret information may well overvalue the strength of the Executive's secrecy interest and undervalue the countervailing constitutional
interest.50 ' For example, the fear of diplomatic embarrassment from
the disclosure of American connections with foreign intelligence services, asserted by the government in Halkin, is sufficiently doubtful as a
counterweight to individual constitutional rights that some judgment
other than the Executive's own decision should be required. Moreover,
the likelihood of distorted executive judgment is particularly severe in
argued that a cabinet officer is constitutionally immune from being held in contempt of court for
official actions. See Note, PryingInformants FilesLoosefrom the Handsof the Attorney General
Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General of the United States, 22 How. L.J. 687, 694-97 (1979).
The Second Circuit declined to rule on the merits of the underlying discovery order, but it dismissed the contempt citation and remanded the action to the trial court for a consideration of less
draconian sanctions. 596 F.2d at 67-68.
497. Halkin 1, 598 F.2d at 13-14 (Bazelon, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
498. See id at 12-14 ("[Ujpholding the privilege in this case precludes all judicial scrutiny of
the signals intelligence operations of NSA."); see also Statement of ACLU Attorney, Mark H.
Lynch, Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of
the House Judiciary Committee 1-2 (June 8, 1983) ("[T]he recent expansion of the state secrets
privilege by the courts has made it virtually impossible for citizens to challenge electronic surveillance which is claimed to concern foreign intelligence or counterintelligence matters.").
499. See supra Part III.
500. See supra notes 271-73 and accompanying text.
501. Cf. Calhoun, ConidentialityandExecutive Privilege,in THE TETHERED PRESIDENCY 17273 (1981) (noting that each branch, particularly the executive, thinks that it "owns" the information it develops); 1977 FOZ4 Hearings, supra note 278, at 73 (statement of Senator Abourezk)
(noting the danger of politically motivated overclassification).
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these cases because a decision in favor of secrecy may insulate executive officers themselves from possible liability.
The judiciary, however, has been willing to defer to the Executive
on the state secrets privilege. Most appellate courts agree that "the trial
judge should accord considerable deference to recommendations from
the executive department" on questions of the privilege.5 0 2 Furthermore, courts have concluded that the privilege is absolute:5 0 3 if a state
secret of any level of importance is present, the standard prevents disclosure regardless of the strength of any countervailing constitutional
or other individual interest.5 4 Thus, judicial deference is built into the
standard; a court cannot consider individual rights and must defer to
an executive determination that may have undervalued or ignored
those rights. Vindication of individual constitutional rights, however,
should not be confided primarily to the Executive when its interests are
adverse to those rights.
Consequently, when the state secrets privilege endangers redress
for constitutional violations, the privilege ordinarily should not defeat
liability in the absence of a specific authorizing statute. Such a statute
would represent a balancing of individual constitutional interests with
executive secrecy interests, a balancing that the Executive cannot undertake objectively and that the judiciary has declined to perform. Although a statute may not be able to answer all questions, substantial
congressional guidance should be required. Without statutory guidance, the courts should not permit the privilege to defeat redress for
plausibly asserted constitutional violations. In such cases, the information should not be withheld unless damages are awarded to the plaintiffs or unless it is possible to make adequate procedural provisions to
50 5
compensate plaintiffs for the loss of the evidence.
502. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Moreover, courts should be willing
"to credit relatively speculative projections of adverse consequences" asserted by the Executive.
Id at 58 n.35.
503. See, e.g., Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
504. The litigant's need for the information is considered only to determine the extent of the
disclosures the government must make publicly or in camera to demonstrate that state secrets are
actually involved. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953). For proposals to change
the doctrine and require a balancing of countervailing interests in determining the existence of the
privilege, see Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege, 50 MINN. L. REv. 875, 910 (1966); Note, supra
note 476, at 584-89.
505. In many state secret cases, the defendant is a present or former government official,
rather than the United States government. Because it may be unfair for a privilege claim by the
government to result in the liability of an individual, indemnification by the government might be
called for. Cf Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 69 n.74 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (suggesting indemnification to resolve a similar problem).
Whether any statutes currently provide for a state secrets privilege is a complex question that
should be resolved in litigation. The Federal Rules of Evidence contemplate that the courts will
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B.

Executive Immunilyfrom Suit

The second executive privileges and immunities issue litigated
during the Carter administration was the extent to which the President
and other executive officials are immune from tort liability for unconstitutional actions. This immunity, which is similar to the state secrets
privilege in its potential impact on individuals, surfaced in a series of
civil actions filed against former President Nixon and other officers for
alleged violations of constitutional rights. A final vestige of the Nixon
era, these cases again posed issues of executive accountability and, in
develop common law privileges, but do not explicitly authorize a state secrets privilege or any
other governmental privilege that might defeat the vindication of constitutional rights. See FED.
R. EVID. 501. The history of the Federal Rules, moreover, is rather unfavorable to a broad state
secrets privilege. Congress rejected the section on privileges in the proposed Federal Rules, in
part because of the breadth of the proposed state secrets and governmental information privileges
included by the Advisory Committee at the suggestion of the Nixon administration. See Berger,
How the PrivilegeforGovernmental Information Met Its Watergate, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 747
(1975).
With respect to the NSA and the CIA, however, more specific statutes must be considered. A
1959 statute, for example, states that
nothing in this Act or any other law. . . shall be construed to require the disclosure of
the organization or any function of the National Security Agency, or any information
with respect to the activities thereof, or of the names, titles, salaries, or number of the
persons employed by such agency.
National Security Agency Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-36, § 6(a), 73 Stat. 63, 64, reprintedin 50
U.S.C. § 402 note (1976). The NSA has invoked this statute to avoid disclosing information gathered by electronic monitoring, under the third exemption of the Freedom of Information Act. See
Founding Church of Scientology v. National Sec. Agency, 610 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Hayden
v. National Sec. Agency, 608 F.2d 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Similarly, the National Security Act of
1947 provides that "the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1976); see also
id § 403g (prohibiting disclosures of certain internal CIA matters). These provisions authorize
the withholding of CIA personnel information and information about intelligence "sources and
methods" under the FOIA. See, e.g., Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Although the NSA and CIA statutes exempt some material from disclosure under the FOIA,
it does not necessarily follow that these provisions authorize withholding information from discovery in cases like Halkin. Cf. Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General of the United States,
No. 73 Civ. 3160 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1977) (finding that NSA and CIA statutes do not create a
privilege, although the Constitution does). The interests in favor of disclosure are stronger in a
civil action for violation of constitutional rights than in a FOIA action in which the claimant need
only have a desire to obtain the information. More fundamentally, however, it seems unlikely
that these statutes were intended to resolve the conflict between executive secrecy and the vindication of individual constitutional rights typified by cases such as Halkin. Nor do these statutes
address the question of whether the loss of evidence in state secrets cases should be redressed by
reversing the burden of proof or through some other procedural technique when constitutional
rights are at issue.
For other statutes that may bear on a state secrets privilege in some instances, see, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 798 (1982) (penalizing disclosure of certain cryptological information and information
about communications intelligence); id § 952 (1982) (penalizing certain disclosures of codes and
matter obtained in transmissions between a foreign country and its United States embassy); id
app. § 4 (1982) (limiting disclosure of classified material in criminal cases); 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f)
(1976 & Supp. V 1981) (authorizing withholding of information about foreign intelligence surveillance under certain circumstances); Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97200, 96 Stat. 122 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 421-426) (prohibiting public identification of
intelligence agents under certain circumstances).
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the views of some, raised the question of whether the President and
other officials are subject to law.50 6 Although in United States v.
Nixon 50 7 the Supreme Court concluded that values of efficient administration do not give an incumbent President absolute immunity from
judicial process, 50 8 the Court had no occasion to consider whether similar considerations insulate a former or incumbent President from tort
liability for actions taken while in office.
The resolution of this issue again requires balancing executive and
individual interests, although from a somewhat different perspective
than the balancing discussed in Part III. Like the state secrets decisions, these cases raised the question of whether effective judicial redress for possible infringements of constitutional rights should give
way to the claimed imperatives of executive power. In approaching
this question, the Carter administration took the position that claims of
executive power should prevail over the redress of constitutional
rights.5 0 9 Therefore, the Administration's position on executive immunity was in accord with its position on the state secrets privilege and
also with its positions favoring executive power against individual liberties, asserted more directly in the cases considered in Part III. In
each of these areas, strong executive claims pose the same danger: judicial acceptance of executive assertions without a statute risks deference to a judgment in which government interests have been
overvalued and individual constitutional interests undervalued or
ignored.
The first case in this series was Butz v. Economou,5 10 in which a
506. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 766 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (Absolute
presidential tort immunity "places the President above the law. It is a reversion to the old notion

that the King can do no wrong."); 68 CORNELL L. REV. 236 (1983).
507. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
508. Id at 706.
509. Unlike the government's positions in the cases discussed above, arguments for executive
immunity were advanced by the Justice Department on behalf of individual litigants-present
and former government employees being sued in their individual capacities-rather than on behalf of the government itself. It is at least theoretically possible, therefore, that these positions did
not coincide with the actual views of the Administration, but rather were positions that the Department thought it should assert on behalf of its individual clients as a matter of professional
responsibility. This possibility is diminished, however, by a Justice Department policy that requires a former or present government employee to be represented by private counsel, rather than
by the Department, if "the adequate representation of the employee requires the making of an
argument which conflicts with a government position." See Letter from Assistant Attorney General Barbara Babcock to the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure
(Oct. 4, 1977), reprintedin STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
RETENTION OF PRIVATE LEGAL COUNSEL TO REPRESENT FEDERAL EMPLOYEES IN CIVIL LAwSUITS 315, 350 (Comm. Print 1978).
510. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
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commodities dealer sued President Nixon's Secretary of Agriculture for
allegedly violating the first amendment by retaliating against the plaintiff for his criticism of the Agriculture Department.5 1' Representing
the former Secretary, the Carter administration argued that executive
officials have an absolute tort immunity for unconstitutional actions
taken within the scope of their authority.5 1 2 According to the government, a less inclusive immunity would impair the efficiency of government by instilling a fear of liability in executive officers.5 13 The Justice
Department acknowledged that an absolute immunity might prevent
tort liability for abuses of power by the Nixon Administration, a spectre from the very recent past.5 1 4 The government argued, however, that
this result was a regrettable but necessary price to pay for a vigorous
and efficient executive branch.5 1 5 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court
rejected the government's position and concluded that the Secretary of
Agriculture was not absolutely immune from civil liability for unconstitutional acts performed in the general course of his official activity.5 1 6 Rather, the Court found that the Secretary possessed only a
qualified immunity, which insulates him from liability for official action unless he "knows or should know" that his acts are unconstitutional, or unless he acts with the "malicious intention" of causing
5 17
injury.
In a subsequent case that also arose from events of the Nixon era,
the Justice Department under President Carter asserted absolute tort
immunity on behalf of the former President and his advisors Haldeman, Kissinger, and Mitchell. In Haperin v. Kissinger,1 8 a former National Security Council official sought damages from former President
Nixon and his advisors for the warrantless wiretapping of his tele511. Id at 482-83.
512. Brief for Petitioners at 17-41, Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), reprintedin 104
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 153, at 77-101. For a discussion of the development of absolute
tort immunity for federal officers before Butz, see Freed, Executive Official Immunityfor Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 526, 528-32 (1977).
513. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 512, at 28-31, reprintedin 104 LANDMARK BRIEFS at
88-91.
514. Id at 34-35, reprintedin 104 LANDMARK BRIEFS at 94-95.
515. Id at 33, reprintedin 104 LANDMARK BRIEFS at 93.
516. 438 U.S. at 494-95.
517. Id at 498-500, 506-07 (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), and Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (state officials)). According to the Court, the finding of a qualified
immunity is "subject to those exceptional situations where it is demonstrated that absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of the public business." Id at 507. Further, the Court found that
subordinate officials in the Department of Agriculture who perform adjudicatory or prosecutorial
functions are entitled to the absolute immunity that is extended to judges and prosecutors generally. Id at 508-17.
518. 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), affdper curiam by an equally divided Court, 452 U.S. 713
(1981).
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phone.5 19 Haperin was argued against the background of Butz, in
which the qualified immunity doctrine was applied to cabinet members, but not to the President. Therefore, the Justice Department argued that the office of President possesses special constitutional

attributes that require an absolute immunity from civil liability for vio-

lations of individuals' constitutional rights.5 20 According to the government, absolute presidential immunity was justified by history,
precedent, and policy.5 2 The government also opposed qualified presidential immunity because the resulting inquiry into the President's
state of mind might force him "to reveal not only the intimate details of
executive decision-making but also the confidential and highly sensitive information on which he based his actions." 522 This result was
"directly at odds" with the "presumptive privilege" of confidentiality
recognized in United States v. Nixon 523 The government argued that
an absolute privilege is especially important in national security and
foreign affairs-supposedly at issue in the Ha#erin case-because "secrecy is essential to the proper execution of these presidential
powers." 524

The Supreme Court in Ha erin was equally divided on the question of presidential immunity, thereby affirming the circuit court's con519. Id at 1195. President Nixon ordered the wiretapping in an attempt to discover the source
of various press disclosures, including disclosure of the secret bombing of Cambodia. Id at 1196.
520. According to the government, the President has an "absolute immunity inherent in the
... Brief for the Petitioners at 17, Kissinger v.
Office. . . under Article II of the Constitution.
Halperin, 452 U.S. 713 (1981), reprintedin 123 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 153, at 524. The
government also asserted that the lower court committed an "unwarranted assertion of judicial
authority in personal damage actions to engage in routine oversight of the President's official
conduct" when it found liability. Id at 17-18, reprintedin 123 LANDMARK BRIEFS at 524-25.
521. "Damages actions against the President challenging the legality of his official acts would
constitute a substantial intrusion into the President's constitutional responsibilities. The risk of
personal liability would serve to inhibit the fearless and decisive exercise of presidential authority
....
" Id at 26, reprintedin 123 LANDMARK BRIEFS at 533. The government also noted that
sanctions other than tort liability were available; it observed that the acts that gave rise to
Halperin's civil action against former President Nixon formed a basis for the second article of
impeachment approved by the House Judiciary Committee. Id at 30 n.28, reprintedin 123
LANDMARK BRIEFS at 537 n.28.

522. Id at 33, reprintedin 123

LANDMARK BRIEFS

at 540.

523. Id (citing Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974)).
524. Id at 39, reprintedin 123 LANDMARK BRIEFS at 546. Moreover, the government argued
that in these areas "vigorous and resolute" presidential action is particularly necessary and that
litigation would "be beyond the ken of the trier of fact." ld at 40, reprintedin 123 LANDMARK
BRIEFS

at 547.

The Justice Department also argued that an absolute tort immunity extended to the President's advisors Kissinger, Haldeman, and Mitchell. Since the President delegates the performance
of various duties, the government argued for a derivative immunity for delegated authority. Id at
44-48, reprintedin 123 LANDMARK BRIEFS at 551-55. Moreover, the government asserted that
anything less than absolute immunity for advice given to the President would impair the President's privilege of confidential communication. Id at 48-49, reprintedin 123 LANDMARK BRIEFS
at 555-56.
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clusion that the President had only a qualified immunity. 5 25 In the
later case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald,52 6 however, the Court held that Nixon,
"as a former President of the United States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts," at least
when Congress has not expressly acted to create liability. 5 27 The President's immunity extends to actions "within the 'outer perimeter' of his
official responsibility." 528 According to the Court, absolute tort immunity is "a functionally mandated incident of the President's unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation of powers
and supported by our history. ' 529 In a companion case, the Court held

that presidential advisors possess only a qualified immunity.5 30 This

holding, however, expanded the protection given to all executive officers because it eliminated the element of "subjective" bad faith or
"malicious intention" as a ground for withdrawing the immunity.5 3 '
Moreover, the Court suggested that presidential advisors and other executive officers may possess absolute immunity when carrying out na5 32
tional security and foreign policy functions.
525. Kissinger v. Halperin, 452 U.S. 713 (1981), aff'g 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Butcf
infra notes 529, 531 (subsequent developments in the Haperin litigation).
526. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
527. Id at 749. In Fitzgerald,a Defense Department analyst alleged that Nixon administration officials dismissed him in retaliation for congressional testimony about excessive procurement
costs, in violation of the first amendment. See id at 736-39. Appearing as amicus curiae in Fitzgerald, Solicitor General Rex Lee relied on the brief filed by the Carter administration on Nixon's
behalf in Haperin. _d at 770 n.5 (White, J., dissenting).
528. Id at 756.
529. Id at 749. In subsequent proceedings in Haperin, a district court recently applied the
Fitzgerald standard and held that President Nixon was absolutely immune from liability for the
wiretapping of Halperin's telephone. Halperin v. Kissinger, 578 F. Supp. 231 (D.D.C. 1984).
530. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813 (1982).
531. Id at 815-19. A district court applied the revised test of qualified immunity set forth in
Harlow and found that President Nixon's advisors Kissinger, Haldeman, and Mitchell were immune from liability for the Halperin wiretap. See Halperin v. Kissinger, 578 F. Supp. 231
(D.D.C. 1984); see also Zweibon v. Mitchell, 720 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding a former
Attorney General immune under the Harlow test for electronic surveillance of the Jewish Defense
League).
532. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 812 & n.18 (1982); see The Supreme Court, 1981
Term, 96 HARV. L. REv. 62, 226-36 (1982). This suggestion is ominous because an absolute immunity for national security and foreign policy functions "could be used to shield large segments
of executive branch operations that offer especially potent opportunities for abuse-including the
work of the Defense and State Departments, the CIA, and the FBI." Id at 236.
Executive officials also may have the benefit of the absolute immunity created for certain
judicial and quasi-judicial functions. See supra note 517. The absolute immunity for
prosecutorial acts, for example, insulated former Attorney General John Mitchell from claims that
he maliciously prosecuted Vietnam War demonstrators to prevent them from exercising first
amendment rights. Dellums v. Powell, 660 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Former attorneys general,
however, are not absolutely immune from liability for acts unrelated to the judicial process. See,
e.g., Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979) (warrantless electronic surveillance),
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (supervision of
police).
In a related legislative proposal, the Carter administration sought to amend the Federal Tort
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In Fitzgerald,the Court neglected the appropriate role of Congress
in balancing claims of executive power and individual constitutional
rights. Judicial deference to executive claims of an absolute tort immunity for constitutional violations presents acute dangers in the absence

of a statute establishing the immunity and regulating the circumstances
in which it can be asserted. The successful invocation of an absolute
tort immunity may well deny any redress for the defendant's violation
of constitutional rights. Moreover, the Executive is most likely to overvalue its own interests and undervalue liberty interests in the absolute
immunity cases; what is at issue is the personal liability of executive
officers, rather than an injury to government interests with which the
officials may identify. The absence of a statute granting immunity,
therefore, should militate against recognizing an absolute immunity.
Whether the executive branch will actually be disrupted by the defense
of constitutional tort actions, and whether executive officers will act
with insufficient vigor and resolution through fear of liability, are basically questions of legislative fact. Before a court should defer to such
claims, Congress should make its own evaluation of these assertions.
To require legislative action before redress for constitutional rights can
be denied by an absolute executive immunity is to recognize the grant
of power to Congress to make all laws "necessary and proper" 533 to
effectuate not only its own powers, but those of the other branches as
well. A requirement of legislative action acknowledges that when constitutional rights are involved, the creation of an absolute immunity
Claims Act to grant absolute immunity to allexecutive employees against tort liability for acts
within the scope of their employment. In return, the Administration's proposal provided for government liability for certain constitutional torts of its employees, eliminated a good faith defense,
allowed liquidated damages, and permitted the victim to participate in agency disciplinary proceedings against the employee. See Amendments to the FederalTort Claims Act: Joint Hearingson
S. 2117 Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and ShareholdersRights and Remedies and the Subcomm.
on Administrative Practiceand Procedureof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 5-20 (1978) (testimony of Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General of the United States) [hereinafter
cited as FederalTort Claims Amendment Hearings]. See generally Bell, ProposedAmendments to
the FederalTort Claims Act, 16 HARV. J. ON LEois. 1 (1979). Despite the potential for an increased frequency of recovery, however, legislators were concerned that decreased personal accountability would encourage more misconduct:
[T]he Administration proposal to insulate all Federal officials from civil suit, no matter
how blatant and egregious their misconduct, is a serious error. To adopt that approach is
to surrender the long-term interests of the American public to the immediate needs and
concerns of the Justice Department. In the aftermath of Watergate, I, for one, cannot
accept the tortured argument that removing individual accountability will lead to more
responsible Government.
FederalTort Claims.4mendmentHearings,supra, at 356 (statement of Sen. Percy). Ultimately, the
Carter administration's proposals were not enacted. For more recent proposals for legislative
change, see Madden, Allard & Remes, Bedtimefor Bivens: Substitutingthe UnitedStates as Defendant in ConstitutionalTort Suits, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 469 (1983).
533. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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must follow a congressional determination that the immunity is indeed
"necessary and proper" for the protection of executive interests.5 34
Since there is no general statutory right of action against federal
officers for constitutional torts, damage claims for constitutional viola-

tions may rest on implied causes of action without explicit congressional authorization. 53 5 Despite the judicial origin of these actions, it
does not follow that the Court should be free to create absolute immunities for executive officers without congressional guidance. Recognition of an implied constitutional cause of action and the creation of an
absolute executive immunity rest on different bases. Recognition of an
implied constitutional cause of action rests on a decision that basic constitutional values require a remedy for violations of "personal interests
in liberty," and a recognition that the traditional remedy for these violations is damages. 536 Creation of an absolute tort immunity, however,
534. Cf. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 590 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (finding absolute
executive immunity "demands the resolution of large imponderables which one might have
thought would be better the business of the Legislative Branch"); Van Alstyne, supra note 476, at
119 (noting that the "Constitution expressly commits [most] questions of executive convenience
and expediency solely to Congress").
This Article urges that absolute immunity for constitutional torts should be unavailable without a statute creating and regulating the immunity. Since this position rests on the need to protect
constitutional rights, any existing absolute immunity for nonconsitutionaltorts would be unaffected. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (finding absolute immunity for a nonconstitutional tort); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498-99 (1896) (same). Moreover, a judicially
devised qualfied immunity for constitutional torts might not be affected because that immunity
may protect the fairness interests of individual officers rather than the institutional interests of the
Executive. It may be unfair to impose personal liability on an officer who had no reason to
believe that acts taken for the benefit of the public were unconstitutional. When creating a qualified immunity, therefore, the court might balance two sets of individual fairness interests, instead
of balancing individual against government interests. But cf. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
240-42 (1974) (emphasizing institutional interests in the recognition of a qualified immunity). No
individual fairness interest can exist, however, when the official knew or should have known that
his actions were unconstitutional. Thus, a claim of absolute immunity can be justified only by
finding that the efficient functioning of the executive branch outweighs the individual constitutional interests. This is a finding that should be made by Congress rather than by the Executive.
535. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). In some cases, however, there may also be a statutory cause of action against a federal
officer. The complaint in Fitzgerald, for example, asserted three causes of action: two based on
alleged statutory violations that arguably gave rise to an implied statutory right of action, and one
based on the first amendment. 457 U.S. at 740 & n.20.
536. In Bivens, for example, the Court seemed to rest its opinion on three propositions, each of
which involves the assessment of constitutional values rather than the determination of "legislative fact." First, the fourth amendment "guarantees to citizens of the United States the absolute
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures carried out by virtue of federal authority." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392
(1971). Second, "'t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.'" Id at 397 (quoting
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)). Third, "damages [historically] have
been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty." 403 U.S. at
395; see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 789 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
Although Justice Harlan stated in Bivens that the Court should weigh "policy considerations"
in recognizing constitutional tort actions, even his opinion ultimately depends on constitutional
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does not rest upon an equivalent decision of principle, but depends instead upon a debatable assessment of legislative fact. Underlying absolute immunity is a finding that government officials will not act with
sufficient vigor because of possible constitutional tort liability.5 37 This
conclusion, and the assessment of its relative importance compared to
individual rights, contains a large, irreducible element of factual judgment. If the court upholds an absolute immunity, it will necessarily
defer to one branch or another with respect to the assessment and
weighing of these factual issues. When Executive and individual constitutional interests are opposed, this assessment and weighing should
be undertaken by Congress in the first instance and not by the
Executive. 538

V. Conclusion
President Carter took office with rhetoric that presaged a degree of
collaboration and cooperation with Congress that would have been
unique among recent Administrations. The promise of the rhetoric,
however, was only partially fulfilled. The Administration's style
lacked the dominant concern for executive aggrandizement that
marked the Nixon administration, and the Carter administration did
values, such as the judiciary's "particular responsibility" to protect constitutional rights and the
importance of uniform federal law. 403 U.S. at 407, 409 (Harlan, J., concurring). Although later
cases observe that Bivens depended partially on the value of deterring future offenses, see, e.g.,
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 25 (1980), that factor is not mentioned prominently in the Bivens
opinion and the decision is justifiable without it.
537. Cf. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 580-81 (2d Cir. 1949) (noting that the fear of inhibiting vigorous executive action is the motive for an absolute tort immunity), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
949 (1950).
538. The Court in Fitzgerald considered tort immunity only and had no occasion to discuss
the extent of the President's criminal liability for acts committed during his term-a liability
which the Constitution acknowledges in the period following impeachment and removal. U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 3. After the Watergate affair, Congress was concerned that the potential criminal
liability of high executive officers might be ignored by a Justice Department under the President's
control. Therefore, Congress enacted the Ethics in Government Act, which requires the Attorney
General to appoint an independent special prosecutor to investigate criminal charges against the
President or other high level officials. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598 (Supp. V 1981). See generally
Kramer & Smith, The SpecialProsecutorAct. Proposalsfor1983, 66 MINN. L. REv. 963 (1982);
Simon, The Constitutionalityofthe SpecialProsecutorLaw, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 45 (1982). The
Carter administration supported the basic provisions of this legislation. See Special Prosecutor
Legislation: Hearingson H.R 2835 Be/ore the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice ofthe House Comn
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-23 (1977) (testimony of John M. Harmon, Acting Assistant Attorney General); Remarks by President Carter on Signing the Ethics in Government Act
into Law, 2 PUB. PAPERS: JIMMY CARTER 1854-55 (1978) (stating that the special prosecutor pro-

vision "is necessary in response to the lessons that we have learned to the embarrassment of our
country in the past"). After experience with the Act, Carter administration officials urged that the
statute be amended to narrow its coverage and otherwise reduce the stringency of its provisions.
See, e.g., Civiletti, Post-WatergateLegislation in Retrospect, 34 Sw. L.J. 1043, 1053-56 (1981).
Some of these suggestions were embodied in the Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598).
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accommodate congressional authority in several areas. In certain instances, however, President Carter asserted executive power as forcefully as other recent Presidents. In domestic affairs, he sought to
employ remote statutes in a manner that closely resembled an assertion
of "inherent" executive power. In foreign affairs, he made extensive
assertions of authority in terminating the Taiwan Mutual Defense
Treaty, seeking to rescue the hostages, and entering into the Iranian
accords. Moreover, in Snepp and other important cases the Carter administration claimed executive power to act against the constitutionally
protected interests of individuals without explicit statutory authority.
Although President Carter generally favored a more liberal information policy, his Administration invoked a broad state secrets privilege
against individuals seeking redress for alleged constitutional violations,
and the Administration argued for an absolute executive tort immunity
against constitutional claims.
In analyzing the separation of powers issues posed during the
Carter administration, this Article has employed three approaches.
First, basic policymaking authority ordinarily should be allocated to
Congress rather than to the President because of the former's representative and deliberative process. Accordingly, as the economic and social
significance of the policy decision increases, the need for congressional
participation also increases. This principle should be applied in both
domestic and foreign affairs, but because of its generality courts may
have to defer to executive judgments in certain doubtful cases. Ultimately, however, Congress has the authority to determine the allocation of power more precisely under -the necessary and proper clause.
Second, when Executive action threatens the constitutional rights of individuals, the action should be impermissible if it is not specifically
authorized by Congress. A legislative rule is necessary to mitigate the
danger of impermissible political motives and to reduce the likelihood
that a preliminary balancing by the Executive of government and individual interests will be distorted in favor of the Executive's interests.
Finally, this Article has argued that executive privileges and immunities ordinarily should be analyzed in light of the underlying values implicated by the privilege or immunity. When individual constitutional
rights are not at stake, the judiciary may balance competing interests,
subject to more explicit regulation by Congress. In contrast, an executive privilege or immunity that denies redress for a possible violation of
constitutional rights should not be recognized without explicit Congressional authorization.
From an historical perspective, an examination of the Carter ad-
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ministration also suggests some more general reflections. President
Carter was faced with severe internal and foreign crises; these crises
subjected him to intense political pressure which may have impelled
him to assert executive power for the purpose of achieving specific substantive ends. For example, President Carter acknowledged the pressures exerted on his Administration by inflation. The clearest example,
however, was the Iranian hostage crisis, an event that gave rise to four
of the major problems discussed in this Article: the attempted rescue,
the Iranian executive agreement, Agee's passport litigation, and the immigration controls on Iranian students. A grave political crisis of this
sort engenders pressure for strong executive action and tends to encourage the disregard of structural considerations. Promises given in
advance to observe structural limitations-the War Powers Resolution,
for example-may be overwhelmed by the pressures of the actual
event. In such cases, the promises need not be flatly repudiated; rather,
the Executive may give a narrow interpretation to their abstract terms.
Narrow interpretation may be coupled with a claim of exclusive competence to interpret the statutory regime. An Executive may believe in
general that structural limitations safeguard various forms of political
liberty. Nonetheless, because political attention and the pressure for
concrete results are focused on him, the President may feel compelled
to assert extensive power in the pursuit of a specific end regardless of
his general views on the importance of structural limitations.
A related point suggested by the history of this period is that one
must view the Executive's claims of self-restraint with great reserve.
Perhaps executive self-limitation may sometimes be effective. As lasting restrictions, however, the Carter administration's attempts at executive self-limitation were ineffectual. The Administration's Guidelines
on secrecy agreements, for example, lacked substance from the outset,
and the Guidelines and other limiting regulations were withdrawn
swiftly by the following Administration. Moreover, it seems likely that
such guidelines-even if they remain in effect-are also subject to the
pressures of individual cases, which may result in a narrow executive
interpretation of its own attempts at self-limitation.
Recognition of these factors leads to a conclusion that is related to
broader historical themes. The history of the Nixon administration
provides a contemporary illustration of the dangers that republican
theorists have seen historically in excessive executive power. The history of the Carter administration further suggests that, in order to mitigate those dangers, it is not sufficient to seek executive officers who
hold abstract views favorable to the limitation of executive power.
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When those individuals are subject to the pressures of executive office,
they can succumb to the apparent needs of the moment or pacify themselves with attempts at self-limitation that may well be ephemeral.
Moreover, in the absence of legislative guidance, the courts may not be
reliable in restraining executive power. The history of this period emphasizes that if executive policymaking authority is to be restricted,
these restrictions must be imposed by clear and sustained legislative
action, rather than by reliance on executive forbearance or self-limitation by even the most willing and accommodating executive officers.
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